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ABSTRACT 
 
The wave of mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa highlighted the crucial 
role of information communication technologies in mobilization and political change. Debate 
among scholars revolved around the Internet’s potential for toppling authoritarian regimes. 
However, rather than seeing the Arab Spring as a direct result of social media, this study 
examines how the online and offline media strategies converged, interacted, or prevailed within 
the various socioeconomic and political contexts. It looks at the purposes and functions of each 
medium, with a discussion of the dialectical relationship between them.   
Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in Morocco, as well as a critical examination of the 
movement’s communications, this study contributes to the debate about the role of social media 
  
and the Arab Spring.  It analyzes an Arab Spring movement that did not call for regime change, 
investigates relationships between the activists’ use of online and offline media, and examines 
the multiple forms of communication flows in meaning making and nation building within 
dominant and non-dominant Moroccan publics.  Finally, the study explores how the February 
20th movement’s communication approaches functioned within the historical, cultural, and 
sociopolitical context of Morocco in the present day.  
 The findings show that the activists generally relied on the online social platforms to 
respond to state allegations against the movement, counter hegemonic practices of the state, and 
to mobilize followers both locally and internationally.  While the online environment helped set 
the agenda for political discussion, it was also, unable, on its own, to mobilize the Moroccan 
people to the streets.  Online platforms simply could not substitute for traditional offline 
communication, with the result that the activists had to utilize both online and offline 
communication channels.  Dismissing the notion that a homogenous Moroccan communication 
strategy prevailed in the February 20th movement, the demographic and political contexts in 
specific cities played a major role in the choice of communication platforms or messages.    The 
study found the activists relied on offline communication strategies, with a particular focus on 
aesthetic practices to mobilize the subaltern publics. Through implentation of various cultural 
and linguistic practices, the movement worked to reformulate the traditional concepts of nation 
and state, create a shared history of oppression and resistance, and envision a new era of 
participatory politics.  
Index Words: social media, February 20th movement, online media, offline media, dialectics, 
aesthetics, subaltern publics, aesthetic protests 
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Study 
The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010 symbolically ignited 
massive demonstrations within Tunisia that prompted the official resignation of President Ben 
Ali 28 days later.  The tragic act of defiance unleashed anger across the region and Bouazizi 
became a national symbol for the youth's hopelessness, misery, and desperation (Ben Yahmed, 
2011).  The 26-year-old street vendor from Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia set himself on fire in desperate 
protest against police humiliation and confiscation of his produce cart (Dabashi, 2012).  His 
tragic death generated “a region-wide wave of sympathy, an empathy that was quickly politicized 
by the mass recognition of his desperation . . .[and] the long-term failure of Arab states to deliver 
on promises of citizenship, political freedom, and economic development" (Dodge, 2012, p. 5). 
 The fall of the long term Tunisian dictator empowered and emboldened youth in the 
region and galvanized popular political action in Egypt.  Contributing to the growth of the 
Egyptian movement were the online activities of 31-year-old Google marketing executive Wael 
Ghonim.  Ghonim’s “We are all Khaled Said” site commemorated a blogger who Egyptian police 
had murdered in 2010.  Ghonim (2012) used his Facebook page to raise public awareness about 
police brutality, corruption, and the lack of democracy in Egypt.  He sent one simple message: 
“Today they killed Khaled.  If I don't act for his sake, tomorrow they will kill me . . . Egyptians, 
my justice is in your hands” (p. 60).  The site quickly gathered thousands of online members and 
became one of the most popular dissident Facebook groups in Egypt (Lim, 2012).  The resulting 
Facebook group provided the diaspora with an online platform where they could connect to the 
issues facing Egyptians day to day and to participate with their fellow citizens.  As such, it 
created domestic and transnational networks that exerted pressure on the elites (Lawson, 2012).  
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Many Egyptians identified with the use of the first person call (i.e., “We are all Khaled 
Said”) on the Ghomin site.  Thousands of people mobilized, took to the street, and protested 
against police brutality.  Protestors carried posters of a smiling young Khaled Said juxtaposed 
with his battered corpse (Wright, 2011).  Affiliated groups organized several silent protests 
involving thousands of Egyptians, including the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed 
ElBaradei (Lim, 2012).  The “We are all Khaled Said” movement intensified the emotions of 
anger, frustration, and resentment against the Mubarak regime (Lim, 2012).  Activists used Said’s 
brutal death as a representative anecdote to encourage a collective fight against corruption and 
police brutality and to engage disaffected youth in the cause of political change.  
The Arab Spring serves as a powerful example of the people’s power, creating a new 
youth synergy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  A wave of protests and 
demonstrations swept the region producing a domino effect where young people demanded their 
governments provide political, economic and social reforms.  Shared years of repression, high 
unemployment, food inflation, corruption, poor living conditions, human rights abuses and lack 
of political freedom in the region triggered revolutionary waves of protests (Frangonikolopoulos 
& Chapsos, 2012; Nashashibi, 2012).  Thousands of people poured into the streets and demanded 
the fall of their regimes.  In a period of just six months, the geopolitical map of MENA 
drastically changed (Dabashi, 2012).  As the vast protests in Tunisia (one of smallest in the 
MENA region in terms of territory and population) and in Egypt (one of the largest countries in 
the region) succeeded in toppling autocratic regimes and dictatorial governments, similar mass 
movements spread throughout the Arab world in the hopes of breaking the chains of fear and 
oppression.  
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The Arab Spring empowered and promoted political and civil liberties in the Middle East 
and North Africa.  As Agathengelou and Soguk (2011) eloquently stated, "these regions and 
peoples, once bracketed as ‘traditional’ and lacking agentic visions, and hence having no ability 
to chart the course of their communities, let alone to change and shape their world, are now 
making a visible and audible claim to global just politics” (p.552).  Ordinary people challenged 
societal taboos, governmental establishments, and demanded political changes from their leaders.   
One key group empowered by the Arab Spring was women, who defied their stereotypes 
as helpless victims of oppressive patriarchies.  As Nada Darwazah of the UN Human Rights 
Middle East Office argued, "The Arab uprising has at long last empowered women to claim a 
larger presence and role in the public arena, which is something revolutionary, and somehow 
contrary to decades of gender stereotyping" (United Nations-Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, n.d., para. 2).  In fact, the Arab spring unveiled “numerous examples of 
courageous Arab women heroes risking not only their reputation but also their physical safety for 
the sake of reform” (Al-Malki et al., 2012, p.81).  The Arab Spring brought about a new era of 
possible opportunities for female citizens in the Arab world. 
This sweeping wave of political upheaval of the Arab Spring also fundamentally altered 
the region’s interactions with global powers.  It toppled regimes, realigned states for geopolitical 
interests, and showed the limitations of American power in the Middle East (Agahthangeloui & 
Soguk, 2011; Keiswetter, 2012).  The geopolitical changes and revolutionary forces threatened 
western domination of the region (Dabashi, 2012), as the western policy of containment and 
backing of Arab autocrats in the interest of stability had proven to be a failure (Human Rights 
Watch World Report, 2012).  The unprecedented show of the people’s power to remove Arab 
dictators through grassroots popular revolts "shattered the familiar presumption that only a 
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western European or a North American is the authentic agent of direct (i.e. unmediated) 
democracy and political change" (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2011, p. 552).  The Arab Spring thus 
became a historic moment in MENA's history rich with the promise of reform and democracy.   
Whether a temporary phenomenon or a lasting impetus for change, the Arab Spring 
fundamentally altered the internal political landscape in the MENA region.  Autocratic presidents 
in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya lost their positions as they tried to cling to the status quo. 
Constitutional monarchies, like the one in Bahrain, relied upon financial backing from the United 
States and Saudi Arabia to suppress its popular uprising with heavy violence.  Some monarchical 
governments, such as those leading Morocco, Jordan, and the Gulf States, accommodated some 
of the citizen movements’ demands.  For example, in Saudi Arabia, the regime pacified the 
domestic unrest with a reform package worth over $150 billion and granted Saudi women the 
right to vote in the 2015 municipal elections (Lawson, 2012).  In Morocco, King Mohammed VI 
allowed the people to vote in a national referendum on a revised constitution that purportedly 
curbed his powers and called for the official recognition of the Amazigh languages.  In Jordan, 
King Abduallah dismissed the unpopular government of Samir Rifai, which led to an electoral 
commission.  However, in both the cases of Jordan and Morocco, the Kings’ executive powers 
remained effectively undiminished (Dalacoura, 2012).   
Though the Arab Spring has brought many positive changes, the rapid and expected 
social and political transformations in the region have proven difficult.  Both internal and 
external actors have employed a sectarian narrative to advance their own geostrategic and 
political interests.  The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has emerged as a central factor in fueling 
sectarian tensions.  The balance of power in Iraq shifted, providing an opportunity for Iran to 
project its influence in the Levant and deepen its ties with the Assad regime and Hezbollah in 
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Lebanon.  As a result Saudi Arabia and Iran are now battling for regional supremacy, as the 
events in Yemen and Syria make evident.  Yemen is on the verge of a civil war in the aftermath 
of the Houthis takeover.  Saudi Arabia and a wide coalition of Gulf countries, including Egypt, 
Sudan, Morocco, and Jordan, are bombing Yemen.  In Syria, a flow of weapons and money to 
Sunni rebel groups from foreign nations (e.g., the United States, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia) continues.  On the other hand, Russia, Iran and Iraq are assisting the Assad regime with 
weapons, money, and militia.  Consequently, sectarian fighting between the Sunnis and Shia has 
overshadowed and forestalled regional political reforms. 
Furthermore, severe challenges still face the people in their day-to-day quest for safety 
and freedom.  In Egypt, another military dictatorship has replaced the Mubarek regime.  In Syria, 
the civil war is entering its fifth year, leaving more than 220,000 dead, and more than half of the 
country’s population displaced as a result of the ongoing violence (United Nations-Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015).  In 2011, public opinion polls in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE found a public divided between those who thought 
the region “was better off” and others who thought it was “too early to tell” (Zogby International, 
2011).  In 2014, polls in these same countries found that the number of those who thought the 
region was worse off had more than doubled (Zogby Research Services, 2014).  The initial, 
simplified notion of a single Arab Spring trajectory has now developed into a much more 
complex narrative that highlights the differences in the trajectories at work within each country.   
The international media provided oversimplified explanations for the factors giving rise 
of the Arab Spring movement.  Articles in major western newspapers highlighted the democratic 
role of social media in the Arab Spring rather than presenting a more nuanced understanding of 
the historical, sociopolitical and cultural context that gave rise to the protest movements.  For 
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example, one headline in the New York Times described the Egyptian Revolution as “Spring 
Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook” (Vargas, 2012).  Similarly, the 
BBC correspondent Paul Mason (2011) wrote in the Guardian, “Technology has expanded the 
power of the individual-their sense of injustice, social and personal- and the whole recent history 
of revolt, from Iran to Egypt to the French banlieues, is driven by this” (para. 16).  Hugh 
Tomlinson (2011) wrote in the London Times that the contribution of social media had become 
one of the most persuasive narratives around the Arab Spring.  Another London Times columnist 
wrote, “The Arabs finally understood the power of new media” (Binyon, 2011, p. 6-7).  As Cottle 
(2011) argued, the failure of international media to cover collective dissent in the Middle East 
prior to the Arab Spring (e.g. the Kefaya movement between 2004-2007 and the 12 hours of the 
2003 protests in Tahir) contributed to situating the Arab Spring as a series of sudden and 
spontaneous revolutions divorced from the region’s historical and political contexts.  
Communication Approaches to the Arab Spring 
Prior to the 2011 Arab uprising, communication scholars began to examine the 
relationship between the increasing penetration rate of Information Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) and the democratization reform process within MENA (e.g., Eickelman & Anderson 
2003; Seib, 2007).  A key factor motivating the study of social media in the Arab world was the 
fact that a majority of the MENA population was under the age of thirty and was increasingly 
savvy with technology.  The Arab region has more than 135 million Internet users with an 
average annual growth rate of close to 30 percent (Mohammed Bin Rashid School of 
Government, 2014) and a regional mobile penetration rate of 110 percent (Mohammed Bin 
Rashid School of Government, 2014).  From 2010 to 2011, the total number of Facebook users in 
the region has doubled (Dubai School of Government, 2011).  Countries like the UAE, Bahrain, 
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Qatar, and Kuwait have penetration rates above 50 percent, while the average regional rate stands 
around 28 percent (Dubai School of Government, 2012).  Youth between the ages of 15 and 29 
make up 70 percent of Facebook users in the Arab World (Dubai School of Government, 2012).  
Most pre-Arab Spring communication scholarship concluded that ICTs would facilitate 
the growth of democracy in the MENA region.  Disregarding claims that low Internet penetration 
rates would cause ICTs to fail to reach mass audiences, for example, Howard (2010) argued that 
communication technologies enabled democratic change in Muslim countries due to content 
distribution between networks of family and friends.  Other communication and media scholars 
maintained that social media gradually increased the pressure for democratization and reforms 
due to broader citizen access to independent news (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003; Lynch, 2006).  
However, none of the earlier studies predicted that social media would play a "significant and 
protagonist role in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes" (Frangonikolopoulos & Chapsos, 
2012, p.10).  
Since 2011, many studies of the Arab Spring have concluded that ICTs were one of the 
major contributing factors to the rise of the revolutions (e.g. Allagui & Kuebler, 2011; Aouragh 
& Alexander, 2011; Castells, 2012; Cottle, 2011; El Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; 
Frangonikolopous & Chapsos, 2012; Ghonim, 2012, Howard & Hussain, 2011; Khamis, 2011; 
Lim, 2012; Stepanova, 2011; Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  Such studies enumerated the benefits and 
democratic potential of ICTs, some going so far as to dub it “Revolutions 2.0,” the “Facebook 
Revolution," and the "Twitter Revolution”.  For example, the Project on Information Technology 
and Political Islam (2011) concluded that social media played a central role in shaping political 
debates, often preceded major events on the ground, and helped spread democratic ideas across 
international borders.  In the Role of Digital Media, Howard and Hussain (2011) adopted a 
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similar perspective:  “There are many ways to tell the story of political change.  But one of the 
most consistent narratives from civil society leaders in Arab countries has been that the Internet, 
mobile phone, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter made the difference this time” (p. 
35).  Howard and Hussain maintained that new media transformed localized and individualized 
dissent into a structured, organized movement that mobilized for a common cause.  
By selectively focusing on the Arab Spring as a social media phenomenon, some 
communication scholars and media outlets falsely positioned technology as the single driver of 
social change.  The excitement around web 2.0 platforms led Mark Pfeifle, former U.S. National 
Security Advisor, to call for nominators to consider Twitter for the Nobel Peace Prize 
(Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014).  Given that only a small group of online users generated a 
significant amount of content (Wilson & Dunn, 2011), an overly deterministic perspective is 
misleading, as no direct correlation exists between the spread of online social media and the 
tendency for social protests (Stepanova, 2011).  The Arab Spring revolutions did not happen 
exclusively in cyberspace; activists had to move beyond Facebook pages and tweets.  People had 
to be willing to be physically present in the streets and put their own lives at risk to demand that 
their governments meet their goals (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2011; Khoury, 2011).   
Other communication scholars openly denounced deterministic views of social media in 
the Arab Spring, but still depended on those same platforms as the basis of their research.  For 
example, Della Ratta and Valeriani (2012) explicitly rejected the view that the Arab Spring was 
Internet-determined or exclusively Internet-based, but their analysis still used online platforms, 
web application features, and Arab tech savvies as the central components of their study’s 
methodology.   
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Nuancing the simplistic assumption by some that social media alone spawned the Arab 
Spring, communication studies have begun to document the various roles ICTs did play in the 
Arab Spring.  ICTs helped organize, disseminate information and raise public awareness about 
critical issues facing the country  (El Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; Frangonikolopoulos & Chapsos, 
2012; Kurzman, 2011; Lynch, 2011; Stepanova, 2011; Youmans & York, 2012), create emotional 
bonds (Castells, 2012; Frangonikolopoulos & Chapsos, 2012; Ghonim, 2012; Howard and 
Hussain, 2011; Lim, 2012), form networks of affinity and solidarity (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011; 
Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2012; Ghonim 2012), function as platforms for political contestation 
enabling the exchange of civic discourse (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; El- Nawawy & Khamis, 
2012; Ghonim 2012; Khamis, 2011, Lim, 2012; Lynch, 2011), serve as a mobilizing tool (El 
Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; Ghonim 2012, Khondker, 2011; Lim, 
2012; Lynch, 2011), and act as a media watchdog to engage the international audience (Cottle & 
Libby, 2011; Lynch, 2011; Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  In sum, the lower cost of entry invited 
participation from local and transnational networks, built solidarity, and generated feelings of 
identification among online users. 
That said, those who study communication approaches to the Arab Spring need to move 
beyond the debate on the democratic revolutionary nature of the Internet (Aouragh & Alexander, 
2011), recognizing that not all platforms of cyberactivism will be equally successful as catalysts 
for political change (El Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; Moharan-Martin, 2000; Rodriguez, Ferron & 
Shamas, 2014).  While Internet tools are a powerful force in disseminating information and may 
serve as accelerating factors of social protests, different sociopolitical factions may utilize these 
very same tools for different political purposes.  Revolutionaries and authoritarian regimes alike 
use social media to serve political goals of (Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014; Youmans & 
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York, 2012).  Further, youth in the MENA region utilize other forms of creative media and 
alternative communication channels to ignite public mobilization and civic engagement from 
below.    
For successful mobilization and change, Arab Spring activists had to establish strong ties 
beyond the sphere of online communication (Tarkowski, Fathy & Melyantsou, 2011).  Mosques, 
soccer fields, coffee shops and cabs widened oppositional networks and complement urban social 
elite networks, serving as crucial spaces for information dissemination (Lim, 2012). According to 
Tufeki and Wilson’s (2012) study, which focused on the relationship between social media and 
the decision to participate in political protest, 48.4 percent of participants heard about Tahrir 
Square demonstrations through face-to-face communication, 28.3 percent through Facebook, and 
13.1 percent through the telephone.  Activists engaged in a wide range of outreach tools that 
were not technologically driven, such as, flyers, pamphlets, music, visual images, re-
appropriated national symbols, and other aesthetic forms of protest to reclaim the streets. 
Description and Significance of the Project 
This research study will contribute to the debate about the role of social media and the 
Arab Spring by analyzing Morocco’s February 20th movement’s use of online and offline 
communication messaging strategies.  It investigates the purposes and usage of these mediums 
and the dialectical relationship between them.  The study uses a qualitative, multi-method 
approach that includes interviews with senior strategists of the February 20th movement, on-site 
observations of movement events in Morocco, a rhetorical analysis of the online and offline 
communications, and a deep analysis of the political, historical, and cultural context.  It explores 
the social movement’s approach for building a collective identity for mobilization and the 
transformation of the overall social structure to strengthen citizenship rights.  The study will 
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expand the definition of social and emerging media to privilege situated experiences and 
indigenous production of knowledge.  As such, it will offer a more nuanced analysis of social 
movements’ consumption, production, and circulation of emerging new and social media and its 
relationships within cultural, social, and political context.    
As will be discussed below, the study expands understandings of the Arab Spring in four 
ways.  First, it shifts the focus on Arab Spring communication studies to a movement that did not 
call for regime change.  It gives greater attention to a nation state that remained stable and 
evaluates how creative nodes of political and social possibilities could help avoid violent, future 
outcomes.  Second, it investigates relationships between the activists’ use of online and offline 
media(s).  Third, it discusses the strategic targeting of subaltern populations to create meaning 
and encourage participatory politics from below.  Finally, it expands on previous studies of the 
February 20th movement by examining how the social activists in the February 20th movement 
challenged the hegemonic system, how they utilized particular communication channels for 
specific purposes, and how they worked to mobilize subaltern publics.  Through these advances 
it will lay the foundation for the development of a new theoretical framework more suitable for 
future studies of social media in MENA social movements.  
Moving beyond Regime Change Studies of the Arab Spring   
Most communication studies examining the role of social media in the Arab Spring have 
focused on the experiences of countries that sought a regime change (e.g., Allagui & Kuebler, 
2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Della Ratta & Valeriani, 2012;  Howard, Duffy, Freelon, 
Hussain, Mari & Marzaid, 2011; Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; 
Khamis & Vaughn, 2012; Lim 2012; Stepanova, 2011; Tawkoski, Fathy & Melyantsou, 2011; 
Valeriani, 2011; Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  To date, the majority of the field’s studies on the Arab 
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Spring have focused on Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria to illustrate the potentials and limitations 
of cyberactivism in promoting mobilization and sociopolitical change.  While most of these 
studies examine MENA countries that did experience leadership turnover, a few have focused on 
the Syrian government, where the regime retains its power through brutal violence and 
repression (Della Ratta & Valeriani, 2012; Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012).  The studies on the 
Syrian movement have evaluated the evolutionary stage of the tech culture (Della Ratta & 
Valeriani, 2012) and the role of the Internet in information sharing and mobilizing the Syrian 
people (Della Ratta & Valeriani, 2012; Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012).  One study compared the 
Arab Spring experiences in Egypt and Syria by examining both the responses of the activists and 
the regimes to their country’s respective communication strategies and by analyzing how 
political activists used both ICTs and traditional offline media communication to promote citizen 
journalism, mobilize, and combat repression (Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012).   
 Although the Arab Spring collectively did mark a power shift and the end of stability for 
several authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, its character defies any single, 
homogenous interpretation.  As Anderson (2011) states, “Tempting as it is to treat the Arab 
uprisings as a single movement, their causes and future missions demonstrate the many 
variations between them” (p.6).  The revolutions that occurred within various states reflected 
divergent economic grievances and sociopolitical dynamics (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011; Anderson, 
2011).   
Examining protest movements that did not call for a regime change is important for 
understanding long-term changes and mobilizations in the region.  As Fanon (1967) reminds us, 
liberation is more than a physical removal of a dictator; political and social consciousness is of 
utmost importance.  Because the post-revolutionary democratic transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, 
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Yemen, and Libya have been fragile and may be short-lived, a better understanding of how 
communication strategies function in movements focusing on internal, long-term institutional 
reforms seems warranted.  Nation building strategies, participatory politics, and identity politics 
are all avenues of understanding that could result from a focus on long-term political changes.  
The context of communication and messaging strategies operating in movements that did 
not ask for regime change is also arguably different from ones that called for government 
overthrow.  Movements that worked within nations run by monarchies that accepted reform 
instead of regime-based remedies worked from a different contextual framework than their Arab 
Spring counterparts.  For example, monarchies have historically employed a ritualization of 
political discourse that hinders an opposition’s mobilization capabilities.  Monarchies rely on 
symbols and rituals, rather than domination through violence, to legitimize and strengthen their 
regimes (Daadaoui, 2011).  Because of a ritualized and, at times, sacred monarchical public 
sphere, engrained norms have and continue to function as a unique rhetorical exigency.  Within 
such a context, activists must employ discursive strategies in creative and unique ways in order 
to dislodge the authoritarian constraints.   
This study shifts the focus on the Arab Spring communication studies to a movement that 
did not call for regime change.  The study will analyze how the February 20th movement in 
Morocco deployed a combination of direct and indirect communication strategies to dislodge 
authoritarian constrains while still acknowledging and sustaining monarchical authority.  Further, 
the study will examine the various interactions between the state and the February 20th 
movement, demonstrating how the actions of each one prompted reactions by the other.  The 
study will add to the Arab Spring communication scholarship by not only examining a movement 
that did not call for regime change, but by also examining the communication strategies of the 
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movement in context to the political context within which it operated. The study will illustrate 
the continuous hegemonic and counterhegemonic responses and struggle between the state and 
the monarchy.  
Moving beyond Online/Offline Binaries in Studies of the Arab Spring 
Most studies of communication strategies and Arab Spring movements have also limited 
their focus to online strategies rather than explore the dialectical, interdependent interactions 
between online and offline media (e.g. Allagui & Kuebler, 2011; Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; 
Castells, 2012; Cottle, 2011; El Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; Frangonikolopous & Chapsos, 2012; 
Ghonim, 2012, Howard & Hussain, 2011; Khamis, 2011; Lim, 2012; Stepanova, 2011; Wilson & 
Dunn, 2011).  Yet, some scholars have recognized that because Arab Spring activists wanted to 
ensure their followers had a continuous flow of content, they constantly shifted from one media 
platform to the next (Aouragh & Alexander, 2012).  Of the few studies that have examined the 
interdependent relationship between online and offline media, the authors generally relied on 
anecdotal accounts without indicating if they employed a systematic, empirically-based model to 
reach their conclusions.  These same studies also generally limited their focus to traditional 
forms of offline media such as face-to-face communication, pamphlets, brochures, public places, 
and mobile phones (e.g., Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Lim, 2012; Tarkowski, Fathy, Melyantsou, 
2011; Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  Recognizing that the Egyptian regime used online platforms to 
monitor, defame, and attack the opposition, for example, Tarkowski, Fathy & Melyantsou (2011) 
reported that activists widely circulated an Egyptian Arabic pamphlet on how to protest 
intelligently.  It explicitly warned readers not to use social media such as Facebook and Twitter 
to divert the Egyptian security forces (Lawson, 2012).  Further, Khamis, Gold, & Vaughn (2012) 
reported that Syrian activists used mobile phones, cameras, tapes, and laptops to document state 
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repression and violence.  Aware of state surveillance, activists in both countries relied on 
traditional offline media to divert security forces and mobilize their targeted public. 
A dialectical understanding of Arab Spring movements’ use of online and offline media is 
important for several reasons.  It eschews technological determinism by avoiding fetishization of 
social media and instead highlights the relationship between technology, political economy, and 
social relations (Aouragh, 2012; Hirst 2012).  Further, it demonstrates that how protest 
movements can utilize online and offline platforms as extensions of one another.  It highlights 
the complex interrelationships and negotiations between the two mediums, as well as 
highlighting the activists’ reasons for deploying message strategies across various channels 
within the communication mosaic.  
This study systematically examines how and why the online and offline media strategies 
converged, interacted, or prevailed within various socioeconomic and political contexts.  The 
study maps the full terrain of communication strategies that February 20th activists utilized to 
accomplish social change.  It expands the definition of social media to include nontraditional 
forms of offline communication strategies.  It looks at aesthetic offline practices of the February 
20th movement, such as music, story telling, street theater, slogans, movies, and film.  It 
addresses the reasons behind the activist’s choice of adopting particular media channels, the 
various emerging contexts of particular technologies, and the domestication of the Internet to 
address local issues (e.g., use of local dialects).  By discussing a fuller range of media channels 
that the movement’s senior strategies utilized, it provides a more holistic approach for 
understanding the dialectical relationship between online and offline media, and how those 
interactions functioned and competed within local contexts. 
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Moving beyond Educated, and Wired Populations in Studies of the Arab Spring 
Previous studies examining the Arab Spring and social media have primarily featured the 
impact of movement strategies on urban, wired, young, and educated segments of the 
populations (e.g., El Nawawy & Khamis, 2012; Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012; Lim, 2012; 
Salime 2012; Valeriani, 2011).  As an example, Wilson & Dunn (2011) interviewed respondents 
from Tahir who were predominantly male (75.5%), young (under the age of thirty), well 
educated (77% reported some kind of college degree) and had wide access to Internet (80.4% 
access in their homes and 50.1% in their phones).  Regional surveys examining social media in 
the Arab Spring have also concluded that the majority of the online social media sites users were 
under the age of thirty, urban, and relatively educated (e.g. Dubai School of Government, 2011; 
“Profils des utilsateurs de Reseaux Sociaux au Maroc,” 2012; Wilson & Dunn, 2011). 
Despite the obvious value of this previous work, such studies risk ignoring the region’s 
high illiteracy rates, its digital divide, and the fact that the majority of the population in the Arab 
world is neither wired nor urban.  As Tarkowski, Fathy & Melyantsou (2011) argued, 
communication studies generally ignore the poor and unwired people that risked their lives and 
fought the police and military troops to enable the opening of Tahrir Square.  The example of 
Egyptian Facebook activists is instructive as, despite their influence in public political discourse, 
these activists still represent only a small fraction of the population (Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 
2012).  Outside of Tahrir Square, Casablanca, and Tunis, the field of communication studies does 
not yet know how movement strategists interacted with citizens from rural, less cosmopolitan 
segments of society and what form of media were most popular in those areas. 
Even though previous studies of social media in the Arab Spring map out contextual 
social media usage, they have not examined the different sociopolitical and cultural inclusions 
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and exclusions that arose within the protest movements.  High fragmentation and internal civil 
strife make a broader perspective particularly important in a post-revolutionary context.  By 
focusing on dominant audiences in high profile national and transnational events, scholars can 
misrepresent or ignore non-dominant publics or the subaltern class altogether.  The inclusion of 
strategies designed to target broader segments of the population in the Arab Spring movements is 
needed to address adequately the cultural and political impact the media environment has on the 
different publics.  In her analysis of the Egypt protest movement, Rabab El Mahdi explained the 
need to include subaltern groups: 
[T]he underlying message here is that it these “middle-class” educated youth (read: 
modern) are not “terrorists,” they hold the same values as “us” (the democratic West), 
and finally use the same tools (Facebook and twitter) that “we” invented and use in our 
daily-lives. They are just like “us” and hence they deserve celebration.  These 
constructions are clear from a quick look the CNN, Time, Vanity Fair and others 
representations of the so-called leaders or icons of this revolution.  They are all middle 
(upper) class Egyptians under the age of thirty.  Most of them have one or more 
connection to the West, either by virtue of education (Time’s cover feature of seven 
“youth,” included three students from the American University in Cairo), work (e.g. Wael 
Ghoneim, sales manager at Google), or training . . . Thus the class composition of dissent 
has been cloaked by a new imaginary homogenous construct called “youth.”  In this 
construct, the media and academic analysts lump together the contradictory and often 
conflictual interests of “yuppies” (young, urban, professionals of the aforementioned 
connections and backgrounds) with those of the unemployed, who live under the poverty 
line in rural areas and slum-areas.  Under this banner of “youth” the “yuppies” and upper 
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middle-class young people are portrayed as the quintessential representative of this 
uprising (2011, par, 2). 
Amin (2008) and Kraidy (2008) agreed, arguing that more theoretical and empirically grounded 
research on Arab audiences is necessary to capture the viewing habits and preferences of lower 
income segments that make up the vast majority of the population.  By taking a broader look at 
the communication strategies targeting particular audiences, scholars can more adequately 
address the cultural impact of changing media environment on the different publics.    
 Studies of social media and the Arab Spring should not ignore the political reality of poor 
urban and rural populations, as democracy frequently most often cannot take root without the 
participation of these groups.  Many studies of the Arab Spring presuppose a homogenous 
populace that serves as the target population for the movement.  However, cultures are 
polyvocal, multilayered, fractured, and decentered.  By taking a broader look at how 
communication strategies target particular audiences, communication scholars can more 
adequately address the cultural impact of changing media environment on the different, and often 
disparate, publics.   
This study adds to the Arab Spring communication literature by exploring how the 
February 20th movement’s senior strategies targeted marginalized publics.  No previous study has 
systematically analyzed how the February 20th movement deployed communication media or 
message strategies to reach the diverse segments of the population.  This study does not treat the 
Moroccan public as one homogenous public and places emphasis on strategies that targeted the 
marginalized poor and urban publics.   It examines the localized context of the struggle and their 
effect on imbalanced flows of communication, identifying factors that led to participatory gaps. 
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This study adds to the current literature on the Arab Spring and social media by examining 
activists’ media strategies towards these marginalized segments of the population.  
Moving beyond the Current Studies of the February 20th Movement 
Most previous studies that analyze the February 20th movement in particular have 
focused on political openings that gave rise to collective action, changes within formal state 
institutions, and the 2011 constitutional reforms.  Drawing on structural theories of movement 
mobilization, each of these efforts has concentrated on political opportunities, resource 
availability, and state structures (e.g., Daadaoui, 2011; Dalmasso, 2010; Dalmasso & Cavarorta, 
2011; Maghraoui, 2012; Molina, 2011).   Dalmasso (2012), for example, highlighted the electoral 
victory of the Islamist party Justice and Development (PJD) as a meaningful first step toward 
successful Moroccan political reform, as the King retreated from the political sphere, allowed the 
parliamentary elections to take place, and accepted a restructuring of the political parties.  
Molina (2011), however, characterized the resulting constitutional reforms as cosmetic, 
concluding that no substantial change would be forthcoming.  Maghraoui (2011) argued that the 
lack of a genuine constituent assembly demonstrated the weakness of the current fragmentation 
of political parties and the hegemonic control the King still had over the political process.  All of 
these studies assessed the genuineness of the country’s political reforms, stressing how the 
Moroccan regime worked to defeat the opposition.  None of these studies examined the 
communication strategies and specific historical and cultural contexts within which the 
movements produced and circulated their messages.  Further, these studies did not examine how 
the communication approaches worked to mobilize, build collectivity, or counter hegemonic 
forces. 
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Four previous studies have examined the February 20th movement from a non-structural 
perspective, emphasizing cultural modes of expression and culture.  One (Salime, 2012) focused 
on gender dynamics exclusively while two others (Salime, 2011; Abadi, 2013) analyzed 
underground hip-hop as form of resistance.  To date, Hoffmann & Kong (2013) conducted 
perhaps the most comprehensive study of the movement’s communication strategies.  They 
identified four frames to encompass the movement’s demands:  individual freedoms, freedom 
from repression, social and economic justice, and political rights.  While an excellent first step 
towards understanding the movement’s overarching goals, Hoffman and Kong’s analysis ignored 
other key aspects of the communication process such as target audiences, communication 
channels, and message strategies.  
This study augments these previous findings by examining the February 20th movement 
from a strategic communication perspective.  The study’s multi-qualitative method approach 
examines the February 20th movement multiple forms of protests and resistance, with particular 
emphasis on how each interacted with particular political and cultural contexts.  Further, the 
study analyzes the movement’s message strategies for particular, target audiences.  It explores 
various communication channels and how they complemented one another to maximize the reach 
of the movement.  Finally, it explores how the movement’s communication approaches 
functioned within the historical, cultural, and socio-political context of Morocco in the present 
day.  Such an approach not only allows for greater understanding of the historical roots of the 
February 20th movement; it provides insights that have use for future movements seeking non-
violent approaches to political reform.    
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Research Questions 
 To gain further insights into non-regime change movements of the Arab Spring and how 
they operated within the monarchal context of the February 20th movement, this study 
specifically addresses the following: 
1. What historical, socio-political, and cultural factors situated the rise of the February 20th 
movement? 
2. What online and offline mediums did activists in the February 20th movement use to 
reach different segments of the Moroccan population?  
3.  Did the February 20th movement’s activists use online and offline communication 
messaging strategies to mobilize the subaltern?  If so, how? 
4. Did a dialectical relationship exist between the activists' use of online and offline 
mediums?  If so, how did the interactions function within local contexts? 
Method of Analysis 
To explore these questions, this study focuses on the first five months of the February 20th 
movement, as most of the movement’s major milestones occurred during this period.  Beginning 
in February 2011, the movement first distributed videos outlining their grievances, made 
demands, organized protests, and held massive demonstrations across the country.  On March 9, 
2011, the King Mohammed VI responded by addressing the nation through a historic televised 
speech announcing his plan for constitutional reform.  He spoke to the nation a second time on 
June 17, 2011 to announce a national referendum.  During that same month, the movement 
released another video calling for a boycott of the national referendum and mass protests 
throughout the Moroccan kingdom.  On July 1, Morocco held a national referendum and the 
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citizens overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution.  As such, the study’s focus on the February 
to June 2011 period covers the rise and early impact of the movement.  
To examine the communication strategies of the February 20th movement, the study 
utilizes a multi-method approach.  It includes a contextual analysis of the historical, socio-
political, and cultural factors operating in Morocco during the rise of the February 20th 
movement, interviews with the movement’s senior communication strategists and key activists 
that brought attention to the movement, public event observations, and an analysis of the 
movement’s communication strategies as they appeared on the movement’s main website, 
Mamfakinch.   
Examining the genealogy of multimodal discourses and the power constellations that 
shaped them, this study explores the complex flow of images, narratives, languages, and symbols 
within the socio-political Moroccan context.  This study relies on Foucault’s (1977; 1989; 2000) 
notions of power and knowledge to map the February 20th movement communication strategies 
and how the activists used them to disrupt hegemonic discourses and practices.  Foucault’s 
unique conceptualization of power enabled an accounting of the ordinary diffusion, enactment, 
and contestation of power (Golob & Gilles, 2013; Keller, 2005).  For Foucault (2010), events and 
discourses functioned as vehicles of economies of power to create new networks and regimes of 
knowledge that is supported by funding agencies and institutions of power.  Such forms of social 
production occurred by constructing “truths” about the natural and social worlds, which 
eventually citizens receive and begin to take for granted.  Truth has a circular relationship with 
systems of power, which becomes an object of diffusion and consumption.  This study applies 
Foucault’s concept of discursive practices to map out the February 20th movement’s 
communication strategies to the state’s responses.  The study examines how language and 
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discursive social practices express power relationships, placing an emphasis on the social 
contexts in which systems of knowledge and practices emerged as permissible or changed. 
Specifically, I will attend to the ways in which power both inhibits and enables February 20th 
movement participants.  
Contextualizing the February 20th Movement 
To better understand the context for the February 20th movement’s communication 
strategies and discursive practices, the study examines both local and regional elements.  The 
study identifies key historical, governmental, sociopolitical, cultural and economic factors that 
gave rise to the movement.  The study analyzes previous scholarly examinations of Moroccan 
contexts, state-run media coverage of the movement during its first five months, and the King’s 
first address to the nation after the mass protests.  The rich context is helpful to assess the goals 
of the movement, the significance of the challenges mounted on the February 20th movement, 
and the mobilization strategies the movement deployed in response.  
Interviews with Key Actors in the February 20th Movement  
 To identify respondents willing to participate in the study’s interviews, a Moroccan 
journalist, who had followed the movement since its inception, provided a contact number for 
activists to call to participate in the study.  During these initial interviews, respondents identified 
other activists that played a major role within the movement and functioned as the group’s most 
senior political and communication strategists.  After completing their own interviews, the initial 
interviewees left and subsequently provided the contact number to the senior strategists and key 
activists they identified or knew, who in turn often participated in interviews themselves.  Each 
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respondent received a consent form that assured the individual of the confidentiality of their 
identity to minimize risks associated with study participation.   
 Twenty-four senior ranking activists participated in the interview portion of the study. 
The activists’ ages ranged from 21 to 60, with the majority in their late twenties to early thirties.  
Six female activists and 18 male activists participated.  The activists represented a wide spectrum 
of vocations, including journalists, professors, bankers, businessmen, college students, and 
artists.  The interviewed activists played lead roles in constructing the messages and strategies of 
the movement, including two activists who were responsible for writing most of the slogans, a 
filmmaker, and two major artists.  
 The interviews took place in Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangiers (see Appendix A). Thirteen 
interviews occurred in Casablanca, including 10 with male and 3 with female activists.  Seven 
interviews occurred in Rabat, all who were male activists.  Four interviews occurred in Tangier, 
including 1 male and 3 female activists.  Together, these three cities represented the largest 
number of people who demonstrated in the February 20th movement.  Each of these cities also 
have large shantytowns on their peripheries that serve as the home to the two major Islamist 
parties in Morocco, Adl wa Ihsane and Adala wa Tanmiya.   
 The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to examine the different types of 
online and offline mediums and message strategies that activists in the February 20th movement 
used to mobilize target audiences.  Each interview lasted between 2 and 3 hours.  The general 
interview questions revolved around three major themes: the activists’ communication strategies, 
the relationship between online and offline media, and the movement’s strategies and cultural 
markers for mobilizing a collective that invited participatory politics from below.  The study 
compared the interview responses and activists’ self-reflection of the movement with the 
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February 20th movement online platforms.  Further, the interviews also provided insights on how 
activists coordinated, negotiated, and created meaning.  In the analysis stage of the interview 
transcripts, the study followed Crang and Cook’s (2004) approach of examining the patterns and 
categories that arise within the interviews and coded for them.  For a complete list of questions 
and the study’s treatment of interview subjects, see Appendix B.   
Public Event Observations 
In addition, the study includes direct observations of four public events organized by the 
movement in May 2014.  These included protests, one in Casablanca that included around 100 
protesters and one in Rabat that attracted about 200 protesters.  The study also included two 
observations of the movement-sponsored cultural activities, which specifically targeted youth 
and used popular education to raise social consciousness and awareness.  These were entitled 
“Philosophy in the Street” (Felsafa fi Zanka ) and “Reading for All” (lecture Pour Tous).  The 
Philosophy on the Street event took place in the public square garden in Rabat with attendance of 
approximately 40 young people, 15 women and 35 men.  Some people that joined the event were 
bystanders that were curious and decided to stop in to listen.  Lecture Pour Tous was in one of 
the main Boulevard in downtown Casablanca.  Around 55 attendees participated in Lecture Pour 
Tous, and were equally divided between male and female participants.   Many bystanders 
stopped and inquired about the event. Important to note that these events took place 3 years after 
the February 20th movement’s initial protest.  
Analysis of Online and Offline Communication  
To better understand the February 20th movement’s online communication strategies, this 
study examines the group’s three digital campaign videos (I am Moroccan, I will Protest, and 
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Who We Are) as they first appeared on YouTube.  It also analyzes postings from February 2011 to 
June 2011 on the February 20th movement’s official website, Mamfakinch.com, as well as the 
online digital campaign videos appearing on that site.  The February 20th activists in the study’s 
interviews identified mamfakinch.com as the most important official alternative online platform 
of the February 20th movement.  During the time period of the study, 180 entries in English, 
French, and Arabic appeared on the movement’s website.  Website entries included archive 
protest videos, interviews with activists and independent journalists, protest maps, live streamed 
tweets, selected blog posts, and recirculated commentaries.  The study examined what 
mamfakinch highlighted as important information.  In particular, the study analyzes how the 
February 20th online and offline communication challenged institutions, regimes of knowledge, 
and contributed to emancipatory knowledge of discourse and social justice (Madison, 2005).  
Finally, the study also examines 20 images of movement activities that one female activist from 
Casablanca provided during the interview phase of the study.   
Situating interviews within the social, political, and historical contexts, this study 
examines how the February 20th movement reached out to various social networks and webs of 
power (for other examples of the approach, see Abu Lughod, 1990; Madison, 2005).  When 
analyzing the activists’ communication strategies, the study examines what various actors 
represented as truth within their social realities.  For instance, the study examines the many 
versions of events activists produced and recounted and how various events differed within the 
state media and February 20th online communication appeals.  Further, following the lead of 
Keller (2005), the study examines the identities, practices, and actions that the state and the 
movement negotiated, encouraged or denied.  Using textual and visual material, the study looks 
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at how these systems of knowledge and practices produce, actualize, perform and transform 
social practices at different social and geographical places.  
Beyond the approaches already discussed, the study borrowed Khatib’s (2013) 
framework of image politics within the Middle East context, Foucault’s concept of power (2010), 
and Azoulay’s (2008) concept of impaired citizenship to examine how the visual images function 
as a space of contestation between the different groups.  In particular, the study examines how 
various images function in the sphere of political relations and what types of visual narratives 
emerged.  All these theoretical frameworks look at counter power and possibilities of rupture 
within the hegemonic system.  Analyzing the images as part of a discursive confrontation 
between state authority and subaltern resistance, the study examines how the images function as 
a site for negotiation and articulation of values.  
Concluding Remarks and Chapter Overview 
This study works from the premise that to look appropriately into Middle East politics, 
media, and other forms of discourse, an account of the histories of colonialization and 
orientalism is necessary.  It challenges the assumption that the Middle East is a stagnant, violent, 
and monolithic region.  The Moroccan case study shows the creativity of ordinary people in 
navigating autocratic political culture. The February 20th Moroccan pro-democracy movement 
called for multiple forms of resistance, with the result that Morocco did not degenerate into 
social anarchy and mass violence.  This study will demonstrate how the Moroccan pro-
democracy movement created social spaces in which to express discontent through an active 
online and offline network that challenged the state hegemonic order and control. 
To further explain the workings of the February 20th movement, this study will begin with 
two chapters that establish context:  one that addresses the theoretical context of social 
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movements and social media theory as they relate to the Arab Spring and one that focuses 
specifically on the socio-political context of Morocco.  The next three chapters will examine the 
February 20th movement’s communication strategies, by exploring approaches for building 
collective identity, for maximizing mediums of message dissemination, and for utilizing 
performative strategies to enact a model of participatory politics.  The final chapter will 
summarize the study’s key findings and explore how they yield important insights for a broader 
understanding of social movements in the MENA region.  Specifically, the chapters will explore 
the February 20th movement in the following ways.  
Chapter Two.  Social Movements and Collective Action 
Chapter two sets the theoretical framework for understanding the February 20th 
movement.   It discusses the trajectory of social movement and media theory literature, 
emphasizing the shortcomings that led to the cultural turn and how social movements operate 
within complex systems of social relationships, symbolic production, meaning making, and 
identity needs.  It begins by highlighting how early theorists have hypothesized constructions of 
identity within social movements and how they have described the role of communication in 
mobilizing target populations, particularly as society has moved into the information age.  It then 
describes how theorists focusing on social movements in the Middle East and North Africa have 
explained the interactions of history, culture, and communication operating in those regions, 
including an examination of collective identity and the role of alternative media.  This chapter 
concludes by suggesting the implications for the study and understanding of social movements in 
the MENA region. 
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Chapter Three.  Emergence of the February 20th Movement 
Chapter three sets out the sociopolitical and historical background context for the 
February 20th movement.  It discusses the way February 20th movement emerged and developed 
over time.  It begins by highlighting the governmental, sociopolitical, and economic factors that 
gave rise to the movement, and then defining the group’s early goals and organizational 
structure.  It then describes how, after the February 20th movement began to pose a serious 
challenge to the King, the state apparatus, and the state-run media responded. 
Chapter Four.  Building a Collective: Towards a Participatory Politics Model 
Chapter four analyzes the February 20th movement’s communication strategies for 
building a unified collective with various target audiences, and concludes with how those 
strategies allowed the movement to respond effectively to the Moroccan state’s efforts to contain 
and coopt the group.  It begins by examining the February 20th movement’s various challenges of 
building a collective identity.  It then describes the movement’s bottom up approach to building a 
common national identity, which included linguistic pragmatism and multimodal appeals to 
national frames.  By analyzing various cultural and linguistic practices, this chapter explains how 
the February 20th movement worked to reformulate traditional concepts of citizenship and 
envision a new era of participatory politics.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
movement’s intersectional political strategies in building an empowered collective. 
Chapter Five.  Navigating Between the Online and Offline 
 The Arab Spring ignited great interest in the democratic potential of new information 
communication technologies.  With the rise in youth activism mediated and enabled through the 
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Internet, the February 20th movement virtual sphere opened a new space of possibilities that 
engaged directly with the Moroccan public sphere.  This chapter broadly discusses the media 
context in Morocco.  It then examines February 20th movement’s communicative strategies in 
both the online and offline environment.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
dialectical relationship that existed between the online and offline channels, and how those 
interaction were context dependent. 
Chapter Six.  Navigating Moroccan Aesthetic Resistance 
 To constitute an active public, the February 20th movement used cultural production to 
creatively challenge Morocco’s hegemonic practices and empower the people as a collective to 
promote civic and social engagement. Through its visual artistic presence, the February 20th 
movement claimed its existence and identity within the Moroccan political and cultural scene. 
This chapter examines how the February 20th movement utilized performative strategies to enact 
a model of participatory politics.  It discusses the movement’s varied aesthetic practices to 
mobilize the subaltern public.  
Chapter Seven.  Conclusion 
The final chapter summarizes the study’s key findings and explores how they yield 
important insights for a broader understanding of social movements in the MENA region. It 
concludes by looking at the limitations and areas for future study. 
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Chapter Two 
Social Movements:  The Role of Identity Culture and Media 
This chapter draws on findings from media theories and previous studies of social 
movements to lay the foundation for analyzing the February 20th movement.  Specifically, it 
examines the intersection of culture, media and identity reformulation.  This chapter begins by 
examining how theorists have understood social movements and how they have described the 
role of communication in mobilizing target populations, particularly since the onset of the 
information age.  The first part of the chapter provides an historical overview of the literature 
related to social movements.  It emphasizes the shortcomings that led to the cultural turn, as well 
as the need to move beyond structuralism to understand how social movements operate within 
complex systems of social relationships, symbolic production, meaning making, and identity 
constructions.  Next, it examines how theorists focusing on social movements in the Middle East 
and North Africa have explained the interactions of history, culture, and communication 
operating in those regions, with a particular focus on the concept of collective identity and the 
role of alternative media.  It concludes by suggesting implications for this study and better 
understandings of social movements in the MENA region. 
Mapping Theories of Social Movements 
The early, behaviorist approach to social movements1 emerged in response to the French 
revolution.  Behaviorists began the study of social movements in an effort to better understand 
                                                        
1
 For the purposes of this study, I will utilize Snow, Soule, and Kriesi’s (2008) definition of social movements:  
“Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity 
outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, 
whether it is culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are part of” 
(p.11).  
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the French revolutionaries, groups of individuals they generally considered to be irrational, angry 
mobs.  Accordingly, the behaviorists initially conceptualized social movements as reactionary, 
deviant and emotional outbursts by angry crowds, masses, and mobs in reaction to felt 
grievances and discontent.  The behaviorists approached mobilization for movements as a 
contagion or mob effect, rather than as a rational response to untenable situational conditions 
(Blumer, 1951; Buechler, 2004; Rule 1988).  
In the 1960s, sociologists worked to refute the behaviorist approach.  The sociologists 
considered behaviorist theories as too limiting and disagreed with the perspective that the 
irrationality of protestors was the chief reason for mass mobilization. Two schools of thought 
emerged as correctives:  resource mobilization and political opportunity.  Both models shared 
their theoretical foundations in structuralism, they both relied on the state as the preferred unit of 
analysis, and they both emphasized the rationality of the protestors (Carren, 2007).  
Resource mobilization models of social movements viewed collective action as a rational 
response that could only occur when adequate resources for addressing grievances became 
available.  Relying on a top-down approach, the resource mobilization model focused on 
microelements, such as resource opportunities and social networks.  Often describing social 
movements as business organizations, resource mobilization models looked at how societies 
managed and allocated resources and how social movements could use resources in pursuit of 
their groups’ goals.  The type and nature of the resources available explained both the tactical 
choices the movements made and the consequences of collective action on sociopolitical systems 
(Edwards & McCarthy 2004; McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  The resource mobilization model 
emphasized the extent to which resources linked to the success or failure of social movement 
mobilization (Davis, 2002; Lind & Stepan-Norris, 2011).  Scholars of the model focused on how 
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collective actors operated, how they acquired resources, and how they mobilized support to solve 
social problems (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).  Critics of resource mobilization models argued 
that such approaches did not sufficiently consider the political conditions that served as the 
context for resource allocations (Tarrow, 2011).  By the 1980s resource mobilization models 
were a dominant paradigm for explaining social movements, but they were becoming 
increasingly criticized for not looking at external factors that might better explain differences 
informs of collective action.  
Rooted in analyses of civil rights struggles, political opportunity models of social 
movement emerged in the 1970s in response to the resource mobilization models.  Addressing 
the resource models’ analytical gaps related to political context, the political opportunity models 
focused on the effects of the institutional political structure on movement activities and outcomes 
(Meyer, 2004).  The political opportunity approach responded to how “people engage in 
contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change and then, by 
strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, create new opportunities, which are used 
by others in widening cycles of contention” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29).  In his 1978 classic, From 
Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly put forward a political opportunity model for analyzing 
collective active where he explicitly identified a necessary set of conditions for mobilization.2  
Tilly’s model stressed interests, organization, and opportunity.  These three components of 
movements examined the potential gains available from participation, the level of unified 
identity and networks, and the political openings, such as shifts in ruling alignments, which set 
the conditions for potential mobilization.  The model questioned the possibility of repression and 
vulnerability of the target groups (Caren, 2007).  In general, social movements, when analyzed 
                                                        
2 Tilly referred his approach as a polity model.  
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according to political opportunity models, placed greater emphasis on economic and political 
contexts.    
A study by Kitschelt (1986) found that a movement’s ability to utilize strategies that were 
adapted to its current political opportunity structure, rather than its resources, impacted 
movement success.  Nevertheless, critics pointed out that political opportunity models were 
unable to explain when and why social movements used particular strategies and under what 
circumstances they chose particular forms of collective action (Bernstein, 1997).  In addition, the 
bulk of studies utilizing the political opportunity models as an analytical framework were limited 
to a focus on western, democratic countries.  
Neither resource mobilization models nor political opportunity models were adequate to 
explain why some actors decided to mobilize and why others did not, even when political 
opportunities and resources were available.  Critics of both approaches focused on the failure of 
such models to take into account the dynamic cultural and symbolic processes that underlie 
collective action (Davis, 2012).  As Bernstein (1997) argued,  
Resource mobilization and political process theorists have neglected the study of identity 
movements with their seemingly “nonpolitical,” cultural goals.  Even when culture is 
recognized as an integral part of sustaining activist communities, changing or challenging 
mainstream culture is rarely considered a goal of activism.  Strategies are seen as 
rationally chosen to optimize the likelihood of policy success (p. 534).   
Taken together, the two sociological approaches contributed many factors useful for 
understanding social movement mobilization.  Drawing from the complementary findings of the 
two perspectives, participation in collective action relates to several factors, including structures, 
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material resources, political opportunities, and the degree to which each interacts with the target 
of the mobilization effort (Snow, 2011).   
The Rhetorical Turn: Study of Movements 
Considered to have pioneered the study of social movements from a rhetorical 
perspective, Griffin (1952) proposed to broaden conventional examinations of public address to 
include considerations of the complex set of rhetorical phenomenon within historical 
movements.  For Griffin, the rhetorical components of movements were dynamic, responding to 
three key moments of a social movement’s lifespan:  inception, development, and 
consummation.   Following Griffin’s lead, scholars of rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s examined 
recurrent rhetorical patterns of persuasion within social movements not found in other instances 
of persuasion (Zarefsky, 1980). 3  Such a framework considered social movements as a unique 
rhetorical problem that generated unique rhetorical strategies in response (Simons, 1970).  
According to Simons (1970), for example, there are three rhetorical problems facing social 
movements:  attracting, molding, and maintaining followers, securing adoption, and reacting to 
resistance generated by larger structures.  Rhetorical scholars placed a heavy emphasis on the 
leadership of the social movement and how the leader resolved and reduced rhetorical constraints 
at hand.  Further, protests taking place in the United States during the 1960s prompted rhetorical 
scholars to reexamine social protests and take into consideration diverse forms of symbols, 
motives, and the types of rhetoric movements deployed.  These early rhetorical studies focused 
on persuasion as their central function of social movements.   
                                                        
3
 Early scholars of rhetoric did not generally use the phrase ‘social movements.’ To distinguish their objects of study 
from those of sociologists, early scholars of rhetoric described social movements as ‘rhetorical movements.’    
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Over time, rhetorical scholars roundly criticized their own field’s early work on social 
movements.  Zarefsky (1980), for example, critiqued early work by noting that, “theoretically 
oriented studies of social movements, since they depend upon establishing the uniqueness of 
movement rhetoric, have not been very productive” (p. 126).  Early studies also relied on an 
unsustainable, linear approach to social movements, overemphasized cause and effect, prescribed 
a rigid set of definitions for the phenomenon of study, and overemphasized intentional analysis 
(Sillars, 1980).  Scholars of rhetoric in the United States could not agree on the preferred 
approach for the study of movements (Lucas, 1980; McGee, 1980; Sillars, 1980; Zarefsky, 1980) 
and they generally confined their objects of study to America and Great Britain (Lucas, 1980).  
Lucas (1980), in particular, sounded early warnings against applying a western framework of 
how discourse works to non-western contexts, as “rhetoricians who study Continental or Third 
World social movements will face the formidable task of mastering cultures and languages 
different from their own” (p.142).  
By the 1980s, various revisions to the persuasive model of social movements arose.  
Rhetorical scholars began focusing on problems of meanings, ideology, consciousness, and 
interpretation in the study of social movements (McGee, 1980).  Some rhetorical scholars of 
social movements began calling for a pluralistic interdisciplinary approach (e.g., Hammerback & 
Jenson, 1994; Lucas, 1980; Sillars, 1980).  Lucas (1980) argued that social movements were both 
“phenomena and meaning” (p. 137), thereby necessitating a focus on messages of all forms and 
shapes.  Several scholars called for a heightened emphasis on the historical, cultural and local 
tactics that social movements utilize to mobilize supporters (Hammerback & Jenson, 1994; Lake, 
1983).  Hammerback and Jenson (1994) argued that in order to understand how any tactic of a 
social movements functions for internal audiences, “the particular rhetorical form should be 
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examined in the relation to its rhetorical legacy in its ethnic culture; the role of the specific 
rhetorical medium in that culture should be considered” (p.317).  
The Cultural Turn in the Study of Social Movements 
As a response to increased human mobility, the rise of globalization, and the effect of 
ICT’s on social movements, a new approach to the study of social movements again emerged.  
As Davis (2012) explained, “The new social movement theory in Europe and later the social 
constructionist approach in the United States have laid new, in part renewed, stress on the role of 
ideas and identities, the symbolic and expressive, the analysis of social movements” (p. 6).4   
Widespread social, cultural, and geopolitical changes on the global scene meant social movement 
scholars were no longer focused solely on class-based labor movements; instead, they began to 
address concerns such as the impact of globalization, women’s rights and environmental 
protection (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).  Castells (2010) characterized these new forms of social 
movements as ones “induced by the confrontation between opposing identities” (p. xvii).  New 
social movement scholars argued that identity-based movements seek to alter hegemonic cultural 
patterns or gain recognition for new social identities by employing strategies that encourage 
participation and empowerment (Bernstein, 1997; Calhoun, 1995; Castells, 2010; Melucci, 1985; 
Melucci, 1989).  These forms of social movements tend to have a decentralized, diffused power 
structure (Davis, 2012) and be rooted in communities and networks where information 
technology plays a central role (Castells, 2010).  With the availability of new communication 
channels, networks of activists in the same movement are less bound to the same place.   
                                                        
4 See Melucci, 1989; Jasper, 1997; Morris and Meuller 1992; and Johnston and Klandermas 1995 for more on 
New Social Movements.  
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The cultural turn in the study of social movements emphasized social and cultural 
contexts as critical elements of analysis.  Adherents to the new social movement model have 
sought to understand the major factors that have motivated people to participate in a particular 
social movement, as well as how members have perceived and interpreted socio-political 
contexts.  These theorists have focused on identity, ideology, and culture to better understand the 
discursive field in which social movements emerge.  New social movement scholars have been 
interested in investigating the complementary roles of identities, symbols, and networks in order 
to explain how collective action has challenged power relations inscribed in institutional forms 
of power and cultural practices (Davis, 2012).  
The theoretical insights of new social movements have built from the fundamental 
assumption that the contemporary global environment required a reconceptualization of power 
relations.  As Castells explained (2012), “the transformation of the communication environment 
directly affects the forms of meaning construction, and therefore the production of power 
relationships” (p. 6).   Drawing on Foucault’s perspective, Castells argued that wherever power 
exists, a counter power arises. Hence, power relations have become multilayered, constituted 
both materially and symbolically.  New social movement theory has contested the exercise of 
power and subjectivities particular to postindustrial capitalism (Melucci, 1985).  In short, new 
social movement theory has situated activism in a larger political, economic, and cultural 
context, and examined how activists seek to establish new identities, networks and strategies 
from the forms of hegemony within which their movement operates. 
Contextual Processes in Communication Approaches to Social Movements 
New social movement theorists have argued that the social implications of ICTs are 
embedded in specific historical, cultural and political contexts (e.g. Beinin & Vairel, 2009).  
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Specifically, communication scholars have emphasized the need to highlight human agency and 
to contextualize the particularities of the political and media landscape for a more nuanced 
understanding of how ICTs function in particular regions (Aouragh, 2010; Rodriguez, Ferron & 
Shamas, 2014; Shamas, 2011; Shami, 2008; Sreberny & Khiaban 2011).  By carefully examining 
both the media and political context, social movement theories overcome several challenges.  As 
Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas (2014) have argued, 
[F]irst, assuming that communication phenomenon are tightly woven with other historical 
processes, dynamics, and conditions, they avoid the deterritorialization of communication 
research; second they maintain the epistemological tension between media and 
mediations; and third, they break away from disciplinary isolation and explore other 
fields, such as literary studies, social movement studies, and the sociology of journalism 
to find answers about media use (p. 157). 
A focus on the political and media landscape, thus, enables the study of societal transformations 
without compartmentalizing or homogenizing the unit of analysis (Shami, 2009).   
Theoretical models of social movements operating in the MENA region have reinforced 
the need to focus on the cultural context of social discontent.  The context of the MENA region is 
particularly important because of its semi-closed political and media systems.  Shamas’ (2011) 
research on ICT use in Lebanon, for example, highlighted the importance of the multifaceted 
historical conditions that gave rise to the prolific outpouring of Lebanese bloggers in 2006.  
Sreberny & Khiabany (2011) maintained that the sociopolitical importance of blogging in Iran 
necessitated an understanding of the country’s history of revolutions and earlier democratization 
attempts, including “the perception and experience of repression by citizens, culturally preferred 
modes of expressivity as well as the meaning and experience of the Iranian diaspora” (p. xi). 
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Similarly, Aouragh (2010) insisted that to best understand the importance of the Internet in 
Palestine, the historical background of the diaspora was necessary, as that particular, contextual 
factor functioned as a mediating space for globally imagining and shaping Palestine as a nation.  
Such perspectives address Barbero’s (2006) call to apply “continuous efforts to disentangle the 
increasingly complex fabric of mediations that articulates the relations between communication, 
culture and politics” (p. 281).  Situating ICTs within their political and cultural contexts enables 
an understanding of old and new media trajectories and the political struggle within which they 
operate.  
As one noted in chapter one, scholars that have focused on big data have examined social 
movements and their use of ICTs in an attempt to understand the formation of complex networks.  
However, such an approach alone does not provide answers to cultural negotiations, local power 
dynamics, anti-hegemonic resistances, and social interactions that traverse uses of media 
technologies (Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014).  For example, Lim’s (2012) research 
demonstrated how several different social movements joined forces in Tahrir Square, a finding 
that shattered the general conception that each social network served as a unique data point.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood handled logistics, and soccer fans employed their street tactic savvy-ness to 
uphold safety.  Each played an important, but differentiated role.  In order to avoid the erasure of 
these multifaceted processes, theoretical frameworks attempting to explain how social 
movements function need to consider the groups’ communications within the local political 
environment.  Highlighting the sociopolitical and historical cultural context enables the 
examination the possibilities of rupture and enables an understanding of how movements 
produce power and sharing between networks, how they build affinities, and how they raise 
awareness necessary for a raised level of consciousness.  
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Collective Action:  Towards Building a Collective Identity 
With the cultural turn of social movement theorists, the concept of identity has become 
increasingly important as a way of understanding and describing the dynamics of collective 
action and it influence on mobilization.  Collective identity is an important component of the 
movement’s “tactical repertoire” (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p.264), as the sense of connection 
to the movement is essential in order to achieve social change (Bernstein & Dela Cruz, 2009).  
Given the centrality of the concept to current understandings of social movements, this study will 
rely on Polletta and Jasper’s (2001) definition of collective identity, namely “an individual’s 
cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution.  It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which maybe imagined rather than 
experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it many form part of a 
personal identity” (p. 285). 
Collective identity is located in shared space and explicitly linked to collective action 
(Melucci, 1995; Snow & Soule, 2011).  It tends to work through submerged networks of 
participation rather than through established institutions (Melucci, 1985).  Invoking collective 
identity in social movements becomes crucial for strengthening solidarity and sustaining 
commitment (Melucci, 1985; Polletta & Jasper, 2001).  It is a form of strategic political action 
that functions at both the cultural and instrumental levels, particularly for social movements that 
strive to be widely inclusive in their target populations (Bernstein 1997; Bernstein, 2008; Polletta 
& Jasper, 2001; Bernstein & De La Cruz, 2012). 
Activists within social movements strategically deployed identity strategies to further 
their movements’ goals of increased participation and solidarity (Bernstein, 1999; Bernstein, 
2008; Leitz, 2011).  Movements implemented collective identity appeals to transform 
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mainstream culture, including its categories, values, and practices (Leitz, 2011).  According to 
Leitz (2011), identity frames attained important goals when they achieve cultural resonance. 
When used in relation to the need for change, activists may deploy traditional symbols, 
identities, and practices in new ways that have oppositional meanings that challenge and subvert 
the dominant order (Leitz, 2011; Taylor, Van Dyke & Anderson, 2009).  Strategies designed to 
build collectives do not take place apart from political structures and state actors; instead, efforts 
to build a common identity are in constant reaction and in dialogue with these institutions 
(Bernstein, 1997).  As Bernstein (2008) elaborated, “collective identities are not simply free 
floating cultural phenomenon but also historically, materially, and organizationally located” (p. 
281).  Accordingly, the discursive environment that gives rise to a movement may also constrain 
the success or failure of the identity appeals (Leitz, 2011). 
 In general, political identity in social movements has three analytical levels: identity for 
empowerment, identity deployment, and identity as a goal (Bernstein, 1997).  Identity strategies 
function within “the configuration of political access, the structure of social movement 
organizations and type and extent of opposition” (Bernstein, 1997, p. 539).  Because of the close 
relationship between collective identity and a social movement’s sense of belonging and action, 
examining how social movements deploy identity as a platform for action, as well as a basis for 
group solidarity, is instructive. Furthermore, reflecting on the fluidity of identity construction and 
negotiation processes is a critical perspective to guard against essentializing those identities or 
presuming the existence of static social relations.  
Cultivating emotional bonds and positive affective ties within the movement are key to 
establishing a collective identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001).  Social movements are, by their 
nature, emotional movements (Castells, 2012).   The framing of appeals on behalf of social 
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movements must therefore take into consideration not only the cognitive but also the affective 
dimensions (Goodwin, Jasper & Polleta, 2000; 2004).  The relational characters of the ties 
established and reinforced within these networks are critical in supplying tactical expertise, 
resources and personnel that function as the foundation of mobilization (Polletta, 1999).  Social 
movements strategically deploy national symbols to trigger a variety of meanings and emotions 
in an audience, which in turn provides them with increased legitimacy (Leitz, 2011).  What 
becomes important here is that actors do not necessarily have to believe in the same ideologies; 
they can still come together in order to generate collective action and entice bystanders to 
participate (Roy, 2010).  Accordingly, this newly created solidarity is essential for mobilization 
across different ethnicities and class.  
Social Movements: Alternative Media and Culture 
While alternative social media forms expand what Tilly (1986) has called a “repertoire of 
contention” techniques within protests, alternative media has continued to be an under-
researched and largely neglected topic in the social sciences (Atton 2002, Fuchs, 2010; 
Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014).  As such, competing definitional conceptions of alternative 
media exist, many of which are very broad and vague.  Such forms of media have various names 
in current social movement literature:  radical media, participatory media, grassroots media, and 
citizen media.  Each label deploys a particular framework that puts emphasis on particular 
elements of autonomous media use (Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014).  For instance, “Whilst 
‘radical’ encourages a definition that is primarily concerned with social change, ‘alternative’ 
offers a much more looser purchase” (Atton, 2002, p.4).  In general, activists deploy alternative 
social media forms to transform existing social roles and practices through political education, 
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critiquing dominant ideologies, and challenging power structures (Atkinson & Dougherty, 2006; 
Atton, 2002; Downing, 2001; Rodriguez, 2001).   
For Downing (2001), the main feature of alternative media was its oppositional function 
to hegemonic practices.  As he explained, “By radical media I refer to media, generally small 
scale and in many different forms, that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, 
priorities, and perspectives” (p. v).  Referring to alternative media as “the most active form of the 
active audience” (p.3), Downing recognized that such forms of discourse can function both 
overtly and covertly within the sphere of popular culture and can work to “disrupt silence, 
counter lies, and provide an alternative vision” (p.16).  Drawing from Gramsci’s analysis of 
culture and counter hegemony, Downing emphasized the role of alternative media to challenge 
the ideological frameworks of a culture by providing alternative visions for the community.   
Drawing a sharp contrast with mainstream media, radical media is loosely structured, 
nonhierarchical, creative, and stimulating for public debate (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2001; Fuchs, 
2010; Rodriguez, 2003). According to Atton (2002). 
[A]lternative media- as a major constituent in the disseminations of the views and 
opinion formation of subaltern counter publics’- (Fraser, 1992)- have the potential to 
offer even more than ‘interpretation;’ they provide readers with access to other leaders’ 
(activists’) lived experiences and on occasion offers these as part of a network of 
sociocultural and sociopolitical projects (p. 153).   
In opposition to state media’s hegemonic practices, alternative media opens the space for access 
and agency.  Rodriguez (2003) argued, “. . . as they disrupt established power relationships and 
cultural codes, citizens’ media participants exercise their own agency in reshaping their own 
lives, futures, and cultures” (p. 190).  Since alternative media privileges the involved audience, 
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alternative media is best realized by cultural interrogation (Atton, 2002).  Such modalities of 
resistance provide an alternative to the hegemonic political nature of knowledge formation and 
production.  
Alternative media often takes the form of aesthetic practices.  Alternative media’s cultural 
practices function as strategies of resistance deployed to break away from hegemonic discourse 
and challenge state ideology.  Cultural practices can take the form of rituals that are meaningful, 
which often include particular choices of language, symbols, and music.  A critical lens on 
culture and creativity will provide a much more nuanced understanding of a social movements’ 
goals and strategies (Jasper, 1997).   
At times, cultural production and aesthetic strategies of resistance connect specifically to 
subaltern publics.  For instance, the Green movement in Iran used the “art of subtleness” by co-
opting the rituals and the history of the Islamic republic against the leaders of the Islamic 
republic (Kurzman, 2011, p. 9).  The reappropriated use of cultural codes and practices, whereby 
culture becomes performed and activated in new ways, mobilizes supporters to challenge and 
subvert the dominant order.  Social movement activists use language and culture already familiar 
and positively associated with the people to create alternative realities.  In Egypt, for example, 
the appearance of murals and graffiti became a battleground between the Egyptian Security 
apparatus and the activists.  The Egyptian walls became a contested space involving an endless 
process of erasure, reversal, and replacement of images linked to the competing perspectives 
(Khatib, 2012).  The activists would draw on the murals and the next day the security apparatus 
would paint over or destroy them.  Nevertheless, the Arab Spring movement’s use of hypermedia 
spaces with different nodal points allowed the activists’ images to elicit affective responses from 
engaged youth in the region (Khatib, 2012).  Cultural and aesthetic productions are a powerful 
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mode for solidifying commitment and building vision for change for social movements (Roy, 
2010).  Deployed as strategic tools for action and reaction, question and answer, and expression 
of struggle, such mediated forms produce a locale culturally shaped discourse of liberation and 
empowerment. 
Cultural production in social movements also evokes a sense of collectiveness and 
belonging.  Such aesthetic practices are not solely a medium for persuasion; they also serve as 
collective action.  According to Roy (2010), “social movements are both a class of actors that use 
culture and a site where culture is enacted” (p. 20).  As Polletta and Jasper (2001) argued, 
“collective identities are expressed in cultural materials…names, narratives, symbols, verbal 
styles, rituals, and clothing…” (p.285).  Cultural material artifacts intertwine with meaning 
making processes to mediate the formation of the movement’s identity (Holland, Fox & Daro, 
2008).  
Cultural processes also function as tools for challenging hegemonic narratives and 
political change (Bernstein & De La Cruz, 2009; Taylor, Van Dyke & Anderson, 2009).  As such, 
they act as instruments for superseding the dominant alienated culture (Freire, 2000) and work to 
become the battleground of freedom struggles with instances of popular culture functioning as 
politics (Downing, 2001; Khatib, 2012).   According to Freire (2000), a cultural revolution is 
especially important because of its role in the reconstruction and remolding of society as it 
distances itself from the old system.  This process produces what Heise (1998) referred to as 
“emphathetic solidarity,” which is “a reciprocated sense of merged consciousness and alliance, 
with faith in others’ commitments to shared purposes” (p. 197).  For social movements that have 
histories of colonization, the move is not only about economic and territorial liberation, but also 
psychological liberation.  Cultural repertoires not only convey powerful political messages and 
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raise social consciousness, but they also mobilize actors to engage in other forms of political 
contention (Taylor, Van Dyke & Anderson, 2009).  
As culture is entangled in the exercise of power (Bennett, 2008; Khatib, 2012), activists 
deploy cultural repertoires such as symbols and rituals to mobilize actors and to convey powerful 
political messages to target audiences (Taylor, Van Dyke, & Anderson, 2009).  For instance, 
citizens during the Arab Spring used images to reclaim political agency, and as such, visual 
expression was at the heart of the political struggle (Khatib, 2012).  As Khatib (2012) argued,   
“ . . . [F]or authoritarian states, political power means having control over visual production and 
consumption.  For political oppositions, democratic representation merges with visual 
representation.  For people, possessing political agency means possessing the ability to be seen, 
not only heard” (p. 1).  Street art became a visible marker of citizen agency and a creative way 
for activists to provide an alternative narrative (Khatib, 2012).  Such activities, perhaps because 
they contribute alternative perspectives, also increase the likelihood that a movement’s goals will 
find broad acceptance among the general public (Leitz, 2011).  
Shaped by local cultures that frame the parameters of grievances, alternative forms of 
social media (online and offline) offer ready texts for understanding contentious politics.  
Aesthetic forms of resistance are particularly important when studying social movements that 
function in autocratic contexts, given the various constraints on the various forms of 
communication available to disrupt established hegemonic powers.   Contentious collective 
action has played key role in political trajectories of the Middle East (Bayat, 2010), and as 
Hoffman and Konig (2013) made clear, “The context on the character and extent of contentious 
behavior needs to be taken into consideration more systematically in order to adjust social 
movement theory to non-western polities.”  In a contentious space, actors “share the idea that 
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changing politics by mobilizations and political activism is possible” (Beinin & Vairel, 2009, 
p.27).  Alternative forms of media function within contentious contexts to create new social 
spaces to challenge state hegemonic order and control.  They not only provide information to 
publics, but they also invite participation into the development of creative ways to question 
hegemonic practices.  
Concluding Remarks 
Studying social movements that take into account the wider historical, sociopolitical and 
cultural context will inform our understanding of meaning making, nation building, vernacular 
political aesthetics, media practices, and pop culture in anti-authoritarian movements in MENA.  
Such an approach will pay particular emphasis on discursive practices and at the same time 
provide a rich and nuanced understanding of social movements communication strategies to 
undermine hegemonic power. Studies that take context seriously do not place social movement’s 
media repertoires in a social vacuum. Such studies look at how social movement’s use of media 
technologies are influenced by a combination of factors such as historical and political 
conditions, activist networks, interaction between mainstream and alternative media, and local 
culture (Rodriguez, Ferron & Shamas, 2014).  
The processes of communication strategies within social movements need to take into 
account a broader conception of social media.  Communication processes take place in the 
virtual, electronic, and physical space.  Moving beyond ICTs and traditional media, social 
movements use of aesthetic practices such as staged action in public spaces, music, clothing, and 
alternative forums for traditional media can help unmask how culture, politics, and media 
combine and function within a particular geographical space.  Such an expanded model moves 
away from technological determinism and places emphasis on individual agency, as participants 
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choose not only if they will attend to a message, but also what form that message will take. 
Similarly, it looks at how different mediums and forms of media function, negotiate, and 
circulate.  
Furthermore, examining how social movements deploy collective identity to subvert 
hegemonic order is important for understanding contentious politics and long-term structures, 
both cultural and societal.  It enables understandings of cultural forces that construct the social 
networks (online and offline) through culturally meaningful strategies and tactics. Examining 
dissemination of messages and the performance and enactment of yields more insights into how 
social movements position themselves within society and responds to a multifaceted response 
environment.    
Many studies of the Arab Spring presuppose a homogeneous view of the region’s 
cultures.  Yet, cultures are polyvocal, multilayered, fractured, and decentered.  Studies on social 
media and the Arab Spring have largely ignored the political reality of poor urban and rural 
populations, yet democracy cannot take root without their participation.  Scholars will be able to 
understand other cultures without imposing their own paradigm and will be better equipped to 
look at the spaces of affinity and examine possibilities of rupture.  
In sum, deploying a framework that is politically, historically, and culturally grounded 
privileges local knowledge and the micro politics of context.  Such a framework moves beyond 
the ideological hegemonic framework of “us” versus “them”.  It requires a more holistic 
approach to social media and social movements, with a heavy emphasis on the political realities 
affecting social relations within the movement, between the movement and its target audience, 
and between the public and governing bodies as they occur over time.  Such an approach allows 
for an examination of contentious politics in its various forms within the complex and shifting 
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relations of power.  Such an approach privileges a multiplicity of forms of communication, from 
performative communication of bodies to disembodied bodies behind computer screens.  
 
Chapter Three 
Emergence of the February 20th Movement 
This chapter sets out the sociopolitical and historical context in which the February 20th 
movement emerged.  It begins by highlighting key governmental, sociopolitical, and economic 
factors that gave rise to the movement and by providing a description of the February 20th 
movement’s early goals and organizational structure in response.  It will demonstrate that the 
unique set of challenges the February 20th movement faced both internally within its organization 
and externally within the Moroccan public sphere prompted the movement to adapt its goals and 
strategies.  The chapter will describe how, over time, the February 20th movement began to pose 
a serious challenge to the state, which led to a changing situational environment characterized by 
various reactions of the regime and the broader state apparatus.  
M6- A New Era for Morocco 
After King Hassan II died after serving as the monarch of Morocco for thirty-eight years, 
Crown Prince Mohammed VI took over the throne on July 23, 1999 and was crowned a week 
later in Rabat, Morocco.  Morocco’s national RTM and 2M television channels showed King 
Mohammed VI greeting members of the royal family, Islamic scholars, and high-level officials 
from around the country as they claimed respect and allegiance to him.  This highly symbolic 
annual rite, known as bay’aa, has been part of Morocco’s rituals and traditions for over 300 years 
(Daadaoui, 2011).  The Moroccan king, who claims direct descendance from the Prophet 
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Mohammad, holds the title of Amir al Mouminine, or commander of the faithful.  Accordingly, 
he is both the spiritual and temporal leader of the Moroccan people (Howe, 2005; Linn, 2011).  
The newly crowned King appeared determined to lead the country to a modern 
democracy.  He sought to distinguish himself from the rule of his father, a dark period in 
Moroccan history characterized by repression, arbitrary detentions, torture, and forced 
disappearances of political opponents (Hazan, 2006; Slyomovics, 2005).  Many of the nation’s 
citizens believed that the thirty-five year old King would break from his father’s oppressive rule 
and forge a new era of reform and open command (Campbell 2003; Howe, 2005; Willis 2007).  
Bolstering such perceptions, the young monarch defined his role as “arbiter” and pledging to 
“adhere to the system of constitutional monarchy, political pluralism, economic liberalism, 
regional and decentralized policy, the establishment of the state of rights and law, preserving 
human rights and individual and collective liberties, protecting security and stability for 
everyone” (“Excerpts from King Mohammed VI’s Address,” 1999).5  At the same time, he spoke 
of his commitment to easing the plight of the rural poor, reducing unemployment, and advancing 
equal rights for women.  The new King’s emphasis on expanding economic and political rights 
offered hope to his nation’s citizenry worn down by years of oppressive rule. 
Further distancing himself from his father’s rule, King Mohammed VI also adopted a 
more accessible, public image.  The new monarch exhibited a unique style that positioned him 
alongside Moroccan youth (Hegassy, 2012; Sandberg & Aqertit 2014).  He was athletic and an 
avid jet skier who, at times, dressed in traditional garments, but did not shy away from modern 
youthful attire at others.  The young unmarried monarch appeared in public areas with few or no 
                                                        
5
 All quotations from King Mohammed VI’s first national address will be cited from BBC News due to the lack of 
an available authenticated recording of the address. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, all references to the 
King’s words will be indicated in the preface to the quotation, but will be drawn from the media’s record and 
translation of the speech.  
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bodyguards, making him even more accessible to his followers.  Unlike the aloof, autocratic 
persona of late King Hassan II, King Mohammed VI enacted populist tendencies, seemingly 
enjoying his presence among the people in crowded areas as he repeatedly presided over 
charitable works.  In 2003-2004, a survey of 622 young Moroccans revealed the success of the 
new King’s efforts to distance himself from his father by finding that “traditional sources of 
legitimacy are declining whereas modern rationales and a ‘youthful spirit’ rise as reasons for 
accepting the king’s authority” (Hegasy, 2007, p. 19).  All these elements brought a new style of 
authority that initially gave him legitimacy and secured a popular basis for his rule, especially 
among Moroccan youth. 
Early on, the young monarch also signaled his interest in bridging the gender divide in 
Morocco.  He announced that he would hold a public wedding ceremony for the first time in 
Moroccan history.  A leading Morocco’s Socialist Press labeled the public wedding “a real 
revolution” in palace traditions, which served as a sign to many that he was modernizing 
traditional practices (as rpt. in Howe, 2005, p. 22).  Photos of his beautiful, red haired fiancée 
circulated both online and offline.  For the first time, the new bride held an official title of Her 
Royal Highness.  Princess Lalla Selma abandoned the traditional title of the Mother of the 
Princes, which allowed her to be involved in state affairs (Sandberg & Aqertit, 2014).  Activists 
in women’s movements were excited about who the new King chose to marry (Howe, 2005).   
Selma Bennani was a well-educated middle class woman who worked in the computer science 
field, who had a strong personality, and who was a strong ally in the fight for women’s rights.  
King Mohammed VI’s reputation as a reformer also arose from his advocacy for human rights 
and the fact that he championed women’s rights in his push for a new family law known as 
Moudawana (Maghraoui, 2011).  Women’s movements welcomed these changes and saw them 
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as a progressive, encouraging move forward (Howe, 2005).  Mohammed VI’s approach to 
women’s rights was an enlightening sign for the country, providing a genuine space for women 
to be equal partners in Moroccan society.   
In another symbolically important move, the young monarch focused on the northern 
regions of the country, previously forgotten and ignored by the late King Hassan II.  Under the 
prior monarchy, King Hassan II refrained from visiting the northern regions and Rif Mountains 
because of a tribal rebellion in those areas that had raged since 1956 (Howe, 2005; Mezran, 
2000).  He disliked the northern region and referred to the Rifian people of the north as “savages 
and thieves” (Errazzouki, 2012).  The populations located in northern regions were appreciative 
of King Mohammed’s new approach.  They heralded him as a national hero at his first highly 
publicized visit to their homelands (“Morocco’s Brave New King,” 1999).  The streets filled with 
crowds of happy fans who wanted to see him in person (Howe, 2005; “Morocco’s Brave New 
King,” 1999).  The King shook the outstretched hands of the crowds, in spite of his secret 
service’s hesitation.  His trip to the northern region signaled his desire to break from the past by 
unifying all of the Moroccan people and reconciling the monarchy with the previously ignored 
region.  
In another move designed to dissociate his rule from that of his father, one of the new 
monarch’s most important acts was the removal of the powerful Minister of Interior Driss Basri.  
Reputed as the most powerful man after Hassan II, Basri was very close to the late King, and was 
believed by many to be responsible for the repressive regime (Howe, 2005; Laskier, 2003).  King 
Mohammed rewarded the minister with his kingdom’s highest award, removed the senior 
officials that were part of Basri’s network and security system, and then dismissed Basri himself.  
Throughout the removal process, the nation avoided protests or a revolution, even though the 
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Moroccan government did not prosecute people close to Basri for war crimes (Howe, 2005).  The 
nonviolent form in which the King stripped Basri of his power was swift and hailed as a positive 
step towards liberalization.  
As part of his political liberalization program, the monarch also attempted to improve the 
human rights record of his father.  Mohammed VI allowed monitors to visit the notorious 
Tazmamart secret prison and promised to compensate some of its victims (Campbell, 2003).  He 
called for the creation of the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice based on the South African 
model, the first such institution in the Muslim and Arab world (Linn, 2011).  The commission’s 
responsibilities included examination of the period from Moroccan independence in 1956 to the 
year of Hassan II’s death in 1999.  It investigated arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, and 
accounts of torture (Linn, 2011).  The Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice Commission gave 
torture victims the opportunity to testify publicly and receive promises of financial compensation 
for their suffering (Hazan, 2006).  Moreover, the King released Abdsalem Yassine from house 
arrest, despite the fact that he had functioned as his father’s foremost adversary and he had 
served as the Islamist leader of the Justice and Spirituality movement (Laskier, 2003; Mezran, 
2000).6 The King also allowed some political exiles to return to the country, including Marxist 
activist Abraham Serfaty and the family of the late Mehdi Ben Barka, both long time opponents 
of Hassan II (Laskier, 2003; Mezran, 2000).  These public steps served to distance the new King 
from Hassan II’s records of human rights abuses and led the county to a potentially more 
democratic future.  
Such actions during the early years of King Mohammed’s rule raised expectations and 
instilled hope, especially among the younger generation.  During his first few years in power, the 
                                                        
6 During the time of his father’s rule (Hassan II), Yassine had questioned the King’s title and legitimacy as 
commander of the faithful.  After Mohammed VI assumed the crown, Yassine also pushed the young monarch to use 
his inheritance of Hassan II’s fortune to pay Morocco’s national debt. 
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King took meaningful, steps to democratize the country and to implement an ambitious political 
liberalization program.  The years of the late King Hassan II’s reign, characterized by repeated 
acts of state sponsored violence against dissidents and repression of political opposition, seemed 
to have ended.  King Mohammed signaled a new vision of the Moroccan state, leading many to 
anticipate the emergence of a parliamentary monarchy, one that would have less executive power 
and more power for the parliament and legislative bodies (Campbell 2003; Howe 2005; Laskier 
2003; Linn 2011; Mezran, 2000).  A new political era emerged, with a generation of “M6” that 
promised empowerment and hope for a brighter future7.  
During the King’s first few years on the throne, the national and international media 
coverage of the young monarch was very positive.  Perhaps appreciative of the King’s promise to 
allow the Moroccan media to flourish, the domestic and international media referred to the 
young monarch as “the King of the poor,” “the royal jet-skier,” “King Charming,” “the modern 
monarch,” and “the M6 generation” (as qtd. in Howe, 2005, p. 5).  According to Time reporter 
Scott Macleod (2000), the King was “confident yet modest, part regal, part ordinary guy . . . .  
Combining a common touch with strategic vision, he may be the most impressive of the new 
generation coming to power in the Middle East” (p. 27-28).  The excitement and energy the 
King’s new initiatives generated should not be underestimated; they brought a significant amount 
of legitimacy to the King on both the domestic and international scenes.   
M6- A Return to a Moroccan Winter? 
Despite the King’s relatively progressive, public agenda, Morocco’s structural problems 
threatened the country’s successful path towards open democracy.  Socio-economic, political, 
and security issues prevented the King from fulfilling the public’s raised expectations.  Over 
                                                        
7 M6 is a youth’s way of mentioning the King Mohammed VI.   
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time, the King’s reforms increasingly failed to answer the expectations of those who hoped for 
more substantial change.  
One chief impediment towards achieving the King’s publicly stated goals was that the 
regime’s security system (makhzen) remained problematic and corrupt.  As Willis (1999) 
surmised, the makhzen was “made up of a patchwork of clientelist networks which although 
historically centered on and supportive of the person of the monarch, have their own interests 
which may be disturbed and even threatened by the arrival of the new monarch” (p.116).  Indeed, 
the makhzen had difficulties adapting to the monarch’s new changes that threatened its long-
standing, safeguarded interests.  According to Campbell (2003), the ruling elite did not accept a 
loss of control over economic and political decisions.  Further, King Mohammed VI could not 
control the makhzen without resorting to his father’s tactics.  As a consequence King Mohammed 
VI exercised power (executive, legislative, and judicial) in the same fashion as before, only with 
a new appealing façade.  While many Moroccans considered the King and the regime’s elite as 
distinct actors, the powerful makhzen continued to be a major challenge, undermining the 
monarch’s attempts to achieve democratization and respect for human rights (Mezran, 2000).  
Prior to the rise of the February 20th movement, Moroccan civil society struggled to 
maintain their independence in the face of the makhzen’s constant attempt at cooptation or 
repression (Jacobs, 2014; Laachir, 2013).  In general, human rights activists remained concerned 
about the makhzen’s presence and its political influence, given its use of repression at many 
peaceful protests and its continued beatings and arrests of demonstrators (Campbell, 2003).  To 
avoid the stifling response of the makhzen, civil society groups attempted to depoliticize their 
demands and even their own organizational structures in an effort to obtain desired reforms 
(Delmasso, 2012; Delmasso & Cavatorta, 2011).    
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Furthermore, the fragmented political opposition fighting to diffuse the King’s executive 
powers ironically strengthened the King’s position as supreme arbitrator (Delmasso, 2012).  With 
minimal oppositional power of their own and weakness vis- a-vis the state, the highly 
fragmented, political groups who had divergent interests and priorities were heavily reliant on 
the King to obtain their desired reforms.  In one case, for example, the monarch arbitrated a 
conflict between the women’s movement and the Islamists.  The women’s movement had called 
for a change in the family law code in an effort to enhance women’s rights, while the other 
group, primarily made up of the Islamists, was opposed to the new proposed legal reform on 
religious grounds.  Grateful that the King had supported the liberal feminist position in the 
outcome of that dispute, the women’s movement felt obligated to limit their critiques and broader 
agenda for social change (Salime, 2012).  In short, the dominance of the monarchy and 
makhzen’s control over the political system continued to influence both the state and civil society 
framework, which led to cooptation and influence over the political reform agenda of Morocco. 
Another factor that rendered the reform agenda unrealized was the attitude of the 
monarch in regards to limiting his own executive powers.  According to the Moroccan 
constitution, the King has the power to appoint state officials and ministers, direct state policies, 
and establish new laws without interference from the media, who face imprisonment if they are 
caught criticizing the monarchy.  Further, the monarch has the authority to dissolve parliament, 
call for new elections, terminate the tenure of any minister, and change the constitution by 
referendum without parliamentary consent (Laskier, 2003; Linn, 2011).  As such, the political 
framework assumed allegiance rather than encouraging genuine public participation.   
Security concerns from the threat of terrorism further set back the King’s promised 
reforms.  The 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, which resulted in 33 victim deaths, shook the 
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nation and solidified the executive powers of the monarchy.  The King faced the decision of 
whether to return to his father’s harsh security policies to strengthen the country’s stability or to 
pursue genuine democratic reforms.  Within weeks of the Casablanca terrorist attacks, the 
Moroccan authorities arrested 1000 people, incarcerated 50 to serve life terms in prison, and 
sentenced 16 others to death.  Many Moroccans, including members of the news media, 
supported the King’s response and saw it as a necessary step to deter any further attacks 
(Kalpakian, 2005; Sandberg & Aqertit, 2014).  Nevertheless, human rights groups protested the 
ruling.  They described the trials as lacking in legitimacy and transparency based on their fears 
that Morocco might backtrack on its path to a stronger democratic state (Sandberg & Aqertit, 
2014).  
The King’s philosophical approach to good governance further dampened the reform 
agenda, resulting in an ineffective response to the high level corruption and clientelism.  The 
country pursued a technocratic, apolitical approach to economic development (Maghraoui, 2001; 
Tozy, 2009).  In other words, the regime prioritized advancement of socioeconomic reforms 
ahead of reforms necessary to ensure expansion of political rights.  As such, the Moroccan 
government exempted the political status quo from becoming an issue of public debate with the 
result that the high-level corruption and clientelism continued to plague the country (Maghraoui, 
2012).  The lack of checks and balances on the state apparatus (which remained immune to 
regulations and procedures governing the populace) enabled the ruling family to control the 
major national shares of the economy through all sectors.  The King’s estimated fortune is $2 
billion, making him the wealthiest African monarch (Nsehe, 2014).  Hence, problems of 
corruption became intimately intertwined with the political environment and could not be 
addressed independently from it.  As long as Morocco’s governing apparatus put political reform 
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on hold, the high level of corruption and clientelism prevented fulfillment of the populace’s 
rising expectations. 
Another divisive issue that dominated the Moroccan political landscape was the Western 
Sahara conflict.  As one of the longest standing, unresolved conflicts in the region, its origins 
trace back to the 1884 Berlin Conference, which divided up Africa among the colonial powers. 
The disputed territory was occupied by Spain until 1976. Both Morocco and Mauritania affirmed 
their claim to the territory.  The Polisario Front, a separatist group seeking independence that is 
financially and materially supported by Algeria, opposed such claims.  From 1975 until the 1991 
ceasefire and deployment of UN peacekeeping forces known as MINURSO, Moroccan and 
Polisario forces fought to claim the territory of the Western Sahara (Ohaegbulam, 2002).  The 
sovereignty of the Western Sahara has remained the subject of dispute between the government 
of Morocco and the Polisario Front.  
No discussion of human rights and democratization in Morocco would be complete 
without an examination of the Western Sahara conflict.  Even though the prospects of the 
negotiated peace hold the promise of socio-political and economic benefits and stability for the 
region, the settlement has, to date, been unsuccessful in resolving this dispute.  The long planned 
UN sponsored referendum to resolve the Western Sahara conflict has suffered frequent 
postponements due to disagreements over who should be entitled to vote in the referendum 
(Conti, 2008; Ohaegbulam, 2002).  Further, the refugee problem resulting from the continuing 
conflict has remained a chief concern both for Morocco and the international community 
(Dunbar, 2000).  Most importantly, the ongoing deadlock has hampered the formation of the 
Arab Maghreb Union, forestalled Morocco becoming a member of the African Union, and 
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disrupted North African stability more generally (Conti, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2007; 
Zunes, 1995).  
Echoing the reign of King Hassan II, King Mohammed VI has consistently refused to 
relinquish Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara.  He claimed territorial integrity as a 
public strategy to maintain control and stability in the region.  King Hassan II publicly 
announced, “I have always said that, in this country, the rights of man stopped at the question of 
the Sahara.  Anyone who said that Sahara was not Moroccan could not benefit from the rights of 
Man” (as qtd. in Mundy, 2008, para. 1).  The monarch’s argument was grounded in the closeness 
in culture, language, tradition and history between the Moroccan and the Sahrawi people 
(Maghraoui, 2003).  In his 2014 Throne speech, the King purposefully mentioned the cost and 
the sacrifice that Moroccans had to endure to develop and maintain their southern territories, 
sending a clear signal that the topic of the Western Sahara was not open for negotiation.   
Consistent with the King’s views, the Moroccan government continued to place heavy 
censorship on civil society and news agencies that covered the events in the Western Sahara.  
The Moroccan government deployed restrictive press code clauses that were subject to arbitrary 
court interpretations that had significant flexibility to rule in favor of officials (Denouex, 2011).  
Clauses that might lead to jail terms included “malicious,” “harmful to the public order,” 
“offensive” to the royal family, and dissemination of “false information” (as qtd. in Denouex, 
2011, p. 4).  For example, the Moroccan courts charged Le Journal a $380,000 fine for 
defamation for its 2006 report on the Western Sahara, forcing the editor to step down and the 
magazine to shutdown due to bankruptcy (Denouex, 2011).  Another example involved an 
independent journalist, Ali Lmrabet, who was sentenced to a 10-year ban on his practice of 
journalism in 2005 (Freedom of the Press, 2006).  His offense was writing an article in El 
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Mundo, where he referred to the people in Tindouf, Algeria as refugees (Freedom of the Press, 
2006).  Such a sentiment contradicted state rhetoric, which claimed the Polisario held the 
Sahrawis in Tindouf against their will.  In sum, international and domestic news agencies faced 
heavy restrictions from a government-pressured judiciary when they covered Western Sahara.   
The Moroccan state apparatus’ use of its territorial claim to the Western Sahara 
effectively silenced or neutralized political opposition. According to the 2014 World Press 
Freedom Index, Morocco ranked 136th out of 180 countries on media pluralism and 
independence, respect for the safety and freedom of journalists, and the legislative, institutional 
and infrastructural environment in which the media operate.  According to the 2011 Freedom of 
Press Index, Morocco scored 68 out of 100 on press freedom score, with 0 as optimal score and 
100 as the worst score.  Reporters without Borders highlighted the urgent need for Morocco to 
protect independent media and eliminate the government’s red line on coverage related to 
territorial integrity and monarchy (Deloire, 2014).  Facing the risk that the state media would 
taint activists as Algerian spies or as disloyal citizens, pacifist movements, peaceful 
demonstrations, and public criticism related to the Western Sahara issue became very limited.  
A third challenge leading to the rise of the February 20th movement was the continued 
lags in socio-economic development under the King’s leadership.  Morocco faced severe 
political and economic challenges, including a poverty rate of 9 percent, an illiteracy rate of 35 
percent,8 and an unemployment rate of 9.1 percent (International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
According to the United Nations Human Development Report (2013), Morocco trailed most 
Arab countries on the three major factors related to human development:  life expectancy, 
educational attainment, and a decent standard of living.  Morocco ranked 130th among the 
                                                        
8 The illiteracy rate of Morocco is a highly contested figure.  Nevertheless, members of the February 20th movement 
generally cite the figure at 47 percent. The most conservative figure that the same movement’s activists cited was 33 
percent. 
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countries of the world, 15th in the Arab world, and 4th in the Maghreb region behind Algeria 
Libya and Tunisia.  Morocco scored medium on the human development index along with 
Jordan, the occupied Palestinian territory, Egypt, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq.  Three other 
countries of the Maghreb region (Libya, Tunisia and Algeria) fared better than Morocco.  The 
liberalization programs that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund funded also 
widened the gap between the wealthy and the working poor in Morocco (Maghroui, D., 2011).  
While international development programs provided opportunities for some, the number of 
individuals falling within the marginalized social groups in Morocco’s major cities still 
increased.  
A fourth topic of concern that gave rise to the February 20th movement was the status of 
gender equity.  While Morocco did pass laws designed to promote more gender equality, those 
measures failed to have a substantial impact on the ground.  The Gender Equality Index (GII) 
examined the gap between men and women in three fundamental categories:  reproductive 
health, empowerment, and economic activity.  According to the 2013 Gender Equality Index, the 
rate of female unemployment was higher than that of men in Morocco.  Morocco ranked 92nd 
out of 149 countries around the globe, and scored worse than its regional neighbors, Tunisia and 
Libya, which ranked 48th and 40th respectively (United Nations Development Programme, 
2014).  Gender disparities in education exacerbated women’s problems.  According to a United 
Nation’s national illiteracy survey in Morocco, 38.5 percent of the population was illiterate, with 
a rate of 46.8 percent for women and 31.4 percent for men (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2011).  Further, low literacy rates in Morocco, particularly 
among women, were a major barrier to the socioeconomic reforms.  
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With rising public expectations for genuine reform and a regional context that frustrated 
realizations of reform, a desire for radical change grew within the Moroccan kingdom.  The 
internal historical and political contexts of Morocco, as well as the regional context of other 
youth-inspired movements sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa, gave rise to the 
February 20th movement.  Within such a dynamic context, the February 20th movement led 
nationwide protests to speed political changes, including constitutional reform. 
The Rise of the February 20th Movement 
On February 20th 2011, between 150,000 and 300,000 citizens in 53 cities across 
Morocco marched in the streets, calling for democracy and change (Hoffmann & Konig, 2013; 
Maghraoui, 2011; Molina, 2011).  While Moroccan youth initiated the movement, members from 
other age groups also joined (Maghraoui, 2011).  The movement’s members implored the 
Moroccan government to reform the nation’s political system and to fight governmental 
corruption.  For the first nine months, the members of the February 20th movement held weekly 
demonstrations in various cities around the country and monthly marches nationwide in support 
of its cause.  
Unlike counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya, the Moroccan activists did not 
demand a regime change.  Instead, they called for a constitutional monarchy that would restrict 
the judicial and executive powers of the King.  They also called for constitutional reform, 
chanting the popular slogan “Al shaab uridou dusturan jadid” (the people want a new 
constitution).  The February 20th movement denounced the lack of citizen power in relation to the 
state and encouraged the reformulation of these power relations.  At first, the movement activists 
described their goals as focused on more democracy and an end of corruption, as well as 
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improved infrastructure for education, healthcare, quality of life, and jobs.9  Following the 
subsequent regime’s violent clampdown, activists added the release of political prisoners to their 
central demands.  As one film student activist from Rabat stated, “We don’t want just to remove 
a system or to remove a regime, but we want to see our fellow citizen able to claim their rights 
and to have their plight heard.”  A male activist from Casablanca agreed:  “We want to see our 
fellow citizens able to claim their rights and to have their grievances heard.”   On the whole, the 
movement’s main goals revolved around removing fear, fighting hogra  (oppression), and 
contesting the Moroccan status quo.   
While the social and political protests the February 20th movement sparked in Morocco 
were not new, the appeal of the movement on the streets signaled a major shift in popular 
attitudes regarding the monarchy and the country’s sociopolitical situation.  Unlike any other 
previous Moroccan political movements, the February 20th movement took more risks and was 
more audacious in attempting to achieve its goals and in generating new ways of challenging the 
regime (Hoffmann & Konig, 2013; Maghroui, 2011; Molina, 2011).  The movement confronted 
the state with specific political and economic demands.  One of the major issues it continuously 
raised was the relationship between the business elites and the makhzen.  It critiqued the 
makhzen’s corruption and unchecked power (Maghraoui, 2011).  During the movement’s first 
few months, its members also called for freedom and socioeconomic justice for all Moroccans.  
As time passed the movement’s slogans became much more politicized and focused on 
individual members of the government and the King’s entourage.  In particular, the membership 
                                                        
9
 Interviews with activists will be cited throughout the dissertation without reference to the names of individuals to 
protect the identity, safety, and confidentiality agreements of those who participated in this study; instead, 
information such as location of the interview, role of the individual in the movement, or other general information 
will be provided. Interviews are cited only when research participant agreed to go on the record.  
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targeted Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi.  Finally, the movement condemned Morocco’s record of 
human rights violations (Maghraoui, 2011). 
Activists in the February 20th movement maintained that the best approach for achieving 
their goals was through raising consciousness through heightened literacy, education and critical 
analysis.  To make its messages audible, meaningful, and unifying, the movement used different 
media platforms, such as music, promotional videos, films, protest signs and street theater.  Most 
of their activities revolved around raising awareness and transforming consciousness through 
cultural education that included street performances and art.  All together, the movement’s 
activities invited open reflection in an effort to redefine both self and nation.  As such, many 
activists characterized the movement as a civic call to citizenship that would serve as a direct 
response to the status quo.  
Organization of the February 20th Movement 
The February 20th movement was a decentralized movement with no unified command 
structure.  It functioned as a horizontally organized and nonhierarchical movement.  However, 
the movement had key activists within each city that attended all of the meetings and played a 
key role with the movement’s communication strategies.  As a semi-structured social movement, 
the February 20th movement had different committees, including a general assembly that voted 
on issues related to the movement’s central goals.  Local committees, known as tansikiyat, were 
responsible for coordinating political actions and protests (Maghraoui, 2011).  The local 
committees were located in all Moroccan regions, but the most powerful branches were in 
Tangier, Casablanca, Rabat, and the historical marginal areas of the Rif mountains (Hoffman & 
Konig, 2013).  According to a female February 20th activist from Rabat, the four main 
committees were creativity (art and culture), logistics, media, and finance.  Each city had its own 
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general assembly and committees, with each local branch directing their own governance based 
on regional differences and needs.  Each locality had a general assembly that decided its own 
structure and agenda (Hoffman & Konig, 2013).  Within such an organizational template, codes 
of conduct and communication strategies varied from one region to the next.  
 To maximize the number of individuals who could relate to the movement’s demands, the 
February 20th activists used a decentralized model to reach all key constituents.  In this study’s 
interviews, all of the activists identified decentralization as one of the key strengths of the 
movement.  A youth activist from Rabat, who played a key role in the movement’s inception, 
explained that the decentralized nature of the movement helped foster inclusion of diverse voices 
and a means to ensure the activists took major regional demands into consideration.  He stressed: 
A person from down south in a small city near Marrakesh doesn’t necessarily have the 
same priorities as someone who lives in the center of Casablanca.  For example in 
Casablanca you may talk about freedom of expression and freedom of press.  It’s 
something that is urgent while in other cities they might not see it as a priority and if you 
approach them with this demand, as something that is critical, you will lose some of your 
credibility because they will say it just doesn’t concern me.  They have other demands. 
Nationwide inclusion served as an overarching principle of the movement’s choices. 
The activists purposely designed the February 20th movement as a movement without a 
recognizable leading figure.  By doing so, the movement avoided selecting a single leader from 
any one of its special interest subgroups; instead, its local heads emerged from secularists, trade 
unions, Marxists, socialists, atheists, Islamists, and members of various political parties.  The 
breadth of the coalition and its internal diversity inoculated against simple characterizations of 
the movement.  Political Furthermore, the decentralization of the movement made it more 
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difficult for the regime to co-opt or target a ‘leader’ of the movement.  The lack of a single, 
guiding ideology also had the benefit of attracting a significant number of people with different 
socio-economic and political backgrounds (Cavatorta, 2007; Hoffmann & Konig, 2013).  In 
short, rather than rise in response to a single charismatic figure, what united the movement was 
“opposition to authoritarian rule in all its different manifestations” (Maghraoui, 2011, p. 687).  
Many political groups that joined the February 20th movement, such as the labor unions, 
exploited the unrest in the country to strategically advance their own interests and increase their 
bargaining power (Buehler, 2015).  By joining a larger movement operating within a national 
level, labor unions succeeded in securing some of their demands.  In a series of negotiations with 
the state, for example, the labor unions succeeded in acquiring a 70 percent increase in 
retirement pensions and a $80 increase in wages for all public employees regardless of their civil 
service ranking (Buehler, 2015). 
While the heterogeneity of the movement was beneficial in the short term, in long term, 
the structure had serious drawbacks.  The movement encompassed different people who held 
different beliefs and believed in different ideologies.  As one female activist from Tangier 
remembered: 
It is kind of good because everyone can feel that it is their movement, but this also has 
great drawbacks . . ..  The movement was composed of different people who are 
convinced by very different things and different ideologies. We have the Islamists of al-
Adl wal-Ihsan and from the other side you have the Democratic Party.  They had to come 
together and agree on a vision and build a common ground to what they could see as a 
future in Morocco.  
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The movement’s members strived to unite behind a common vision regarding Morocco’s future.  
The main internal challenge was consensus building.  A young male activist from Casablanca 
recounted the resulting tension that occurred at times in the general assembly.  He stated,  
 It wasn’t always smooth because sometimes we would differ on many important points, 
especially in Casablanca and Rabat where the number of activists from the left wing part 
or neutral activists are almost the same in number with al-Adl wal-Ihsan.  But during 
demonstrations I think they would try hard as possible to not impose their ideas.  
Torn by conflicting ideologies, the February 20 movement activists had to agree on a common 
vision that maintained group cohesion and commitment without losing sight of their original, 
fundamental purpose.  
Taken as a whole, the activists’ were divided on whether the heterogeneity of the 
February 20th movement was predominately advantageous or a drawback for the movement.  
Responses ranged from some who thought that the movement somewhat failed because of the 
diversity to others who thought it enriched the movement.  The ones who believed that the 
movement was constrained by its different ideologies cited gender and secular tensions.  
Examples they referenced included the internal organizational disagreements over whether 
female activists should smoke in conservative neighborhoods and whether application of 
religious inspired texts was permissible.  Others believed that the Islamist party specifically 
added value to the movement, and blamed the “laique” (secular) members of harming the 
organization by not wanting Islamist party members to be part of the movement.  To this group 
of activists, the Islamist movement al-Adl wal-Ihsane brought organization to the movement and 
exponentially increased its size.  One female activist questioned about these tensions stressed 
  
69
that an activist becomes willingly or unwillingly a representative of the movement.  In her own 
words:   
When you describe yourself as someone who carries a message and someone who 
convinces another person who may not be as privileged as you, and may not have 
received the same education as you, or might not have had parents who are tolerant as 
yours, you just have to sacrifice your small liberties . . . Your goal is not to affirm 
yourself or your personal will, but the goal is to convince that person and to do whatever 
it takes to convince a person. Wanting to smoke or to do any other things (deemed liberal) 
may shock.  I think those things should have been sacrificed or postponed to another time 
when we are strong enough to do whatever we want. 
The State’s Response to the February 20th Movement 
 To fully understand the context that influenced the strategies of the February 20th 
movement, three Moroccan institutions emerge as pivotal.  These include King Mohammed VI, 
the state media, and the state-security apparatus.  In short, the movement had to respond 
effectively to each of these actors to ensure its survival.  Although some argue that the 
Mohammed VI’s responses to the February 20th movement demands were essentially cosmetic 
(e.g. Maghraoui, 201l; Molina, 2011), his proposed reforms did garner sufficient internal 
consensus and international support to push back calls for more radical and deeper reform 
(Benchemsi, 2012).  Nonetheless, as Moroccan journalist Ahmed Benchemsi (2011) opined, “ . . 
. one thing is certain: the democratic Pandora’s box is open, and will not be closed again” 
(para.11).  To more fully understand how the February 20th movement prompted certain, if 
incremental, changes to Morocco’s socio-political landscape, exploring how the various 
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components of the monarchy worked to constrain the advances of the movement is a necessary 
step for understanding the movement’s broader context.   
King’s Response  
 After February 20th demonstrations developed within each major city of its kingdom, 
King Mohammed VI responded to the movement’s demands with a national televised speech.  
Even though he did not mention the pro-democracy movement or the massive protests that were 
sweeping the region, the March 9th speech was notable because it was the first time a Moroccan 
king had ever responded to street protests by addressing a national audience.  King Mohamed VI 
delivered his historical speech in classical Arabic and promised to take steps to speed up the 
democratization process.  He also called for major constitutional reforms aimed specifically at 
democratizing the political system.  The promised reforms included respect for human rights and 
the rule of law, comprehensive constitutional reforms, independence of the judicial system, and 
an elected government more reflective of the will of the people.   
Mohammed VI seized the opportune moment to maximize the potential impact of his 
words, because, unlike the other Arab rulers who waited to publicly respond to massive Arab 
Spring demonstrations, the King responded to the Moroccan people in short order.  By doing so, 
he distanced himself from the political trajectory of other Arab rulers who relied upon violent 
responses to internal protests that detached the rulers from their people and shifted public 
demands towards dismantling entire political systems.  As such, the timing of the King’s speech 
functioned as a useful rhetorical device to expand the conditions of possibility. 
In the speech itself, King Mohammed VI differentiated himself from his father by 
reiterating acts of democratic reform he had initiated since his assumption of the monarchy.   In 
the King’s words,  
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Many significant accomplishments have been made thanks to an innovative concept of 
authority, far-reaching political reforms, major development projects and ground breaking 
historical reconciliations . . . . Ever since my accession to the Throne, I have sought to 
bring about the right conditions for thorough institutional reform” (“King Mohammed VI 
of Morocco Historic Speech,” 2011).10   
To emphasize his commitment and will for political change, the King characterized his efforts as 
“comprehensive reforms,” “wide ranging,” “constructive national debate” and “profoundly deep 
reform.”  The speech was strategically framed to focus on his positive reforms and deflect 
attention from the failures of past Moroccan monarchies or the burgeoning revolutions in 
neighboring countries. 
Throughout his address to the nation, the King argued that the timing was now ripe for 
Morocco to undertake even more meaningful reforms.  He stated, “Morocco has matured” and 
“Morocco is ready for change.”  By placing reform in a temporal context, he rhetorically 
distanced himself from other Nation’s experiences in the Arab Spring.  Drawing a contrast with 
other Arab leaders in the region, he insisted that reforms have been underway since he became 
the King, while noting that only now was the country ready to take further steps to develop a 
new constitution.  Placed within such a context, reasons for the slow reforms within the kingdom 
were not attributable to his personal failure, but were, instead, a necessary step to prepare the 
country for the proper moment to undertake substantial, historical reforms. 
Having situated the timing of the speech strategically, his speech unveiled a series of 
unprecedented, democratic changes for Moroccans.  For the first time in Moroccan history, the 
King named the Amazigh people and culture as central to the Moroccan identity and recognized 
                                                        
10
 All quotations from the King’s national speech on March 9th 2011 will be directly quoted from the video file 
found in YouTube. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, all references to the King’s words will be indicated in 
the preface to the quotation.   
  
72
the Tamazigh language within the constitution.  He rhetorically shifted the Moroccans from his 
subjects to citizens, and called for a national referendum to change the constitution.  
Furthermore, he positioned the audience to participate in the proposed reforms.  He stated, 
I call on everyone to be mobilized in order to ensure the success of this crucial 
constitutional undertaking, to show determination, commitment and a keen sense of 
purpose, and to put the nation’s best interest above all other considerations.  I should like 
to say how proud I am of the sincere patriotism shown by my loyal people across the 
kingdom, by committed political parties and trade unions and by our ambitious youth.  I 
hope the broad national debate will cover issues that are of crucial importance for the 
nations and the citizens. 
This statement from Mohammed VI was the first time in the nation’s history that the nation’s 
monarch referred to the Moroccan people as “citizens” rather than “subjects” or “loyal people”. 
He did not attempt to persuade the Moroccan people to support the monarchy, as their support 
was already inherent in his subject position.  Instead, the King’s strategic word choice 
interpellated the public into a collective of active Moroccan citizens prepared to take action.11  
The King’s speech also offered no action alternative for Moroccans but to mobilize for 
constitutional reform.  Interestingly, the monarch merged the topics of his loyal people, 
patriotism, citizens, and a call for action throughout his address.  From the King’s perspective, to 
be patriotic required the nation’s citizens to put the nation’s best interests first, which in turn 
translated into giving the monarch another opportunity to implement his proposed reforms.  
Together, audience constitution and the strategy of limiting the audience actions dissolved any 
conflict between the continuation of the monarchy and achieving democracy.  
                                                        
11 For more on how rhetoric performs its constitutive function, see Charland (1987) and Leff & Utley (2004).   
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While Mohammed VI explicitly called for a participatory democracy, he retained the use 
of his religious standing to maintain his state of exception.  Daadoui (2011) noted that the 
Moroccan monarchy banked on religious capital and based its legitimacy on socio-religious 
concepts and practices of Baraka, amir al mu’minin, ba’yaa, and sharaf in order to maintain 
monarchical stability and political survival.  So, while the King’s arguments in the 2011 speech 
were based on representation and participation, his speech was also filled with religious 
references that elevated his status and solidified his demand for sacred recognition.  
Taking on a prophetic persona in the speech, the King emerged as a messenger of God on 
a mission to deliver his new promise.  He started his speech by quoting a religious statement:  
“Praise to be God; May peace and blessings be upon the prophet, his kith, and kin.”  Similarly, 
he ended with a symbolic Quranic verse without reference to the chapter or verse in the Quran:  
“I only intend reform as much as I am able. And my success is not but through Allah.  Upon him 
I have relied and to Him I return.”  Through such religious referents, King Mohammed VI 
characterized the values of the kingdom and the people as first and foremost sacred.  By evoking 
his role as Prince of the Believers, a caliphate title that traces his family lineage to the Prophet 
Mohammed, the King reminded the audience of his sacred authority.  His choice of Quranic 
verses reaffirmed his special title and reinforced the sacred traditions.  This rhetorical authority 
of “sacredness” elevated him to a protected status above the public sphere.  
A more full understanding the rhetorical strategy that the King deployed also requires 
attention to what he did not say.  In the conclusion to the Throne speech, the King cited only half 
of the Quranic verse in context, namely the part where he embodied a prophetic persona.  He 
stated, “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can 
only come from Allah.  In Him I trust, and unto Him I look.” The omitted first part of the same 
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Quranic verse reads, “O my people, have you considered:  if I am upon clear evidence from my 
Lord and He has provided me with a good provision from Him…?  And I do not intend to differ 
from you in that which I have forbidden you [...].”  Through such an omission, the King chose 
not only to invite the public to further question his actions, but also to blur the public’s 
realization that he was quoting from the Quran and adopting a prophetic persona. 
In the speech the King also invoked Moroccan cultural and historical references to frame 
particular symbols and rituals that institutionalized the government’s legitimacy.  He emphasized 
the special relationship between the Moroccan monarchy and the people by reiterating the 
phrase, “Commemorating the revolution of the King and the people.”  Furthermore, his 
references to “the unity of the state, the nation and the territory” and “territorial integrity” 
reinforced the importance of the monarchy, as it historically functioned as the sole institution 
responsible for safeguarding Morocco’s territorial integrity and national stability.  The appeal 
throughout the speech to particular symbols of Moroccan social identity diffused some of the 
February 20th pro-democracy claims and further legitimized the monarchy and its slow path to 
reform.  
The monarchy responded in ways that, at least on the surface, appeared to allow for 
genuine political reforms within the Moroccan political system.  He promised an “independent 
judiciary,” “the rule of law,” and an “elected government that reflects the will of the people, 
through the ballot box.”  He appointed a constitutional commission made up of 18 local 
experts.12  The King instructed the commission to “listen to political parties, trade unions, youth 
organizations and qualified civil society groups intellectuals and scholars, to work closely with 
them and to seek their views.”  On April 16, 2015, the royal commission also invited members of 
                                                        
12
 According to Benchemsi (2011), the make up of the constitutional commission was very problematic because the 
King appointed the members, who were all loyal civil servants with little independence.  
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the February 20th movement to participate in the discussions.  Many in Morocco felt that the 
King has finally heard them and were encouraged by the King’s direct response to the people, 
especially the recognition of the Tamazight language and his call for a referendum (Errazouki, 
2012).  A pro-regime March 9th counter- movement arose to applaud the King’s efforts.  
Moroccan public opinion moved towards seeing what the new constitution would look like and 
supported the King in his outlined reform agenda (Errazoukki, 2012).  
However, to members of the February 20th movement, the concentration of power still 
remained with the monarch without sufficient checks and balances.  The February 20th 
movement boycotted the talks and rejected the invitation.  Instead of attending, they demanded 
material proof of the King’s commitment rather than solely symbolic acts (Karam, 2011).  The 
February 20 activists challenged the sacredness of the King and his title of Commander of the 
Faithful.  A male activist from Rabat asserted that without genuine reform, “a written constitution 
will not bring real changes.”  Some in the February 20th movement and their supporters conceded 
that the content of the speech was not without merit, but all agreed that it did not go far enough 
and fell short of their demands for an immediate dissolution of both the existing parliament and 
government. 
Simultaneously, those who opposed the King’s process for developing the new 
constitution cited the lack of an independent constituent assembly and lack of governmental 
transparency.  They dubbed the final document “the given constitution” (al destour al mamnuh) 
(Hoffmann & Konig, 2013, p.15), because while the King’s advisors consulted political parties 
about constitutional reform, the palace managers (rather than the constituent assembly) prepared 
the final text over a short, three-month period (Maghraoui, 2011).  One frequently circulated 
online image during the protests captured these activists’ sentiments (see figure 3.1).  The slogan 
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in the picture translates to “The given constitution is thrown in the garbage.”  Activists used this 
image during the protest to rally people to mobilize and called on the people to question the 
process of the proposed reforms.  One of the activists summarized the feelings of many in the 
movement:   “What we wanted was a constituent assembly to write the constitution, like what 
just happened in Tunisia.”  As the monarchy only allowed a two-week period for comment 
between the announcement of the new constitutional changes and the referendum, the Moroccan 
people had little opportunity for meaningful public debate.  For these activists, the referendum 
call was simply a way for the regime to co-opt the movement.  Their June 29, 2011 communiqué 
stated: 
If the makhzen insists on citizen’s participation in the referendum, this is not out of 
concern for democracy and citizenship, but rather to be able to attest the following: that 
the majority of the people support the regime and that only a small minority supports the 
February 20th movement (“Communiqué Mamfakinch/Mamsawtinch,” 2011). 
From the perspective of these activists, nothing had really changed; the regime was simply using 
different methods to continue to reaffirm its power and authority.  
Despite shortcomings, many local and international articles praised the Moroccan state’s 
response to protests as a model of peaceful reform.  Internationally, political figures such as 
Secretary of State Clinton and French president Sarkozy lauded the speech as a “profound 
change,” “impressive,” “courageous,” and “a regional model to learn from” (“Mideast uprising: 
Is Morocco a Regional Model,” 2011, p. 1).  The national media and the political and religious 
institutions called on the Moroccan people to support the new reforms that the monarch 
proposed.  Media outlets, religious institutions, and different government institutions backed the 
referendum and supported the King.  One activist stated, “After the speech, all you heard is how 
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the reform will be.”  After the constitutional referendum, the movement dwindled in numbers 
and the Islamist faction, al-Adl wal-Ihsan, quit the February 20th movement.  
State Media’s Response  
Since the political challenges that the February 20th movement posed to the state were 
serious, media outlets and forums close to the regime carried out an intense campaign to discredit 
and delegitimize the movement (Kinani, 2011, “Revue de Presse Marocaine Ecrite,” 2011).  
National media outlets portrayed the activists as delinquents and uneducated youth who were 
interested in creating national instability and public disorder (Errazoukki, 2012).  February 20th 
movement activists accused the Moroccan state-sanctioned media of falsely claiming the 
movement barely existed and that it had cancelled planned protests.  When such press efforts 
failed, the media then accused the involved youth of being disloyal to the King, as working for 
Algerian national interests, and as having jeopardized the Western Sahara issue (Errazoukki, 
2012; Lalami, 2011).  For example, Moncef Belkhayet, Morocco’s Youth Minister used online 
platforms to portray the movement organizers as working for Algerian foreign agents.  He stated: 
“My personal position, as a Moroccan citizen who lives in Casablanca, and not in Paris or 
Barcelona, is that this march is today manipulated by the Polisario, with the goal of creating 
street clashes that will weaken the position of our country in the United Nations regarding the 
human rights situations in Sahara” (as qtd. in Lalami, 2011, par. 3).  Furthermore, to bolster 
Belkhayat’s accusations, pro-government activists and people close to the makhzen reinforced 
these allegations by circulating photos of activists inside a church or with Saharan activists 
(Errazoukki, 2012; Lalami, 2011).   The portrayals positioned the February 20 activists as not 
only traitors to their country, but also as traitors to their faith.  
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Both the media and the regime also singled out certain February 20th members as leaders 
of the movement.  Many of the activists recounted how the regime tried to break one of the 
activists, Ousama Al Khlifi, by portraying him both as the leader of the movement and as a 
member of Party of Modernity and Authenticity (PAM), a collective Moroccans perceive as the 
Party of the King (Hoffman & Konig, 2013).  While both efforts failed, Al Khlifi lost all 
credibility within the February 20th movement, which led to his public apology and his 
withdrawal from the movement.  
From the perspective of the activists, the national and international media failed in their 
role as watchdog over the atrocities of governmental authorities.  National media RTM and 2M 
media did not publicly hold the regime accountable for many of its purported crimes.  The 
activists indicated that they had asked members of the press to go and document the regime’s 
violent acts and otherwise controversial responses to the movement’s activities, but the media 
writers refused.  Further, a state-led media blockade prevented journalists from reporting such 
issues (Errazoukki, 2012).  According to the activists interviewed for this study, the police seized 
citizen journalist videos and burned documentation of state-led violence.  Activists also criticized 
international journalists for only wanting to go to places where the citizens spoke English.  The 
state media provided little effective check on government responses, leaving activists with a 
heavy burden of proof. 
State Apparatus’s Response 
Agencies within the Moroccan state apparatus were the final actors that significantly 
shaped the movement’s strategies.  One of the main challenges to the movement was the 
regime’s long history of successfully co-opting opposition groups.  As one activist questioned, 
“How can you attack a strong system with its sophisticated means?”   Activists shared the 
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regime’s methods of co-optation, including using money to buy protestors loyal to the King’s 
cause. They indicated that governmental actors paid poor people to go to the streets and chant, 
“long live the King.”  On a larger scale, the state apparatus would at times try to buy an entire 
village for its silence.  A senior female activist from Casablanca described how the state gave 
120 bikes to citizens in the small town of Taza to silence people’s grievances and stop them from 
joining the protest.  She concluded, “The government gives you something really small to live on 
and buys your silence, but it does not give you your dignity.”  The same activist shared her 
frustration at the movement’s lack of resources to respond to such tactics.  
The sometimes-brutal response of the regime also caused serious problems within the 
movement.  According to activist accounts, the police violently clamped down on public 
demonstrations, detained and incarcerated the most exposed activists, and tortured political 
prisoners (Hoffman & Konig, 2013; Jacobs, 2014).  One online February 20th movement 
statement posted on March 13, 2011 reported the regime’s clampdown on demonstrations by 
stating: 
Hunt the nature of the ‘makhzen,’ it comes back galloping! Even if the makhzen, through 
the king’s address to the nation, talks about collective liberties and the holiness of the 
democratic choice, wild repression has lashed down on the youth of the 20 February this 
Sunday morning in Casablanca. We have to continue to fight for the fall of tyranny on the 
20 March (“Feb 20 Casa Repression Sit-in Dimanche Matin,” 2011). 
Prominent examples of police repression and brutality included the beating of Khadija Riyadi, 
President of Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), the incarceration of Mouad 
Belghawat, a young rapper from a poor working class neighborhood in Casablanca, and the 
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detention of Rachid Niny, the publisher and editor of Morocco’s most popular Arabic newspaper, 
Al- Massae.  
Another tactic the state apparatus employed to discredit and undermine the February 20th 
movement was shaming and slandering the reputation of the activists.  The regime accused some 
of the most outspoken activists of committing illegal activities including extramarital relations, 
drug possession, drinking alcohol, belonging to a satanic group, and serving foreign agendas 
(Monjib, 2014).  The security apparatus criminalized dissent as police arrested activists simply 
because of their affiliation with the movement (Errazoukki, 2012).  A female activist shared her 
personal story of when the police knocked on the door of her home and stated to her family 
members and neighbors that she was involved in illegal activity.  This public shaming tactic 
exerted pressure on the families to forbid their daughters from joining the movement.  As one 
activist stated, “We are much weaker than the government and the system, so we have to do a lot 
of effort.  There is this whole system that is waiting for you to make the smallest mistake in order 
to turn your reputation and to prevent people from joining what you are doing right now.”  The 
regime used slandering and shaming tactics to instill fear and silence critical voices of potential 
and current movement members far beyond that of the specifically targeted individual.  Families 
feared for their sons and daughters and tried to persuade them to not participate in any major 
protest or movement activity.   
All of the interviewed activists recalled that the regime used violence and brutality 
against the protestors. Some also discussed police brutality that resulted in the deaths of many, 
especially in the northern region of the Rif.  Lawyers for some detained activists described the 
violent nature of the activists’ confinement and lack of medical assistance (Errazoukki, 2012).  
Furthermore, one female activist from Tangier shared the story of an activist who passed away 
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while in the custody of the authorities.  She stated, “In Asfi, there was a young man called Kamal 
el Amari.  He passed away under the violations of authorities and things used to get very violent 
and bloody at times.”  Activists who sought medical help at local hospitals were arrested and 
questioned (Errazoukki, 2012).  The places that the police mostly targeted were the small towns 
in the south and the small cities in the north, especially the Nador and Rif areas.  
Fear was the main tactic the state apparatus deployed to dissuade the Moroccan populace 
from joining the movement.  The state apparatus emphasized that Morocco was on the right path, 
focusing on all the new infrastructure projects headed by the National Initiative for Human 
Development.  By focusing on the economic development and political reforms, it warned 
against the February 20th movement and accused the activists of leading the nation to chaos, or 
fitna.  During the first major demonstration in Tangier, for example, the police and security 
system were absent even when violence erupted.  The state apparatus accused the members of 
February 20 movement as perpetrators of the violence.  The February 20th activists denied such 
allegations and accused groups loyal to the regime (baltajiyya) as being the main instigators.  
According to the activists, the state bribed baltajiyya groups to create chaos in the streets with 
the end goal of creating a negative image of the movement.  Activists recounted instances when 
the police distributed papers that authorities had signed ordering people not to demonstrate 
because such actions were illegal. The authorities also arrested some of the activists for 
disturbing the public order (Errazoukki, 2012; Lalami, 2011).   
With the possibility of being sentenced for participating in a protest activity, the stakes 
for movement involvement were high for the activists and the general Moroccan public.  
According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2011), “Authorities have over the years charged 
hundreds of Moroccans with participating in ‘illegal’ demonstrations and courts have sentenced 
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many of them to prison terms of few to several months” (Human Rights Watch Report, 2011, 
para.8).  The high personal costs of the state apparatus’ strategy dissuaded many in the Moroccan 
populace not to join the protests.  
Along with police brutality, slandering, and state cooptation, the police also utilized 
infiltration as a strategy to undermine the movement.  The February 20th movement had no 
mechanism to vet the people joining their cause.  Given the movement’s high recruitment goals, 
they welcomed all to join.  Many of the activists shared stories of when they suspected one of the 
members to being part of the security services.  One of the activists from Casablanca discovered 
that one of the February 20th members who came and was outspoken against the regime in every 
meeting was, in actuality, a policeman.  The infiltration strategy affected both the trust level and 
camaraderie within the movement.  
As the February 20th movement increased its success over time, activists faced police 
brutality, state cooptation, slandering and infiltration.  These challenges affected both the group 
cohesion within the movement and the outside perceptions of the movement.  This challenging 
context motivated the members to creatively develop ways to build trust between members and 
with the broader Moroccan public.  
Summary and Conclusions 
The lack of connection between the raised expectations of reform under the King 
Mohamed VI and the ongoing frustrations with conditions on the ground gave rise to the 
February 20 movement.  Given the lack of significant internal progress and the inspiration of the 
upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, February 20 movement members called for nationwide protests 
on February 20, 2011 to speed political change. Unlike the neighboring prodemocracy 
movements, the February 20th Movement called for genuine constitutional and political reforms, 
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not the fall of the regime. They called for a constitutional monarchy that would restrict the 
judicial and executive powers of the King, including a system whereby the legislative, judiciary, 
and executive branches functioned independently and the government would be accountable to 
the people.  The movement also called for an improved infrastructure that would remove 
corruption and improve the citizenry’s quality of life.   It denounced the constitutional process 
and outcome initiated by the King and called on Moroccans to boycott the referendum. 
The activists were faced with several challenges including a staggering illiteracy rate, 
strong media censorship, political repression, a ritualized monarchical public sphere, and divided 
public opinion on political reforms. With police brutality and indiscriminate arrests of political 
activists on the rise, the movement called for freedom of speech and demanded that the state 
release of all political prisoners associated with the movement.  The lack of an independent 
media in Morocco prompted the February 20 movement to rely on other means to report acts of 
state subjugation and disseminate information about the movement.  In a context where state 
rituals and symbolism have long-standing legitimacy, the February 20th movement had to 
constantly find innovative means in creating and maintaining allegiance to have their messages 
heard.   
The sociopolitical challenges facing the February 20th movement were complex.  The 
movement operated within a highly ritualized public sphere where the monarchy had legitimacy 
amongst the people.  As such, the February 20 movement had to develop response strategies for 
the King who held sacred status, the corrupt state security apparatus, and the unresponsive state 
media.  Recognizing the complexity of the context, replete with its various actors, creates a lens 
for examining the various strategies that the February 20 movement used and the reasons for 
their deployment.  Rather than treat the Moroccan government as a homogenous response entity, 
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the relationships between these different political actors provide space to investigate the 
mechanisms of power and the resulting action of the February 20th movement.  With this 
multifaceted context, the subsequent chapters will focus on ways in which the February 20 
movement attempted to challenge legitimacy of the system in place and encourage participatory 
politics from below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1 The New Constitution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 All photos included in this dissertation are courtesy of the activists.
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Chapter Four 
Building a Collective: Towards a Participatory Politics Model 
Faced with a divided Moroccan citizenry and a regime deploying a multifaceted approach 
to further fractionalize calls for far-reaching reform, the February 20th movement needed 
sustainable collective strategies to achieve its goals.  This chapter focuses on the ways the 
movement utilized appeals to redefine national identity in ways that could appeal to various 
target audiences.  Through implementation of various cultural and linguistic practices, the 
movement worked to reformulate traditional concepts of nation and state, create a shared history 
of oppression and resistance, and envision a new era of participatory politics.  I will begin by 
identifying particular linguistic and ideological challenges the movement had to negotiate to 
unite the public behind goals of significant political reform.  I will then proceed to describe the 
February 20th movement’s linguistic and cultural strategies for building a unified collective, and 
conclude with how those strategies allowed the movement to respond effectively to the 
Moroccan state’s efforts to contain and coopt the group.   
Challenges of Building Collective Identity 
Given the history of colonialism in Morocco, the February 20th movement faced rampant 
structural and symbolic marginalization of its potential recruits.  In response, the movement 
embraced at once a policy of redistribution of wealth while also calling for the recognition of 
identities and cultural practices that were rendered invisible or suppressed by colonialism and its 
aftermath.  The complexity of colonialism, which manifests itself in lasting social inequalities, is 
at once social and psychological.  Moroccan Dutch psychiatrist Said Bellari (2010) described the 
aftermath of colonialism as “a mental complex deeply rooted in our collective mind and would 
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take generations to overcome” (para. 3).  For the colonized mind to liberate itself, an initial 
acknowledgement of the past and recognition of the general struggle needed to overcome that 
past must occur (Fanon, 2011).  Individuals need to go through psychological, political and 
cultural self-transformations (Fanon, 2008).  As Freire (2011) explained, “The awakening of 
critical consciousness leads the way to the expression of social discontents precisely because 
these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation” (p.36).  For the February 20th 
movement, the activists needed to identify, and then respond to, the structural and symbolic 
marginalization of Moroccan subgroups to achieve the end goals of social justice and liberation.  
At the genesis of the February 20th movement, language politics in Morocco was a clearly 
visible manifestation of such marginalization.  Even with more than half of the Moroccan 
population of Amazigh descent (Tayler & Boulat, 2005) and the majority of Moroccans using 
Darijia (an Arabic vernacular mixing Tamazight, French, and Spanish words) to communicate 
(Pennell, 2000; Sadiqi, 2003), the Moroccan government generally repressed, or, in some cases, 
banned Tamazight (Sadiqi, 2003).  The Moroccan government encouraged the use of Amazigh 
culture and language only during performances and state festivals.  The late King Hassan II 
excused the marginalization of Amazigh by asserting Moroccan identity and insisting he could 
not accept identity politics within the kingdom (Bahaji, 2011).   
Language politics in Morocco functions as a visible manifestation of the inferiority 
complex of past colonial history.  The February 20th activists viewed that many Moroccans 
positioned themselves to the civilizing language, French.  French is the unofficial language of the 
kingdom and seen as prestigious and the “civilizing” language of choice (Sadiqi, 2003).  French 
plays a significant role in Morocco as it serves as the main language in business and in some of 
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the government sectors.  In big cities, the Moroccan elite speak French or code switch between 
Daarija and French (Pennell, 2000).  As Bellari (2010) explained, 
[I]n the matter of language the question does not even beg for an answer:  every 
Moroccan academician, scientist, entrepreneur, artist, writer, doctor, politician or 
whatever key societal character, will easily admit that French is still the Master of the 
Moroccan Universe.  In more than 50 years France has still succeeded in keeping the 
illusion in Morocco alive and kicking that we need our historical and cultural ties with it.  
It is a communal trance-like state of mind that is inhibiting our progress” (para. 3).  
The activists held a consensus view that the Moroccan language inferiority complex remnant of 
the past colonial policy of  “divide and conquer” needed to be urgently addressed.  To redress the 
situation, activists chose to elevate the status of Darijaa.  
For the February 20th activists, the current political culture and state-based discourse 
practices were problematic.  Formally rejecting Morocco’s linguistic roots in a move that 
simultaneously elevated Arab influence over the nation’s contemporary culture, the 2010 
Moroccan constitution named Modern Standard Arabic as the officially recognized national 
language.  Modern Standard Arabic functioned as the language of choice for Morocco’s official 
events and for the King’s speeches.  More than 80% of the interviewed activists expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the Moroccan state’s political discourse.  To them, the political discourse was 
elitist and alienating, which encouraged non-participatory politics.  The politicians’ use of 
classical Arabic when speaking to a nation that suffered from a high illiteracy rate was not 
enabling an active public sphere.  Many cited examples of how the Moroccan public could not 
understand the King’s speech to the nation in response to the protests due to the monarch’s 
reliance on Modern Standard Arabic.  Activists described how they had to construct messages 
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that various Moroccan publics could understand.  The hope for such an endeavor was to build a 
new political discourse that was all-engaging and all-inclusive.  
 The use of Modern Standard Arabic also had a strong association with the language of 
Islam and of the Quran (Pennell, 2000; Sadiqi, 2003).  A young male activist from Casablanca 
recounted the friction and tension that occurred at times between the Islamic contingent and 
others in the February 20th General Assembly.  He stated, “It wasn’t always smooth because 
sometimes we would differ on many important points, especially in Casablanca and Rabat where 
the number of activists from the left wing part or neutral activists are almost the same in number 
with the Islamist party Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence).”  
Building of a Collective Identity 
Facing high illiteracy rates, a highly divided public on national reform, and a diverse 
conglomerate of linguistic and ideological groups, the February 20th movement had to creatively 
form a solid basis of appeal for people to connect with the goals of the movement.  The February 
20th movement used a range of strategies to create a new discourse of identity that emphasized 
the agency of those affected the most by injustice.  Language choices, reappropriation of national 
symbols, slogans, and symbolic rituals were all examples of the variety of strategies the activists 
deployed as they worked to encourage mobilization and collective action.  The movement’s 
shared values, traditions, language(s), symbols, and ritualized behavior encouraged participatory 
politics and built unlikely coalitions across various political and religious spectrums.  This study 
defines participatory politics as politics that is interactive, non alienating, inclusive, where 
individuals and groups can exert pressure for social change.  
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Linguistic Pragmatism  
For many of the February 20th movement senior strategists, language choice was a key 
component for rendering visible the social and ideological inequalities.  A female activist from 
Casablanca and Tangier stressed the centrality of language strategies for achieving the 
movement’s goals when she stated, “We focus on language more than anything else.”  The 
movement’s strategic use of linguistic approaches included the use of subaltern vernaculars, 
simple word choice, cultural codes, multilingual formats, and goals of linguistic inclusion.  
Subaltern Vernaculars:  Daarija as the Moroccan Language 
 The February 20th activists relied on subaltern vernaculars to help mobilize the subaltern 
publics and avoid perceptions they were building a bourgeois social movement.  A male 
journalist activist from Casablanca stated, “We chose the language that was very close to 
Moroccans.  People do not speak Modern Standard Arabic, so we used language that they used. 
The things that we want the media to understand and transmit were in English, French, and 
Modern Standard Arabic.”  In general, all of the interviewed activists prioritized the Moroccan 
language, Daarija.  One female activist from Casablanca and Tangier, for example, recounted the 
omnipresent use of Daarija within the movement’s communications:  “Whenever there was a call 
to demonstrate, it would be in Daarija, Amazigh, and classical Arabic.”  Representating the 
strong sentiment shared by the movement’s senior strategists, one senior businessman who owns 
a large share of an independent newspaper and participated in all of the February 20th protests 
and marches, insisted, “Daarija is not a dialect, its the national language of Morocco… people 
were expressing themselves in Daarija.”  For the activists, the use of Daarija played an important 
role in the formation and construction of a collective Moroccan identity.   
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The February 20th activists expressed multiple reasons for elevating the status of Daarija 
in the movement’s communications.  A male activist from Rabat remembered that the 
movement’s activists circulated press releases and pamphlets in marginal neighborhoods written 
exclusively in Daarija for the purpose of bolstering inclusivity and identification.  One young 
artist who served as a movement activist emphasized that the movement made a conscious 
decision to use Daarija to distinguish itself from colonizing influences.  He stated, “Daarija is not 
a dialect, it is a language in of itself and has its own rules and it doesn’t have anything to do with 
Arabic. It is more close to Amazigh than to Arabic actually.”  The use of subaltern vernaculars 
extended to the movement’s use of popular culture.  Many of the activists, who were also artists, 
used their talent to educate the subaltern publics on the latest political developments.  The songs 
utilized simple, memorable lyrics in Daarija, so the people could understand the messages the 
songs conveyed.  By emphasizing Daarija as not only an acceptable, but as a preferred method of 
communicating, the movement’s senior strategists sought rapprochement with Moroccan cultural 
and ethnic heritage.  
Multiplicity of Languages and Calls for Linguistic Inclusion 
 Given the vast diversity of the movement’s membership and its potential recruits, the 
February 20th senior strategists chose to present their messages in multilingual formats.  A female 
activist from Casablanca and Tangier remembered that, “Even slogans used to be written in 
different languages.”  She went on to explain that such an approach “helped the most in the 
decentralization of the movement because the February 20th movement came first from Rabat 
and Casablanca.”  Through the usage of multilingual formats, the activists wanted to broaden 
their outreach and unite Moroccans under a common identity.  
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One language the movement targeted in particular for inclusion in its multi-lingual 
approach was Amazigh.  The Amazigh protest movement, a previously constituted collective 
who had historically struggled for the state to recognize Amazigh as a national and official 
language, functioned as a decisive discursive force within the February 20th movement (See 
figure 4.1).  Responding to the Amazigh supporters, the February 20th movement officially called 
for constitutional recognition of the Amazigh language (Rachidi, 2011).  The Amazigh language 
was visible in most of the February 20th movement’s online and offline communication, 
including in all of their campaign videos that called for national protests.  Similarly, vibrant 
flags, banners and signs in Amazigh colored the streets during the protests.  The February 20th 
activists’ use of Amazigh marked their affiliations within a collective and enabled the movement 
to build alliances and relational networks across sites of resistance.  
Meaning Making: Slogans and Cultural Codes  
  To facilitate its target audiences’ broadest level of understanding, the February 20th 
movement focused on use of message simplicity.  All of the interviewed activists provided 
similar descriptions of the mechanisms they employed to identify with the various segments of 
the Moroccan population.  As one activist insisted, their strategy was to simplify by “removing 
the fat talk (kelma Ghaleda).”  When asked to clarify what the movement’s members meant by 
that reference, one male activist from Rabat stated,  
Ghaleda is the complicated words in the books.  It’s good to read but it is not good to 
speak to people like in the books.  One needs to know how to speak to people and reach 
them with their own language. 
He used one example, fasad, to illustrate how attention to particular language choices impacted 
the movement’s ability to mobilize diverse publics.  The word ‘fasad’ in classical Arabic has a 
  
93
double meaning:  corruption and prostitution.  As such, when the movement first used the word, 
the activists found that many citizens from marginal neighborhoods did not respond well to their 
messages.  One elderly man came up to the activist and stated that he had more serious concerns 
than the problem of prostitution.  Through this example, the activist illustrated how the use of a 
single word, if misunderstood, negatively impacted the February 20th’s mobilization of particular 
audiences.   
  In addition to relying on simple messages, the February 20th movement adopted culturally 
specific frames to achieve resonance of their messaging.  A male activist from Casablanca that 
served as a spokesperson in many of the movement’s media outreach activities stated that the 
movement wanted to “vulgarize the politics.”  In other words the group wanted to use the 
everyday localized vernacular when discussing politics and the February 20th movement goals.  
As an illustration, the movement moved away from using the word ‘fasad’ to highlight the 
corruption of the Moroccan government to a local phrase in Daarija, ‘shetab derbeg,’ which 
means clean or, literally translated, “broom your neighborhood.”  Such local phrases had a higher 
level of resonance with citizens living in particular neighborhoods the activists targeted for 
mobilization.   
For the February 20th movement activists, emphasizing the local context was a key factor 
in transmitting successful messages and building identification with target audiences.  For 
example, when the activists were attempting to mobilize supporters in the cities, they focused on 
questioning why electricity and water were so expensive.  Since the King’s family owned both 
the electric and water companies that served many cities, the approach served to highlight the 
monopoly the King has over the economic sphere.  Activists were also pragmatic in readjusting 
their linguistic messages to be sensitive to variable local viewpoints.  Perhaps the most 
  
94
illuminating example is how the members of the February 20th movement had to adjust their 
discourse to accommodate the Islamist party within the movement.  When the Islamist party of 
Adl wa Ihsan was part of the movement, some secular activists used religious terms to maximize 
the chances that the Islamist audience heard and did not dismiss their messages.  A student 
activist from Rabat reported that many activists who were non-religious had to use religious 
vocabulary to be heard.  For example, the activists would start the meeting by saying bismillah 
(in the name of God), insh’Allah (God willing), hamduallah (Thank God), and salam wa 
Alaykum (Peace be upon you).  The student activist stressed that these religious phrases were not 
part of his everyday discourse.  However, he learned from his interactions with the Islamists that 
when he used these words, his message was more likely to resonate.  In his own words, 
When we were having the general assembly, we were always having problems with the 
Islamists that will not accept someone if he’s not saying Bismillah.  So at that moment I 
started saying Bismillah.  Why not say it if it will make him happy and he will hear me 
after I say bismillah and Inshallah.  Anyways, these things belong to my culture, so I will 
use it to mobilize.  I will talk more with the language of people. 
Sensitivity to religion, cultural heritage, and geographic location all contributed to the 
movement’s ability to broaden the audience that would listen to its message.  
Part of the February 20th movement strategy for building collective identity was its use of 
slogans.  Slogans in the February 20th movement had three functions.  First, they promoted 
inclusivity by empowering disenfranchised groups who were left out of the political discourse.  
Slogans simplified complex issues and made the information accessible to all target audiences.  
Second, slogans served as alternative information sharing.  With heavy media censorship on 
relevant political developments, slogans served as an effective way to disseminate news about 
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the movement’s goals, domestic political developments, and introduce new ideas.  Lastly, the 
February 20th movement’s slogans embodied cultural codes that invited strong commitment to 
the cause. 
The February 20th movement slogans broadened the generational appeal of the message 
by drawing in young activists.  Unlike the previous sociopolitical movements in Morocco, the 
majority of the February 20th movement members were young people.  These young activists 
wanted to distance themselves from the past and believed that they needed to bring change and 
creativity to the political activism scene.  A male artist and activist who played a lead role in 
writing slogans for the movement illustrated the perspective:   
Young people should go out and not the old.  Our society is full of these young people.  
They have no job and no nothing.  They can do it and fight . . . If we want the regime to 
change, we need to move and speak to these young people. 
Willing to abandon many of the ideals of their parents’ generation, the youth activists did not 
have the same responsibilities as the older generation, such as family obligations.  The February 
20th slogans greatly differed from the slogans of past public uprisings; they were not recited in 
Modern Standard Arabic and they were not long and hard to memorize and understand.  The 
February 20th movement activists took pride in their creativity and wanted to appeal to the youth 
through their witty and easy to remember slogans.  
 For the February 20th activists, their approach to slogans was similar to their general 
outlook on language usage.  Activists stressed that they wanted marginal publics to understand 
what the movement was about and not have a slogan turned into a long manifesto that only 
Moroccan elites would understand.  As one male artist and activist explained, “If the movement 
couldn’t create any new slogans, how can you create a new Morocco?  We needed slogans that 
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people will identify with and like. We needed new slogans.”  One slogan that demonstrated the 
implementation of such a strategy specifically targeted the subaltern publics:  “How can you live 
you poor man when the style of living is sky high.”  This slogan, distributed in Daarija, used 
cultural codes, that when translated to English, loses cultural power.   The translation from 
Daarija to English makes it difficult to capture the entire meaning and cultural reference.  
Another one of the movement’s slogans targeting young people was “everything is in bribes.”  
The problem of corruption and bribes were an issue that all Moroccans easily identified with.  
The activists wanted young, fun, and rhythmic slogans that would be easy to remember. 
 For the activists responsible for writing slogans, the slogans also had to unite the 
heterogeneous Moroccan public that held different views on the necessary political reforms for 
Morocco.  For example, a young male activist from Rabat who was responsible for writing 
slogans stated, “We had to be careful with types of slogans.  We could not say down with the 
regime.  People would be scared and they will runaway.”  Another senior female activist from 
Casablanca further elaborated on why the movement could not say “down with the regime.”  She 
indicated that a direct attack on the King would have destabilized the movement and the people 
would have been too scared to join.  Operating within a context where the state was summoning 
baltagiya in opposition to the February 20th movement,14 the February 20th activists had to be 
extremely careful not to give credibility to the baltagiya slogans, such as "We are with the 
King," "Yes to the constitution, no to the February 20th Movement," and "The February 20th 
Movement protesters are traitors" (Lazare, 2011).  The baltagiya slogans equated the February 
                                                        
14
 Officials from local municipalities summoned and paid people from poor, marginalized, and illiterate areas to 
support their cause.  Some of them had criminal records or were drug addicts. They were paid to either vote for a 
particular party or show support. These baltagiya were present during protests and attacked February 20th movement 
activists.  They are also known as chmakriya.  For more, see Lazare, 2011. 
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20th movement’s actions with a direct attack on the monarchy.  As such, support for the new 
monarch’s constitution meant support for the King himself.   
 In their communication strategies, the activists differentiated between the makhzen and 
the King.  When it came to the makhzen, slogans did not shy away from direct attacks on the 
corrupt system.  Slogans, for example, unmasked the makhzen’s mismanagement and 
squandering of public funds.  One of the slogans stated, “Hey Corrupt Minister, Everything has 
an expiration date. See you March 20th” (the next day planned for large February 20th protests).  
Activists chanted another slogan, “police everywhere and justice nowhere,” during the protests to 
call out police abuse.  This slogan was in direct reference to the police brutality and repression 
present at previous February 20th protests.  Another slogan read, “No to makhzen’s violence, no 
to oppression, no to terrorism.”  The inclusion of terrorism in the slogan functioned to respond 
directly to state allegations that the participants within the movement were inciting terrorism.  In 
general, slogans did not refrain from targeting the makhzen directly, as perhaps most evident in 
the movement’s highly circulated slogan “down with the makhzen.”  
The movement’s activists utilized culturally coding of the slogans to better identify the 
movement with its target audience.  Activists were adept at adapting slogans and cultural 
parables that were familiar within certain Moroccan sectors.  One of the February 20th main 
slogan writers, for example, used one of the slogans he created to illustrate how the movement 
coded its messages in Rabat and Casablanca.  His slogan, “We are Moroccans and we belong to 
it, and Majid should understand” was an indirect reference to the King, as ‘Majid’ did not 
literally translate to the word ‘King.’  Known to many, however, the oblique referent allowed the 
movement to avoid shocking the Moroccan people who resisted direct attacks on the sacred 
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monarch.  Without naming the King, the slogan, nevertheless, provided a clear critique of the 
King for the target audience who wanted significant change.  
Another example of a cultural coded slogan came in response to a senior Moroccan 
government official who had publicly stated, “it’s impossible to do democracy in Morocco 
because Moroccans are still not ready for it.”   According to one of the main communication 
senior strategist within the February 20th movement in Rabat, the activists chanted a slogan that 
shamed the “boss” for thinking less of the Moroccan people and thinking that they are not 
capable of having a democracy.  As before, the slogan did not name the King, but used the word 
“lmaalem” (boss).  As such, the slogan embodied a shared cultural vernacular that was therefore 
safe to use during the protests. Through shared cultural codes, the movement challenged 
dominant ideologies and worked to transform the political culture.  
Multimodal Appeals to National Frames 
To inspire others to join the protests, multimodal appeals established national frames that 
evoked a new, inclusive type of social contract that rejected token nationalism devoid of full 
citizenship rights.  The February 20th movement’s campaign videos used three different 
languages to call for a new Moroccan collective identity of all ethnicities, languages, religions 
and socioeconomic classes.  Each of the February 20th movement’s campaign videos commenced 
with an overarching identity claim of Moroccanness and then proceeded to articulate various 
individual grievances for participating in the upcoming protests.  Some videos started with a 
dedication that read, “All victims, All oppressed, All Moroccans, for a better Morocco.”  The 
online campaign videos focus on “Moroccanness” functioned to ground their grievances locally, 
to generate a new understanding of politics, and to create identification built on trust and 
emotional bonds.  Their shared emphasis on cultural commonality and Moroccan identity was 
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anchored in a process of meaning making that sought to change people’s consciousness and 
mobilize supporters.  With the need to maximize participation in the movement’s national march, 
the videos aspired to resonate with a broad swath of the Moroccan people.  
Challenging hegemonic power relations, the February 20th online campaign videos sent a 
message of not only what Morocco should look like, but also what constituted a Moroccan.  The 
second video campaign opened with “We are the Moroccan youth. We love this country and are 
calling for change and Dignity…. We want a government that serves our interests and a 
parliament that represents us.”  By identifying with all Moroccan youth and their love of their 
country, the video’s introduction invited political action.  As such, silence became problematic 
while taking action signified loyalty and love for the Moroccan nation.  
The movement’s videos invited loyalty to the nation through the frequent reiteration of 
two common phrases:  “I am Moroccan” and “We the Moroccan Youth.” The February 20th 
movement developed a common language of “we” and “us” to position the grievances from the 
onset as a collective grievance that affected all Moroccans.  For instance, in the second online 
campaign video, a February 20th activist stated in Tamazight, “I am Moroccan and I am joining 
the protests so that all Moroccans will be equal.”  The use of “I am,” however, reinforced the 
fixity of the subject position by emphasizing a static subject.  Activists within the movement did 
not need to be in complete agreement on ideological frameworks to come together and generate 
collective action.  Regardless of their individual perspectives, the members could articulate the 
power of their own presence with the national collective. 
For the February 20th movement, the process of constituting a broad collective 
necessitated a revision from the historic perspective of top-down Moroccan citizenry formation.  
The movement worked to break down existing conceptualizations of national identity to 
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transform public acceptance of Moroccan social norms and the public’s perception towards the 
movement.  As a political strategy, the movement used national symbols and historic images for 
garnering legitimacy and identification.  The movement’s appropriation of national slogans and 
images became referential, moving the audience to respond and act as the meaning of the historic 
images was malleable.  Such images invited empathy and identification where the audience 
members were encouraged to participate in the creation of the new collective.  
One example of how the movement reappropriated historic images was the use of the 
hand of Fatma.  After the Casablanca terrorist attacks in 2003, but prior to the February 20th 
movement, a particular iteration of the Fatma symbol had emerged to unite the Moroccan people 
in their stand against transgressions that threatened the country and its citizens.  The hand 
symbol incorporated the red and green colors of the Moroccan flag to symbolize nationalism 
(See figure 4.2).  It also included two messages inscribed on the skin of the hand. One in French 
stated, “Ne touch pas a mon pote” which translates to don’t touch my buddy and the one in 
Arabic that translates to “Don’t touch my country.”  The symbol signified unity of Morocco 
during the most difficult times.   
During the early stages of the movement, the 2003 version of the hand of Fatma 
reappeared.  The context of the image’s reemergence was grounded in allegations from state 
media and makhzen, which accused activists of being terrorists and supporting the Poliario Front 
(Kinani, 2011; Lazare, 2011).  Through association with these allegations, the 2003 Fatma 
symbols thus became an indirect way to create fear within the public and warn them against the 
February 20th movement.  According to mamfakinch, these bulletin boards were paid for by 
Mounir Majidi- an affluent Moroccan businessman and personal secretary of the King (“feb20 
Nous aimons notre pays, Monsieur Majidi,” 2011).   
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As a direct response to the state security apparatus, the movement and its supporters used 
the highly recognizable and affect-driven 2003 Fatma symbol.  The movement reappropriated it 
with a new message in Darija: “Don’t suffocate our nation’s Children” and “Don’t steal from my 
Country” (See figure 4.3 & 4.4).  By altering the familiar message included in the image, the 
movement worked to redefine nationalism by shifting the focus to economic social justice and 
freedom.  According to one of the activists from Rabat, the reappropriation of the national image 
was both an intentional and direct movement response to the regime’s allegations and to critique 
the King’s title as “King of the Poor”. These simple, yet symbolic, actions diminished the state’s 
status through what Bayat (2010) characterized as the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” 
(p.45).  The reappropriated symbol simultaneously affirmed loyalty to the nation while 
challenging the boundaries of inclusion in the collective.  
The February 20th movement also utilized provocative strategies of representation to 
challenge official Moroccan societal markers.  For example, the Moroccan national anthem ends 
with the phrase, “God, the Nation, and the King.”  The February 20th movement challenged 
existing understandings of patriotism by replacing “God, Nation, and the King” with “God, 
Nation, and the People” in their singing of the national anthem in the protest marches.  One of 
their famous slogans that was chanted in every protest was “Long Live the People.”  Another 
culturally specific symbol the movement targeted was the stop sign, which consists of two 
Arabic letters.  The reversal of the order of the two letters caused the sign’s meaning to change 
from ‘Stop’ to ‘Wake Up.’  The revised stop sign circulated heavily during the protests and 
rapidly found its way to the Facebook pages of movement supporters.  Such reappropriation of 
visual and national symbols served to deconstruct conventional views of “Moroccanness”, 
marking a radical break with the hegemonic discourse of the state.  
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With the high illiteracy rate and the semi-closed political and media systems, the 
movement relied heavily on images and videos to influence external audiences.  These images 
highlighted the large number of demonstrators, police violence and atrocities, and the wide 
socioeconomic disparity between the poor and the rich.  Some of the movement circulated 
photographs depicted Moroccans carrying signs touting affect driven slogans such as: “We are 
not settling,” “Moroccans are not idiots,” “Where did the money go,” and “We are all 
Moroccan.”  Other slogans, such as “we are all this small village”, focused more on challenging 
existing relationship between the rural villages and the state.  February 20th movement activists 
also visited and visually documented the socioeconomic disparities of these villages.  Most still 
had no access to running water and electricity.  The diverse topics of these photos unmasked the 
widespread impact of hegemonic and corrupt power and revealed numerous assaults on human 
dignity. In a sense, these photos functioned as a source of authority and legitimacy to the 
movement, documenting all that was corrupt with the political system.  
Affective appeals were another key component of how the February 20th movement 
forged its bonds of solidarity through multimodal appeals.  In the second campaign video, for 
example, a young male activist enacted the courage needed to overcome Moroccan oppression 
by stating:  “We are not afraid of the beatings and political detentions do not scare us. On the 
contrary, they give us strength and credibility.”  By showcasing the courage of the activists, the 
video infused positive emotions in the call for collective action.  Such affect-driven appeals of 
identification emboldened the activists after movement setbacks, helped them overcome the 
effects of repression, and became a way for people to internalize the February 20th movement 
claims.  However, the use of affective appeals did not come without a risk.  One activist from 
Rabat maintained that the strategy was a “double-edged sword.”   On the one hand, it inspired 
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people from outside and within the movement to see their passion and how fearless and selfless 
they could be in changing their nation.  On the other hand, such appeals might scare away some 
people from joining (e.g. when they see the police brutality).  After weighing the pros and cons 
of the strategy, the activists decided the potential benefit was worth taking the risk. 
Affect driven narratives called on Moroccans to break away from the hegemonic grip of 
the state.  For instance, the first campaign video ended with an older woman who spoke in 
Darija announcing her right to protest.  Her long personal story was the most striking of those 
including in the movement’s videos, as she stressed her persona as a Moroccan grandmother who 
had suffered abuse at the hands of Morocco’s corrupt system.  She stated,  
I am Moroccan and I am going out on February the 20th. I am going to protest . . .. The 
high food prices are killing me.  Every time I tried to protest against the high prices, the 
authorities abused me.  I don't understand why I am afraid and abused in my own country.  
I was in a peaceful protest, and was beaten and harassed by the police (“Morocco 
campaign #feb20 #morocco,” 2011). 
Her narrative was affect-driven, as Moroccan viewers would not have expected the police to beat 
and abuse an older woman speaking for her right to protest.  Unlike others in the video who 
called for concrete material changes, she called for the right and freedom to peacefully protest 
and assemble.  The use of an older woman invited her audience to mobilize and engage in 
political action.  Her image functioned both as that of a nurturing mother and of a militant for 
freedom.  The use of the woman was halting, as elderly, soft-spoken Moroccan women typically 
did not represent activists within movement populations. Yet, this women’s voice portrayed a 
strong sense of involvement, commitment, and strength.  The video’s subject confounded 
existing cultural codes, thereby solidifying the challenge to the cultural state of fear and inaction. 
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The woman’s story served as a direct appeal to the Moroccan people to join her in the protest 
movement and national march. 
Concluding Remarks 
 In response to the challenges of a highly diverse, differentially disenfranchised, target 
audience, the February 20th movement developed a creative repertoire of intersectional political 
strategies.  The February 20th movement’s ability to mobilize different target audiences relied on 
language and cultural strategies that directly responded to the localized realities on the ground.  
This diversified approach enabled the February 20th movement to avoid fragmentation and 
allowed strong alliances to cross political and religious divides to champion a discourse of 
democratization and social change for all Moroccans.  
The February 20th movement developed and deployed strategies that responded directly 
to a multifaceted set of contextual obstacles.  The many challenges included the sometimes-
brutal response of the regime, the public’s high illiteracy rate, the unsympathetic, if not hostile, 
state media, and a diverse and divided public.  To address these problems and build consensus, 
the February 20th movement created a new collective identity that used national frames to invite 
participation of all Moroccans.  The pluralism that constituted the new collective identity helped 
protect the movement from societal cleavages and from the allegations of the regime.  At the 
same time, it fostered as a new sense of belonging bound in mutual trust.  
The movement’s interpolation of Moroccan subjects as empowered, political citizens 
enabled the movement to challenge the regime’s political, social, and economic norms.  By 
articulating a new, inclusive national identity, the movement cultivated public legitimacy across 
localities, a move necessary to counter state allegations of treason and foreign involvement.  The 
movement’s vision of the national collective avoided forcing the public to position themselves 
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against the nation or the King.  Instead, it reimagined the Moroccan citizenry as individuals with 
the necessary agency to question the inadequacies of the Moroccan political and social status 
through an affirmation of love for their nation. The use of such a citizenship discourse blunted 
the impact of the security system’s accusations that members of the movement were anti-
Moroccan.  It also enabled the movement to engage with diverse segments of the population who 
might have opposing views on the monarchy, but agreed on the need for genuine reform.  
Finally, it helped the movement deflect media accusations that members of the movement 
belonged to one particular subgroup of the Moroccan population.  
 The February 20th movement’s particular attention to language demonstrated how language 
has intimate linkages to social change and concepts of citizenship.  Language choices can both 
alienate or empower citizens in the political process. For the February 20th activists, language 
was key to ensure participation of all Moroccans.  The return to indigenous languages in a region 
that had embraced the language of a former colonizing power highlighted the dehumanizing 
nature of colonialism, helped resolve the citizenry’s sense of inferiority, and built a path towards 
self and national liberation  
 The movement’s decision to target different audiences through the use of Daarija and 
Amazigh, instead of classical Arabic, in its communication strategies worked as a key factor of 
mobilization.  The movement’s use of Amazigh helped mark affiliations within the collective to 
bolster the call for institutionalized recognition of Amazigh as one of the official Moroccan 
languages.  The February 20th movement’s decision to join the previously existing Amazigh 
movement helped build lasting networks and alliances to foster constitutional reform.  
The historical persistence of the Amazigh movement, coupled with the support of the 
February 20th movement for the Amazigh national struggle, pushed the state to eventually 
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acknowledge the power and strength of the Amazigh national discourse. In response to the 
February 20th movement’s demand, the 2011-revised constitution recognized Tamazigh as an 
official language.  The new 2011 amended constitution placed the new language within the 
context of the broader Moroccan national identity by stating: 
The Kingdom of Morocco is a sovereign Muslim State that is attached to its national 
unity and it territorial integrity, and committed to preserve in its fullness and diversity its 
national identity, one and indivisible.  Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-
Islamist, Amazigh and Saharan-Hassanic components, nourished and enriched by its 
African, Andalusian, Hebraic, and Mediterranean influences (Constitution 2011 of 
Moroccan Kingdom, 2011, para. 2).   
The constitutional change marked a notable advance for the Amazigh movement and was a 
stepping-stone toward equal rights for Moroccans of Amazigh descent (Mulderig, 2014; Sadiqi, 
2014).   It also implied that Arabism and Arab nationalism could no longer be the state’s sole 
political ideology.  The discursive force of the Amazigh movement within the February 20th 
movement forced the state to reconcile with its multicultural and multilinguistic communities.  
The new linguistic recognition purportedly elevates the Tamazight to the hegemonic Moroccan 
public sphere, advancing Morocco as the first North African country to constitutionally 
recognize Tamazight as a national language.  
 Despite the new constitutional linguistic rights, however, questions of integration and 
implementation continue to undermine the efficacy of the new law.  The degree to which this 
change will actually fulfill the demand of the Amazigh activists depends largely on 
implementation of these new reforms.  The constitution lacks a coherent plan for linguistic 
integration and inclusion of Tamazight. For February 20th activists committed to the Amazigh 
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cause in the present day, two serious gaps in Article Five of the new constitution might still 
curtail the efforts of the Amazigh movement:  “the explicit conditioning of the official status of 
Berber by the elaboration of ‘organic laws,’ and the implicit conditioning of this status by the 
elaboration of a law creating the National Council of the Moroccan Languages and Cultures” 
(Sadiqi, 2014, p.25)15.  While the February 20th movement’s various coalitions offer hope of a 
positive, political model for coexistence of multiple political discourses and different social 
groups, political will and a new legislature committed to full implementation of the new identity 
framework will be necessary to realize the benefits of the February 20th/Amazigh alliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15
 Berber refers to Amazigh. However there is a negative connotation for the use of Berber. Berber is derived from 
the Spanish word barbaric. The Spanish called the people it colonized as such. Amazigh activists refuse to identify 
with such word and use instead Amazigh to refer to the people and Tamamzight to refer the Amazigh language. For 
this study, Amazigh and Tamazight will be used.    
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Chapter Five 
Navigating Between the Online and Offline 
To achieve the goal of mobilizing diverse groups of Moroccans into a unified collective, 
the February 20th movement activists recognized that their target audiences relied on various 
channels of communication to stay abreast of current events and information about the 
movement’s activities.  Accordingly, the senior strategists for the movement considered whether 
offline, online, or some combination of the two would maximize the chances that particular 
target audiences would receive their messages.  This chapter examines how the activists 
interacted with the diverse media landscape, with a particular focus on local issues that guided 
the movement’s decisions on channel selection.  It will begin by providing a brief overview of 
the media context in Moroccan context in relation to the broader MENA region.  It will then turn 
to examination of the message strategies the movement utilized in both the online and offline 
environment.  It will conclude with a discussion of the dialectical relationship that existed 
between the online and offline channels, and how those interactions were context-dependent.  
The Moroccan Media Context in Brief 
 Chapter one has already detailed the level of Internet connectivity throughout the Arab 
Spring region.  The February 20th activists, however, identified particular social media forums 
that were particularly active regarding the movement’s activities:  namely, the movement’s 
website mamfakinch, Facebook, and Lakome.  Further, movement followers began utilizing 
Twitter in the later stages of this study’s time period.  Each of these sites was a major source for 
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citizens to learn about the February 20th movement, and they served as a central platform for the 
February 20th activists to distribute information.   
 Previous studies have begun to document social media usage in the MENA region.  One 
study completed the year after the rise of the February 20th movement showed that the Middle 
East, North Africa, and the Gulf region had 3, 203,440 Facebook users, with Morocco having 12 
percent of those users (“Profils des utilsateurs de Reseaux Sociaux au Maroc,” 2012).  Of those 
who used Facebook, 80 percent were below the age of 30 (Dubai School of Government, 2012).  
The top reason for joining online social media in the region was to express some sort of dissent, 
followed by the desire to mobilize and express themselves, to initiate and reinforce networks, to 
adhere and identify, and to stay informed.  More than of 75 percent have more than 500 friends 
and only 17 percent have a twitter account with more than 50 followers.  As for access, 29 
percent used a common computer and 17 percent used their individual computer.  With the rise 
of 3G and cell-phones, 50 percent of the people connect to Facebook and other social sites via 
their cell phones (“Profils des utilsateurs de Reseaux Sociaux au Maroc,” 2012).  While these 
numbers identify potential followers of the movement, the social and political implications of the 
online and offline media usage depend on other material realities of the communities.  
February 20th Online Communication Strategies 
 The senior strategists in the February 20th movement viewed the online environment as the 
appropriate channel to respond to state allegations against the movement, to counter hegemonic 
practices of the state, and to mobilize followers both locally and internationally.  The following 
sections will describe the online strategies the movement used to accomplish these objectives 
and how the strategies functioned within the broader Moroccan context.  
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Countering State Allegations against the February 20th Movement  
 A primary way the February 20th movement deployed online communication platforms was 
to respond to state allegations designed to discredit the movement.  As previously discussed in 
chapter two, the state’s allegations against the movement included accusations that activists were 
thugs, members of the radical left, Algerian agents, and traitors working with the Polisario to 
create instability within the Kingdom (“Taoujni Continue d’Accuser”, 2011).  To respond, the 
February 20th movement disseminated alternative information about the movement and its 
members to the Moroccan population. The activists posted personalized videos, such as the ones 
entitled “We are Moroccan and are Protesting” and “Who we are,” to explain who the activists 
were, introduce the February 20th movement to the public, outline the goals of the movement, 
and contest the varied state allegations.  
 Mamfakinch functioned as the movement’s main online platform for information.  
Moroccan bloggers and activists created mamfakinch during the inception of the February 20th 
movement, but the founders did not pretend to be the voice of the movement.  Instead, they 
wanted to provide free and transparent information to the Moroccan citizenry (Mamfakinch, 
2014 Feb. 18).  Members of mamfakinch staff came from diverse backgrounds but agreed on the 
following principles: “dignity, democracy, liberty, social justice, and respect for human rights” 
(“About Mamfakinch,” 2011).  Many of the members of mamfakinch lived abroad and traveled 
back and forth between their respective countries.  The site emphasized repeatedly that its 
content was neutral and transparent.  
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 The need to create the Mamafakinch website spawned from the need to open the closed 
media infrastructure of Morocco (Mamfakinch, 2014 Feb.18).  As the website’s content stated: 
Mamfakinch.com does not pretend to be an online newspaper but a citizen media that 
believes in the citizens’ right to access information.  Information that is often ignored or 
misrepresented in official mass media . . . .We have the conviction that the existence of our 
website as well as the desire of Moroccans to have access to alternative media stems from 
the fact that traditional media does not do its duty and responsibility. These traditional 
media are either domesticated by state power, or they practice auto-censorship out of fear 
of state sanctions” (“About Mamfakinch,” 2011). 
The online traffic of mamfakinch during the first six months of the movement reached one 
million unique visitors, with the majority of their visits between the months of February and 
April of 2011.  For its robust coverage of Morocco during the rise of the February 20th 
movement, mamfakinch won the Breaking Borders Award from Google and Global Voices 
online, an award that recognizes “courage, energy, and ingenuity of those who advance freedom 
of expression on the Internet” (“Breaking Borders,” 2015).  
 To expose state media, mamfakinch functioned as a fact-checker, reviewing all of the 
Moroccan press coverage of the February 20th movement (Mamfakinch, 2011, February 18; 
Mamfakinch, 2011, March 5).  To differentiate the coverage posted on the website from that 
appearing in the state controlled media, the movement quoted the various articles directly, 
supplied dates of the original articles, posted hyperlinks to those articles, and named the 
journalists and the publication outlets responsible for the initial story.  Mamfakinch staffers then 
critiqued the stories by highlighting misrepresentations of facts on the ground.  By way of 
illustration, the movement copied and pasted the Moroccan National Media Agency’s (MAP) 
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reports that stated the February 20th movement had cancelled the protests taking place on 
February 20, 2011.  Their efforts to provide authentic, alternative information functioned to 
augment the credibility of the movement in relation to other media sources.   
 Mamfakinch worked to build its own comparative standing by asserting the alterity of state 
controlled media. The movement issued a press release entitled “The Lies of the National 
Moroccan Media Agency” (“Mensonge de la MAP”, 2011).  In another example mamfakinch 
critiqued the Arabic newspaper Assabah both for not reporting accurately on the movement and 
for focusing on the Islamist factions within the movements instead of the movement’s goals and 
activities (Revue de Presse Marocaine Ecrite, 2011). In addition, they also published frequent 
online press releases that contradicted the state allegations and identified by name the people 
close to the regime who were behind the accusations.  In one example the activists wrote a press 
release shaming Ahmmed Taoujni, the President of the Moroccan Sahara Association (ASM), 
who accused the youth participating in February 20th movement of working as Algerian agents 
(“Taoujni Continue d’Accuser”, 2011). 
 In a response to state allegations that the activists were terrorists wanting to create chaos, 
mamfakinch responded directly to the accusations and used the opportunity to underscore its 
vision of a renewed collective identity.  The staffers released a press statement that stated,  “#feb 
20-We love our country Mounir Majidi.  February 20th supports democracy and the rule of law. 
Therefore, we are going to protest in a civilized and a peaceful way” (“Nous Aimons Notre 
Pays,” 2011).  The February 20th movement morocanized the online sphere through its use of 
various languages, cultural and national symbols, and coverage of localized issues. The February 
20th online presence focused on Morocco and localized concerns.   
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  In addition to checking state run media articles, the February 20th movement also 
highlighted the lack of coverage by some national media that chose to remain silent.  The 
movement listed all of the newspapers and media agencies that did not cover the February 20th 
movement.  For instance, the website posted that, as of February 18 2011, the Moroccan French 
newspapers L’economiste and Aujoud’hui “chose to simply just ignore the #feb20” (“Revue de 
Presse Marocaine Ecrite,” 2011).  By highlighting the media’s failure to cover a burgeoning 
national movement, the movement questioned the state media’s legitimacy and neutrality. 
 The February 20th activists also used humor to critique the state media.  One of the 
movement’s circulated cartoons featured a Moroccan citizenry watching state run media.  The 
individual who is watching the television has his normal head replaced with that of a donkey’s 
head.  Within the Moroccan cultural context, the connotation of the donkey head is that someone 
is being stupid.  In other words, the cartoon implies that if one watches the state run media, they 
become stupid and backwards in their thinking.    
 The February 20th movement online platforms engaged directly with state-run media and, 
in doing so, sidestepped state run media and delegitimized it.  For instance, on March 20th, 
February 20th activists along with journalists from the public television channel 2M gathered 
inside and out the 2M building, calling for the firing of the Director of Information for public 
channel 2M, Samira Sitail, due to her erroneous coverage of the February 20th movement from 
March 13-20, 2011 (“Rassemblent a l’interieur et a l’exterieur de 2M,” 2011).  Protestors held 
signs in Arabic that read, “The people want the fall of a makhzen media,” and “For a free public 
media,” and “Journalists be aware, the demands are the same.”  Through such actions the 
movement pressured the state media to function more as a neutral reporter.  
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  In short, rather than allow the state’s media to function as the Morocco’s dominant source 
of news, the February 20th movement’s website acted as a credible watchdog.  The semi-open 
digital media environment in Morocco allowed activists to present their communication 
messages. The February 20th movement’s online platforms troubled the state’s monopoly over 
the production and flow of information.  The state no longer functioned as the sole producer of 
information. The February 20th movement introduced a new level of accountability that forced 
both the state run media and security state apparatus to justify their positions and actions if they 
did not want to risk losing their public legitimacy.  The online Moroccan sphere, as a result, 
became an arena of contestation.  By employing multiple strategies to ensure the Moroccan 
public of the authenticity of the movement’s reporting, February 20th online communication 
platforms functioned to raise the credibility of the entire movement.  As trust and credibility were 
necessary to mobilize the collective, the movement’s key strategists recognized and reinforced 
the urgent and sustained need to convey accurate and exhaustive reporting of the movement’s 
activities. 
Unmasking the Hegemonic Practices of the State 
 For the February 20th movement, the online platforms also functioned to unmask the 
hegemonic practices of the state, such as state violence, corruption, and rampant inequality 
rampant in particular geographical areas.  The February 20th online platforms uncovered abuses 
by the makhzen and other institutions loyal to the regime.  The mamfakinch online platform 
documented police and state repression through press releases, hospital records documenting the 
victims, extensive circulation of photos, video captures, and open online letters to officials 
demanding open investigations.  In a formal and open letter to the Minister of Communications, 
for example, the February 20th movement exposed the brutality of the police and security 
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apparatus in the region of Houceima.  The state apparatus had beaten and threatened journalists 
for covering the protests, as well as confiscated and burned documentation of the events 
(Mamfakinch, 2011, Feb. 27).  In the letter the February 20th movement demanded the minister 
to open an investigation and protect journalists, since Moroccans deserved to have an open and 
transparent media culture with informed citizens.  The northern Rif regions, such as Houceima, 
were among the places facing the most police brutality and the locations that had no state media 
coverage. Being geographically distant from the Moroccan major cities, the people in those 
regions heavily depended on the online platforms to expose state brutality and their calls for 
justice.  
 To maintain accountability and accuracy of the reports, the February 20th movement 
published the names of each activist targeted and violently beaten up, the location and timing of 
the incident, and hospitalizations that took place.  For instance, during a protest in Rabat, the 
police and security services dressed as civilians beat Khadija Riyadhi, the President of the 
Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH), along with other activists (“Communiqué de 
l’AMDH”, 2011, February 21).  A joint press release of the February 20th movement and the 
Moroccan Human Rights Association described the incident in detail, denounced the violence, 
and published the names of all the victims.  The joint press release co-authored with one of the 
oldest and most respectable human rights organization in Morocco further legitimized the 
February 20th movement through association.  The naming of all the activists personalized the 
story in a way that built identification with the Moroccan public.  The release also sent a message 
to the Moroccan public that their struggles were not in vain.  The victims were recognized and 
honored for their sacrifices. 
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 The spread of mobile phone cameras also helped document and archive the hegemonic 
practices of the state.  Videotaped and photographed realities on the ground circulated in the 
online environment.  These images included ones of political prisoners, police brutality and 
repression, and images of shantytowns.  The visual images functioned for the movement in a 
number of ways.  First, the images served as additional evidence to the written text recounting 
the incidents of violence.  The photos amplified the known incidents of state violence and set up 
a visual binary between the acts of state violence and the movement’s peaceful and artful 
aesthetic practices.  Second, the photos invited various segments of the subaltern population who 
might not have the necessary literacy level to understand the movement’s online public 
discourse.  As Dauber and Winkler (2014) noted, “Humans process images more quickly than 
text, making images more emotionally visceral and responses to images frequently more 
immediate and powerful than responses to text” (p. 9).  Further, the photographed images reduce 
complex situations into simpler abstractions and do not require as high a literacy level as textual 
arguments.  In this case the message was simple:  the state was violent and oppressive.   By 
presenting the visual evidence, the movement positioned the public as direct eyewitnesses to the 
acts of state repression, and as such, citizenry became implicated in the struggle against 
oppression.  Third, the images personalized stories by placing faces to the victim’s names.  
Serving as a counterpart to the state media that ignored the harmed citizens, the February 20th 
online platform gave voice to those who had suffered. 
 The extensive circulation of videos also positioned the viewer into the scene and the acts of 
the February 20th movement.  The videos increased the credibility of the movement’s accusation 
that the state was conducting violent acts by placing the subject position of the viewer into the 
scene.  For instance, the February 20th movement used the online videos and photos to expose 
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makhzen bribing young men to protest against the February 20th movement and to shout slogans 
in favor of the King.  The organization of the pro-monarchy marches occurred around the same 
time as the February 20th protests were taking place.  The videos showed the majority of the pro-
monarchy protests consisted of impoverished males that had clearly come from the nation’s 
marginalized neighborhoods.  Wrapped in Moroccan flags, these men carried long knives that 
were very visible as a tactic to instill fear in those considering participating in the February 20th 
movement.  The posted article accompanying these photos on mamfakinch warned that these 
makhzani strategies would harm the monarch’s image and credibility.  Further, it warned that the 
proposed political reforms could transform from a referendum on the constitution to a 
referendum on the King himself (“Après D’état Makhzanien Arrive d’état Chmakri,” 2011).   
 Another illuminating example of the movement’s use of subject position emerged 
regarding a video posted on mamfakinch showing a police car attempting to crush protestors in 
Tangier (“Feb. 20 Police Car attempting to Crush a protestor,” 2011).  After the viewers watch 
the video, the website asks its visitors to form their own judgments about the presented evidence.  
Rather than assume viewers will reach their own conclusions, the website explicitly asks for an 
interactive response to an affect-driven scenario.   
 The videos in the movement’s main online platform worked to bridge together the various 
regions of Morocco.  By demonstrating a stunning amount of visual evidence showing repression 
and state violence in various Moroccan cities and remote towns, the online environment 
functioned to unify the collective based on shared grievances. The repetitive acts of violence 
worked to gain empathy across demographic and geographically dissimilar groups of citizens.  
At the same time, the use of visual images prompted a collective sense of social responsibility as 
viewers became witnesses to the rampant state violence.  
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The February 20th movement not only competed with the state media to produce 
information about current events, it also sought to participate in the archiving of the movement’s 
history.  The state was no longer the sole site of institutionalized knowledge. The documentary 
activities of the activists and their supporters would contest state erasures and 
misrepresentations.  The images and videos that recorded offline events continue to circulate to 
this day in the online environment as historical reference material and testimonial evidence 
(Mamfakinch, 2011 February 20).  The direct experience of citizens archived by dates and 
geographical location documents various aspects of the February 20th movement and calls into 
question the state’s narrative.  As Scott (1999) eloquently puts it, “When the evidence offered is 
the evidence of ‘experience,’ the claim for referentiality is further buttressed-what could be truer, 
after all, then a subject’s own account of what he or she has lived through?” (p. 777).  
Mobilizing Political Reformers 
 The February 20th activists deployed online social media to attract the tactical expertise, 
resources, and personnel necessary to mobilize the national collective.  With the Internet’s ability 
to transport individuals through time and space, the online environment also functioned as a link 
between the local and the global supply of resources and tactical expertise.  For instance, the 
February 20th activists translated Jillian York, article on how activists could protect themselves 
on Facebook, with advice such as having a strong password, using https, and having a secondary 
email to confirm login (“Quelque Conseils pour vous proteger sur Facebook,” 2011).  She is an 
American journalist and Director of International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation.  Mamfakinch included numerous posts that advised activists on how to 
safely use various online social platforms, as activists’ Facebook pages experienced pirating and, 
in some cases, shutdown.  Further, activists posted the pirated sites on mamfakinch as a warning 
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to other activists (“Quelque Conseils pour vous proteger sur Facebook,” 2011) in an effort to 
create sustainable virtual communities that coalesced around the movement’s issues and 
concerns.  
 The online environment also functioned as a site for building relational networks with 
activists across the Moroccan kingdom.  For example, each city had its own Facebook page and 
activists from the city were responsible for reporting on the movement’s activities, updating the 
page, and loading photos and videos of the various protests.  Facebook was the most important 
online broadcasting tool among the activists to broadcast their messages to their personal 
networks.  According to a female activist from Tangier, “activists dedicated their personal 
accounts to the movement.”  The online portal mamfakinch served as a national platform for the 
February 20th movement, and, as such, the site relied on a gatekeeping process for content 
production and information sharing.  Individual activists wanting to post on the website had to 
email the administrators for mamfakinch.  The site had an interactive map of the movement’s 
protests, where a viewer could click on any part of the map and they would receive an update on 
the details of that protest.  The map included live tweets, report of incidents, photos, videos of 
the protests, and any relevant safety information.  
 Moreover, online platforms served to promote deliberation and debate.  According to the 
activists, Facebook was a site of contestation and deemed the most popular platform for 
discussion. The online platforms enabled participants to become active in the public sphere.  The 
online platforms were dynamic, provided information on current events, and invited deliberation.  
Participants in online forums critiqued the consultative commission that the King appointed to 
draft the new constitution.  They identified committee members and questioned the actual power 
that the consultative members possessed (Mamfakinch, 2011, June 25).  An online discussion 
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board on the movement’s central platform discussed the boycott of the referendum (Mamfakinch, 
2011, June 29).   Such online discussions challenged the public to question the Moroccan 
political status quo and brought to the forefront active issues of shared concern.  The online 
participatory media increased opportunities for engagement in the process of discursive 
citizenship.  It allowed a large number of activists to participate as contributors to the public 
discourse and potential influencers of public opinion.   
 The online strategies of the February 20th movement functioned in unique ways for various 
target audiences.  According to the personal interviews with senior activists, the February 20th 
movement did not target rural areas with their online strategies.  All of the interviewed activists 
stated that the February 20th movement was an urban movement and, in hindsight, regretted that 
the movement had not prioritized rural areas.   Nonetheless, the rural areas joined the February 
20th movement and protested each week (“FEB20 122730 manifestants dans 53 provinces du 
Maroc le dimanche 20 Fevrier,” 2011).  Unlike in the cities, however, entire villages in the rural 
areas would mobilize and protest.  According to a female activist from the north: 
There was a part of the movement present in every part of Morocco, especially the north, 
but no one targeted enough the rural areas.  The activities of the movement were 
broadcasted online and in some national newspapers and that was the only way these 
people would have access to the information; but at the same time they don’t have the 
means to stay up to date with the activities of the movement online because they don’t 
necessarily have the internet and the money to buy newspapers, or even the will to buy 
these newspapers because they are just occupied with their everyday lives. 
Other activists added that many of the February 20th activists in the cities had families in rural 
areas.  As one activist from Casablanca recalled, “We won’t say that the movement 
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communicated with people from rural areas. But people communicated with people. The 
movement reached the rural areas. Some of those places don’t even have streets but they still go 
out and protest.”  Because the movement communication strategies were grounded in local 
issues, the rural areas were able to identify with the movement (“Feb20 Imzouren: Le Peuple 
veut mettre fin a la corruption,” 2011).  Having families divided between rural and urban areas 
further broadened the reach of the movement.  Activists from the cities were able to able to learn 
about rural protests via Faceboook pages.  A male activist from Casablanca recalled, “Bou-
Ayash, Taza, Houceima and many more areas [were] where the entire village went out and 
protesteds. The people from big cities stopped manifesting but they [people from rural areas] are 
still manifesting. We see them and learn about them only via Facebook.”  Despite the admission 
by movement strategists that they failed to mobilize the rural communities sufficiently, the online 
environment nevertheless facilitated interactions between urban and rural supporters on behalf of 
the common cause.   
 The online technologies also strengthened the national awareness of the movement’s goals 
and activities in the Moroccan diaspora.  Mamfakinch most often focused on the diaspora from 
France, as Morocco is a formal colony in close geographical proximity to that nation.  The 
Moroccan diaspora in France remained very active in Moroccan politics during the rise of the 
February 20th movement.  Based on various mamfakinch Communiqué, the French Moroccan 
diaspora called on the EU to pressure the Moroccan government to end the violence and 
repression of its own people (“#Feb20 Communiqué Voie democratique-France,” 2011) and 
frequently protested in solidarity with the February 20th movement in Morocco (“Appel a 
manifester et a se rassembler le 26 et 27 Fevrier sur Paris,” 2011).  
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  The online platforms also included direct appeals to the publics around the globe. At 
times, protest signs appeared in English, which led to photographs of them circulating in the 
various online social networks.  The online videos included English subtitles so that the non-
French and non-Arabic speaking publics could also participate. The February 20th activists 
conducted interviews with foreign international newspapers to bring greater attention the 
February 20th movement. During an interview with Mohammed Elbouliki, member of the 
administrative commission of the Moroccan human rights organization AMDH and a political 
prisoner from 1985-1994 under Hassan II, one activist asked the international media to support 
the movement and offered suggestions for how international supporters could stand in solidarity. 
He stated:  
There is a media war on the movement. Tell people about the February 20th demands.  
Collect signatures to show support.  If you want to support, give us media support. Make 
known this movement and its claims. Let people know that it is not directed by Islamist 
groups.  There are many other groups, sections and individuals (Lazare, 2011). 
During the same time period, mamfakinch dedicated a page on its site written in English. The 
page included links and articles on the February 20th movement in English.  On the page, the site 
read, “We present in this post a list of links about the recent development in Morocco to our 
readers who are looking for pieces in English” (“Links and articles related to Feb. 20 
Movement,” 2011).  The main online platform also included a page showing the protests 
occurring all over Europe in support of the February 20th movement (“Manifestation 20 Fevrier 
en Europe…,” 2011).  
 In sum, the activists strategically used online social platforms to counter the state’s 
accusations against the movement, unveil abuses of state power, and mobilize a wide net of 
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supporters for the movement.  However, the online also came with some state surveillance.   
While infrequent, the security state apparatus did arrest some identified bloggers and activists 
and threatened or accused others (Mamfakinch, 2011).  According to the activists, state 
surveillance technologies tapped phones and email accounts, as well as used cab drivers to spy 
on the movement.  Accordingly, the activists used mobile phones to divert the police by calling 
to say that they were meeting in a particular location but never showing. 
February 20th Offline Communication Strategies 
 The online social platforms alone were insufficient to build a national collective 
representative of the Moroccan public in its entirety.  The online marginalized subaltern publics 
were often unable to participate because of high rates of illiteracy and limited access to organized 
movement activities.  Additionally, while the online environment helped set the agenda for 
political discussion, it was also unable, on its own, to mobilize the Moroccan people to come to 
the streets.  Operating within a local context steeped in political apathy and fear, the online 
simply could not substitute for traditional offline communication.  This section will provide a 
brief, generalized overview of the February 20th movement’s offline activities; the next chapter 
will continue the discussion of offline strategies singling out the substantial array of aesthetic and 
performance approaches of the movement.   
 In an effort to build their outreach through offline channels, the activists did not work 
alone.  They partnered with various civil society organizations at both the national and local 
levels.  The activists tapped into the networks of the coalitions and organizations.  The activists 
worked with the local neighborhood committees and other civil society groups to organize 
protests, write slogans, and get their messages across.  An activist from Casablanca who was 
active in mobilizing subaltern neighborhoods stated, “We had to coordinate between the 
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neighborhood committees and the movement to get the message across.”  He further explained 
that by holding discussions with neighborhood committees the activists understood better the 
local grievances and priorities of that particular neighborhood.  Offline communication strategies 
included face-to-face meetings, gatherings in neighborhoods, knocking door-to-door, distributing 
of pamphlets, holding protest rallies, and conducting other aesthetic practices. The cooperation 
with local civil society associations helped fostered trust among the local communities for 
building momentum toward positive political action. 
 From the perspective of the activists, offline communication strategies were the most 
effective communication channel for reaching publics living in the marginalized areas.  
According to a female activist from Tangier, 
Face-to-face communication in marginalized areas was the most effective communication 
strategy in getting ideas across. The national television was completely absent.  Face-to-
face communication enabled activists to get their ideas across and explain to the people 
with any means possible.  It also enabled us to adapt the type of communication used to 
that particular individual.  
Activists working in these areas were often dependent on face-to-face communication to recruit 
members and secure their commitment.  An important function of the face-to-face method was 
building trust and identification with the people.  As the young female activist from Tangier went 
on to explain, face-to-face communications enabled the activists to adapt their messages to the 
different neighborhoods and regions.  
 To build the movement’s offline presence, the activists began by focusing on mobilizing 
people within their personal, inner circles.  They subsequently expanded to people acquaintances 
outside their local neighborhoods.  According to a female activist in Tangier,  
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 We were very personal.  Every person would convince a friend.  People used to be 
convinced easily because our networks were very personal: friends, neighbors, and family.  
Activists were very passionate about what they were doing and very persuasive. They used 
to convince friends, family, and other people to just come and see.  
The determination and sustained action of the activists played a major factor in offline 
recruitment.   
 To have real impact, activists gathered in neighborhoods to distribute their messages in 
ways that would win “the hearts and minds” of the people.  The activists combined face-to-face 
interaction, storytelling, music, and other social and cultural activities to explain to the people 
the goals of the movement and details of the planned protests.  During these gatherings, activists 
disseminated flyers and pamphlets to raise awareness.  The flyers were simple and contained 
minimal information.  According to a female activist in Casablanca, “in order to communicate 
with the people that don’t necessarily have the means or access to the Internet, activists 
distributed flyers with just the date of the protest and concise description of the goals.”  
However, activists stressed that offline communication strategies that included direct contact and 
interaction with potential members were much more helpful then distributing flyers and 
pamphlets.  In these personal moments, the activists discussed the members’ daily lives, which 
served as the foundation for appeals about the movement’s goals pertinent to the local 
grievances.   
 To further build trust and collective identification, the location of the protests was crucial.  
Distancing the February 20th movement from the perception of it as a bourgeois social 
movement, activists changed the locale of the protests from the central cities to the marginalized 
neighborhoods.  According to the activists, the decision to relocate was a controversial and 
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stirred many emotions during the general assembly.  According to an activist from Rabat who 
was part of these deliberations, 
The working class neighborhoods are composed of the poor class.  This was a big decision 
in the movement to take the protests to these neighborhoods.  We were confronted by many 
people in the February 20th movement who claimed that this is a middle class movement 
and for the middle class-not from low levels and societal low class. We were adamant to 
change this. If we didn’t go to the streets, the people will not have the price of the bus 
ticket to go downtown and protest.  
Another senior male activist from Rabat who played a leading role in writing slogans recalled the 
evolution of the movement’s decision to move its activities: 
The movement has one huge goal of explaining democracy and its benefits.  At the 
beginning the movement, it used to be in the center city. Then it went to poor 
neighborhoods to mobilize and convince people. When you go to this poor neighborhood, 
you should relate his life to the concept of democracy as in the food he eats, the work he 
has, healthcare, his kids, studies, etc. . . . The protests are always a way to communicate 
and relate with the people.  
  It was much easier for Casablanca and Tangier to move their protests to the subaltern 
neighborhoods.  However, it proved much more difficult for the activists in Rabat.  One major 
factor was the demographic constituency of the activists.  Many of the activists coming from 
Casablanca and Tangier identified with the subaltern publics and came from those same 
neighborhoods.  As such, activists built on the already established trust and networks.  For 
instance, an activist and artist from Casablanca who comes from one of those poor 
neighborhoods stated, “When the February 20th movement came to my neighborhood, I already 
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spoke to the people and explained to them the movement. They trust me.”  According to this 
same activist, when the police targeted the neighborhood and repressed the protestors, the people 
from that neighborhood opened their doors to provide safety and welcomed them in. Trust was 
already established and the subaltern publics from that neighborhood identified with the activists 
and provided protection.   
 The Dialectical Online and Offline Media Relationship 
 According to all the interviews with senior communication and political strategists of the 
movement, the activists had to rely on both online and offline communication platforms.  They 
did not manifest as an oppositional binary.  Instead, they functioned as an organic hybrid that 
combined face-to-face interactions and communicative practices on the ground, with online 
mobilization and exchange of information.   
 In several ways the February 20th activists used complementary communication strategies 
for both the online and offline environments.  In both spheres, the activists emphasized a 
Moroccan collective identity that was all-inclusive through the use of diverse languages, national 
and cultural symbols, music, and a prioritization of the local issues and grievances.  Each of 
these communication strategies facilitated grass roots outreach.  Further, the movement 
employed both the online and offline channels to critique the makhzen and the national state 
media, while both spheres refrained from directly critiquing the King.  By digitally transmitting 
documentation of the February 20th movement offline strategies, the February 20th movement 
strengthened its online presence and legitimacy.  The frequent circulation of photos and videos 
built the case for a united populace behind the movement’s goals.  From the perspective of the 
activists, the public needed to see the movement grounded in their Moroccan realities.   
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 However, the precise nature of this dialectical relationship differed across the movement’s 
various target audiences due to differing demographics, as well as the subgroups’ unique 
historical, cultural and political contexts.  By way of illustration, the northern and southern cities 
were different in their usage of Internet technologies and offline communication strategies.  
According to the interviews with activists, the northern city of Rabat substantially relied on 
Internet technologies, as activists there were mainly youth.  Video technology was particularly a 
focus for activists in Rabat.  All of the campaign videos of the February 20th movement 
originated from Rabat.  Further, the same city’s activists produced the film that documented the 
February 20th protests.  On the other hand, the southern cities of Casablanca and Tangier relied 
more on a combination of offline and online platforms.  As both of these cities contain large 
shantytowns on their outskirts where poverty is most visible, the movement had to incorporate 
more offline activities.  The heavier reliance on the offline also emerged in these southern cities 
because a large segment of activists from Casablanca and Tangier came from marginal 
neighborhoods and identified with the subaltern. 
 The unique political contexts of the various cities also played a major role in the 
movement’s targeted choices of communication platforms.  The biggest difference between the 
three cities was the ratio of Islamists to leftist activists.  In Casablanca, Islamists and leftists were 
almost divided equally.  In Rabat, the percentage of Islamist participants was minimal, while in 
Tangier, the Adl wa Ihsan outnumbered the leftists to a large degree.  An activist from northern 
Morocco remembered, “Adl wa Ihsan was a major force in Tangier.  And when Adl wa Ihsan was 
no longer present in Feb. 20th movement, the movement in Tangier dwindled.”  Many of the Adl 
wa Ihsan members from Tangier and Casablanca came from poor neighborhoods.  As such, 
activists in those cities were able to mobilize a large segment of the subaltern publics and had 
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greater success with their message.  In Casablanca, hip-hop artist and activist Al Haqed, in 
particular, played a key role in mobilizing the people from marginal neighborhoods. Seen as one 
of them, the hip-hop artists spoke in the vernacular language and discussed issues that were 
pertinent to the marginalized publics.   
 Not surprisingly, Casablanca and Tangier differed from Rabat in their approach to 
mobilizing the subaltern neighborhoods. The movement’s decision to relocate the protest rallies 
from downtown to marginalized neighborhoods was problematic in Rabat, as the activists were 
not as well connected to the subaltern publics as the activists from Casablanca and Tangier.  In 
Casablanca and Tangier, the subaltern publics played major roles in the protests and mobilization 
of the movement.  An academic and female activist from Casablanca remembered,  
 In Sbatta [a marginal neighborhood in Casablanca], protesters were getting hit and were 
welcomed to the people’s house. People literally opened their homes to the February 20th 
movement.  When this was happening, I was there.  The movement of Adl wa Ihsan was 
organized and had good structure and support in those streets. (“FEB20-Urgent-marche des 
bidonsvillois a Casablanca,” 2011).  
The national media’s lack of attention to the subaltern made them less visible to the public.  As a 
result, the makhzen tactics differed substantially when the protests occurred in these 
neighborhoods rather than at downtown locales.   
 Due to the demographic and cultural contexts of the cities, the February 20th movement 
used aesthetic practices, such as body performances and street theater, more frequently in Rabat 
and Casablanca then in Tangier.  On the whole, northern Morocco is much more conservative 
than the southern portions of the country.  As such, nontraditional forms of art, such as 
performances emphasizing the body and western appropriated art, were less likely to prompt 
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identification with the movement.  According to an activist located in Casablanca responsible for 
incorporating art into the movement’s protests, “In Rabat and Casablanca, art was used more 
than in Tangier.  We had a theater troop that is based in Casablanca, called ‘Masrah al Mehgor’, 
that used to rely on art."  Even within the offline platforms, cultural considerations influenced the 
movement’s selections of how to deliver its messages to target audiences.  
 The February 20th movement communication strategies clearly demonstrate that the 
movement did not rely on a single, homogenous online and offline approach to reach the 
Moroccan people.  Regional differences and cultural contexts influenced the types of 
communication strategies the activists deployed.  Viewed from a holistic perspective, however, 
the movement used the online environment for communication between core activists and to 
strengthen those networks throughout the country, while the offline communication strategies 
were key to building trust and collective identification with various segments of the population, 
such as the subaltern. 
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Chapter Six 
Navigating Moroccan Aesthetic Resistance 
“Morocco is a big prison and the prison is a small one. I met people and I found my music in 
prison before I even went to prison”  
      Male activist and artist from Casablanca 
The Arab Spring unmasked the centrality of aesthetic practices to the processes of 
cultural struggle and modes of contestation (Abadi, 2013; Khatib, 2012; Salime, 2012).  Through 
various aesthetic forms and strategies of protest, the Arab Spring brought human rights, politics, 
and social issues back into the public sphere, breaking decades of fear and censorship.  States 
and political institutions no longer functioned as the only sites of control for the production and 
consumption of cultural processes.  Activists used a multitude of cultural and artistic expressions 
to engage their constituencies in critical discussions on politics, religion, culture, corruption, 
citizenship, and identity.   
Like other movements in the MENA region, the February 20th movement relied on a wide 
range of aesthetic practices to convey its key messages.  The movement’s use of music, street 
theater, performances, and film helped mobilize the public as a politicized citizenry.  The 
February 20th activists’ use of aesthetic forms of resistance questioned the hegemonic 
constructions and provided an alternative narrative that was readily consumable and widely 
diffused.  This chapter explores how the February 20th movement’s strategies of cultural 
production engaged with the state’s hegemonic discourse.  Applying Foucault’s (2001) concept 
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of culture as “a hierarchical organization of values, accessible to everybody, but at the same time 
the occasion of a mechanism of selection and exclusion,” (p. 173), it recognizes that the 
hegemonic aesthetic practices of the state reflect the political conditions in which they emerge 
and function in the community’s unconsciousness (Bruner, 2012).  This chapter argues that the 
Moroccan cultural landscape constituted a crucial site of struggle between the February 20th 
movement and the state.   
The chapter begins by briefly contextualizing the Moroccan cultural scene, providing a 
critical overview of the relationship between state and cultural production.  It then examines the 
reasons that led the February 20th activists to place a heavy emphasis on cultural activism and 
how the February 20th movement used various aesthetic strategies to provide alternative spaces 
for dissent free from the hegemonic discourse of the state apparatus.  The chapter concludes with 
the implications of the movement’s cultural and artistic activism, reflecting on opportunities and 
challenges of art and culture in Morocco.  
Cultural Context of Morocco 
In Morocco, the state governs cultural institutions. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
dictates what constitutes art and what does not.  To have work qualify as art, artists must align 
their cultural productions with the goals and mission of the state.  The Film Fund Commission, 
Aid Fund for Theater on Music, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Endowments and Islamic 
Affairs all provide funds for cultural organizations and events if they are aligned with their 
mission statement (Graiouid & Belghazi, 2013).  The Royal patronage is the most prestigious, 
which provides direct support from the King (Graiouid & Belghazi, 2013).   
As state institutions formally provide material and financial support for culture and art, 
Moroccan artists struggle to maintain their independence in the face of regime’s constant attempt 
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to co-opt dissent (Graioudi & Belghazi, 2013; Laachir, 2013).  The Moroccan state uses culture 
and arts to “promote its image as reformist liberal state” (Laachir, 2013, p. 257) and to enhance 
Morocco’s image by showing the country as modern yet still authentic, cultured, tolerant, and 
diverse (Graiouid & Belghazi, 2013).  Graiouid & Belghazi (2013) have noted, “It should be 
emphasized that royal patronage and its cronies provide financial backing on condition that 
artistic production meets their vision of society, that is to say, they clearly co-opt these forms of 
production” (p. 263).  
In practice, the cultural scene within Morocco operates as a complex power struggle.  
Cultural production functions as a site of ideological struggle between the King, the makhzen, 
key political figures from various religious parties, and a wide spectrum of activists who oppose 
the state and Islamists when they perceive them as a threat to individual liberties, democracy and 
freedom (Graiouid & Belghazi, 2013). At times, activists and state political actors align for the 
purpose of allowing space for “liberal” art within the Moroccan cultural scene to exist, for as 
Bruner (2012) has observed, “In any given aesthetic/political configuration, however, there will 
always be networks of divergent interests and experiences, where ruptures, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions emerge, triggering battles between those supporting different interpretive 
strategies competing for dominance” (p. 2).   
The competitive struggles over Moroccan cultural productions, for example, became 
evident in a 2003 case involving the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD).  The PJD 
had been instrumental in the arrests of 14 young hard rock musicians, accusing them of 
belonging to a satanic cult and endangering Islamic values (Belghazi, 2009).   During their trial, 
the prosecution portrayed the youth as having practiced Satanism and questioned them on why 
they killed and drank the blood of cats (Langendonck, 2010).  The arrest of these young artists, 
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however, created public outrage and mobilized activists, lawyers, and journalists.  Acting in his 
role as arbitrator, the King mediated between the activists who demanded the immediate release 
of the young people and the PJD who wanted them convicted.  The King supported the activists’ 
claims and demanded their immediate release.  
On occasion, the activists and the Islamists form pragmatic alliances against the state, 
albeit for drastically different reasons.  One recent example involved the Mawazine Festival.  
Since 2001, a major annual music festival, Mawazine, has taken place in the city of Rabat.  
Mawazine had become a controversial festival because it features local and international artists 
such as Shakira, Elton John, Joe Cocker, and Kenye West (Almiraat, 2011 April 17).  Activists in 
the February 20th movement critiqued Mawazine as being part of the festivilization of Morocco 
(i.e., the trend towards commodification of Morocco’s culture into festivals).  On April 10th, 
2011, Mamfakinch.com released an open letter to the artists slated to appear at the festival asking 
them to cancel their appearances.  It stated, “By refusing to attend, you will contribute to 
reforming Morocco and paving way for its transition to democracy” (as qtd. in Almiraat, 2011 
April 17).  In their national campaign to cancel the Mawazine Music Festival, the online group 
was explicit about the motivations behind the movement’s opposition:  “the priorities for 
spending public funds in Morocco should be the infrastructure, the promotion of basic services 
and the provision of jobs for youth” (as qtd. in Almiraat, 2011 April 17).  The PJD, by contrast, 
opposed the Mawazine festival because it did not represent Islamic and other Moroccan 
traditional values.  The two groups, who on other issues disagreed about the appropriate direction 
for the country’s future, came together to oppose the state-run festival.16   
                                                        
16
 Since the Islamist party PJD came to power in 2012, the PJD party has been less vocal with its criticism of state 
sponsored cultural events, especially those directly endorsed by the King (Graiouid & Belghazi, 2013).  
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The February 20th Movement’s Aesthetic Strategies of Resistance 
The February 20 movement worked to embed its message within pop culture.  One of the 
February 20th movement’s four committees was the Committee of Art and Creativity.  The goal 
of the committee was to use artful practices to mobilize people across the sociopolitical and 
cultural divides.  The use of pop culture for the February 20 movement functioned to serve four 
complementary purposes:  mobilization and participation, message diffusion and circulation, 
attitudinal conversion of potential constituencies, and to challenge the state” (Abadi, 2012).  
According to a male artist and activist from Rabat, “Art is important to resistance. It’s a way to 
show a different narrative from the official narrative, the propaganda of the state.”  All of the 
interviewed activists agreed that art was a powerful tool for resistance that could be creatively 
deployed in direct opposition to the state while at the same time enacting sites of learning.   
The February 20th activists perceived their desired changes for Morocco as part and 
parcel of a long process.   For them, meaningful change necessitated a change in Moroccan 
culture.  According to one male activist in Casablanca who wrote on the February 20th 
movement, “Change in mentality needs to be done before anything else.  What the February 20th 
activists are doing is focusing on cultural change before concentrating on changing the regime.”  
Another activist from Casablanca metaphorically referred to removing the culture of fear that is 
pervasive in Morocco:   “Every Moroccan has a policeman in his mind and tells him don’t do 
this.  If he doesn’t take him out, he won’t succeed.”  Deploying art as a form of aesthetic 
resistance is a bottom up, cultural reform approach to provide youth a space where they can 
exchange ideas and opinions, and encourage people to critique their social realities.  
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The usage of the various aesthetic practices served as a gateway for public understanding 
of complex issues.  In the face of pressing social and political issues, aesthetic practices enabled 
activists to approach issues of corruption, marginalization, and oppression.  Through 
performance and the public’s participation in the process, the movement worked to build 
solidarity around the struggles of the marginalized and create a fissure within the political 
hegemonic system.  Marginalized groups voiced their opinions, shared their stories, and inspired 
other young people to join the cause. According to a male activist in Casablanca, “Artistic and 
cultural discourse reaches people quickly.  People are tired of the traditional discourse.  All 
protests that included art succeeded.”  The movement invited the public to participate in their 
own liberation through a form of cultural revolution and self- expression (Abadi, 2012).  The 
next section will discuss the different modes of alternative aesthetics practices and strategies 
activists employed and the functions that each played.  
Resistance Through Sound 
With the majority of the Moroccan population under the age of 35, music became a key 
strategy of the movement.  The February 20th movement deployed music as a strategic tool to 
contest state power and call for collective action (Abadi, 2012).  The music functioned as a 
vehicle for empowerment, self-expression, and mobilization (See figure 6.2).  According to the 
February 20th activists, music served as a powerful tool for deploying a counter hegemonic 
narrative.  The lyrics mapped various facets of oppression, marginalization, and corruption, 
which produced a discourse of liberation that empowered listeners to call for structural changes.  
One particular singer, Al Haqed, became and continues to be the movement’s iconic 
music artist.  All of the activists spoke of Al Haqed’ s songs and the symbolic role he played 
within the movement.  One of the male activists from Rabat stated, “Al Haqed is very down to 
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earth, he does not know how important he is to the movement.  In Casablanca, Al Haqed is the 
symbol of the movement. He mobilized the people.”  Coming from a very poor neighborhood in 
Casablanca, Al Haqed represented the authenticity of the struggle, positioning him to serve as 
one of their rallying forces for the subaltern publics.  His critical lyrics were grounded in the 
struggles and materiality of life in poor neighborhoods.  Passionate and fearless, Al Haqed was 
arrested and imprisoned three times for his daring lyrics.  However, his popularity did not recede.  
The regime’s direct attack on Al Haqed only strengthened his public standing.  Citizens in 
Casablanca wrote graffiti on the cities’ walls to demand the immediate release of Al Haked side 
by side with the slogan, written in Arabic, “Long Live the People” (See figure 6.1).  
Al Haqed’s music functioned to inspire the new Moroccan collective.  In one of the mass 
protests, Al Haqed rapped about the new constitution and highlighted that the document 
mentioned the King sixty-six times while touching on the people only once (“Long Live the 
People,” 2011).  He engaged with the people and asked why they had to tolerate such continued 
humiliation.  He concluded with “long live the people,” “power to the people,” the “decision to 
the people,” and may “God bless the people” (“Long Live the People,” 2011).  The people 
responded back, stating “Long live the people, Long live the people.”  The protest video 
undeniably demonstrated the power the music had on the crowd to build solidarity.  Thousands 
of people in the streets repeated his lyrics while cheering and clapping.  The music’s appeal and 
the social relationships it reinforced are very visible within these videos.  Al Haqed’s repetition 
of the phrase “the people” challenged traditional, hegemonic notions of role of individuals living 
in the monarchy by envisioning a new collective identity (Abadi, 2012).  Further, his daring 
lyrics explicitly countered and disrupted the state’s discourse of “Long live the King” (Salime, 
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2015).  Al Haqed’s use of the Moroccan dialect (darija) to call forth the new collective blurred 
any distinction between the artist and activist.   
Al Haked challenged the state’s hegemonic powers by recounting the impact of state 
actions on the populace.  Al Haked’s music shed light on the everyday struggle of most 
Moroccans.  It articulated how poverty left many Moroccans unprotected from economic and 
political violence.  In his song, Bladi (My country), for example, Al Hakked’s lyrics read:  
My country who is red and has a green star . . . . Long live the people. Long live my 
country.  For the Free Moroccan who do not accept the abuse.  My country, who ever 
comes wants to rape you and does what they want with you . . . . Remember the people.  
You sold out to the west.  In every city a new castle is built. The children of the nation 
have nothing.  My country I love you.  My country I watered you with my tears.  Give us 
our share.  They made housing more expensive and everyday living more expensive too. 
Al Haqed’s lyrics are preoccupied with Morocco and serve to unmask the hegemonic state 
practices that leave the Moroccan populace at a disadvantage.  
Unlike other artists who cautiously avoid attacking the monarchy, Al Hakked was 
fearless.  He ironically positioned himself as King to draw attention to questionable monarchical 
practices. For instance, the lyrics of one of his songs read, 
The cars are approaching.  I am coming.  Close and clear the streets.  Let me pass. I am 
not like you . . . . Hang my photos in every shop and house. Don’t forget to hang them in 
the bar as well.  Take my photos, take my photos.  My photos are not like your photos . . . 
. My people are with no dignity.  They are under my shoes . . . . I am the one who is 
pictured in the Dirham bill [Moroccan currency, photos of the King depicted on the bills].  
Tell me Long Live.  Long Live.  But you live in the problems.  I am coming, get out of 
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the street.  This is my street not your street.  Clean the streets because I am coming.  I 
have allergies and am sick . . . . Kiss my hands.  
While not stating directly he is the King, he hinted to the people that he was the one who was 
pictured in the Dirham bill and asked for his hand to be kissed.  Using humor, Al Haked ridiculed 
the practice of having the King’s photo hanged in every store or place of business, even the bar!  
By mentioning the bar, he critiqued the hypocrisy of the King’s title, Prince of the Believers.  
Deemed as unislamic practice, the bar is in direct contradiction with the King’s title of Prince of 
the Believer.  By using irony and sarcasm, he questioned the meaning of real citizenship and 
bolstered the case for more rights for the people.  In the lyrics, the King asks to have the roads 
cleared, closed and cleaned so that he and his entourage can pass.  This King’s request highlights 
the inequality and position of his “subjects.”  Through the use of his daring lyrics, Al Haqed 
supported the citizens’ right to public space and to their country. 
Performing Resistance and the Politics of Public Space 
 When strategizing what aesthetic forms of resistance the movement would utilize, the 
February 20th activists relied on participatory and interactive processes in an effort to involve the 
public.  In particular, the movement used street theatre, philosophy in the street, literary 
programs, and music.  The movement’s goal was to empower the Moroccan public and 
encourage participation of the various populations.  For many of the February 20th activists, 
encouraging critical thinking and enacting active citizenship through aesthetic practices was a 
safe way to bolster participation.  
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Street Theater  
A key strategy designed to bolster audience participation was the use of Masrah Al 
Mehgour (i.e., the theater of the oppressed).  One of the February 20th activists who founded 
Masrah Al Mehgour revealed how the movement adapted the Brazilian-born Theater of the 
Oppressed into the Moroccan context.  Founded by Brazilian theater director Augusto Boal, 
Theater of the Oppressed aims to achieve active participation by allowing the audience to select 
material for inquiry, respond, and perform stories of problems and oppressions in their own 
communities (Lee, 2015).  
 For the February 20th activists, the theater of the oppressed was a form in which the 
activists activated participatory politics for political action.  Mainly performed in the streets, 
participants discussed an oppressive situation with both a protagonist and an antagonist.  The 
activists asked the audience to find a resolution and perform an alternative way of responding to 
the situation, thus transforming the spectator into a spect-actor.   An activist and artist from 
Casablanca shared an example from one of the Theater of the Oppressed tours that was 
performed throughout all major cities.  The topic was a discussion of the problems of corruption 
and state violence.  With no script, activists and artists acted out common everyday scenes of 
corruption and invited bystanders to comment on what they would change in their own 
reenactments.  From the perspective of the activist, the performances made concrete what each 
individual could do to change the status quo, but they also empowered the people to feel that 
they were active agents.  The Theater of the Oppressed served to help build emotional 
investments to encourage audience members to become part of the solution.  
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Philosophy in the Street 
Similar to street theater, the February 20 activists tried to find other creative ways to 
normalize taboo topics and encourage critical and respectful debate.  One such activity was the 
Felsafa fe Zanka (Philosophy in the Street).  Across Rabat and Casablanca, young activists met 
every Saturday for two hours to discuss a taboo topic and to encourage debate.  According to one 
of the founders of this group, “the goal for felsafa fe zanka was to raise social and political 
consciousness.”  He recalled how Philosophy in the Street arose as a movement strategy:  
This philosophy in the street came about one day when we were sitting down in Ramadan 
in a coffee shop.  We were having a meeting and one of our group members liked a 
French philosopher, Michel Onfray, who gave philosophy lessons for free.  So A. [name 
removed for safety of activist] suggested to do like Michel Onfrey . . . .We want to see 
philosophical debates in the streets and people abiding to the rules of the debate. We 
spoke about religion, love, sexual orientation, and many other taboo subjects . . . . What 
we want to do is make these subjects normal in our society. We want people to talk about 
anything and to not leave anything taboo in our talk.  
The Philosophy in the Street that I observed directly for this study was held on May 2014 
in Rabat.  At the start of the meeting there were 5 male and 3 female college students.  However, 
as time passed, more people came and the total of people in attendance rose to around 40.   
People walking by the event (that occurred in a public square in front of a main street) were 
curious and stopped to listen to the young people who were participating.  Some bystanders 
shook their heads in disapproval, while others were captivated and decided to sit in the circle and 
join the conversation.  The event observed for the study was on the role and status of religion in a 
Muslim country.  Questions ranged from whether God exists, to the role of minorities, to respect 
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for the believers and nonbelievers.  The participants in the debate spoke Darijaa and French.  
While conducted in a respectful, calm manner, the discussion was lively with people challenging 
each other’s views.  The participants enacted an active form of citizenship that was based on 
agency and a vision for a future Morocco.  
Let’s Read 
  Recognizing the high illiteracy rate of their target audience, the activists conducted a 
national campaign to raise awareness about illiteracy and the need to read.  The Lecture Pour 
Tous (Reading for all) goal was to instill in the young people the love of reading.  A female 
activist in Rabat concluded, “If the reading culture becomes entrenched in our daily lives, then 
we will as a nation move ahead.”  To change cultural views about the value of reading, activists 
organized various activities that targeted different locations and various groups of people.   
To mobilize and unite the public around the necessity of reading, activists organized 
major online campaigns in which they called on the public to participate in raising awareness.  
Activists pointed to a YouTube video where a young male activist started by identifying himself 
by name. Speaking energetically in Daarija, this young man looked straight at the camera and 
asked the people of Morocco to participate in a Reading for All campaign on June 17-19, 2013.  
He stated, “The goal for this initiative is to bring back the love of books and normalize reading in 
our daily lives. We need to elevate the status of reading”  (“Initiative La Lecture Pour Tous,” 
2013).  Using social media to unite all the of the cities and major towns of Morocco, the young 
activist asked the public to take photos of the book of their choice, ride public transportation, and 
take out the book and start reading.  He called on those with the books to discuss what they were 
reading with the people around them and the importance of reading. The activist then asked the 
future participants to use the hashtag #initiativeLLPT (LLPT) and archive their experiences by 
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loading the photo of their book and sharing their story in the national Facebook page 
highlighting the initiative.  
Activists also organized sit-ins in public streets and parks in cities and towns throughout 
Morocco to highlight reading.  The activists discussed the books they were reading with others, 
who, in turn, focused on the books of their choice.  In the Lecture Pour Tous event in Casablanca 
in May 2014 observed for this study, the books were written in many languages and covered 
many subjects.  The audience was equally divided between males and females.  The sit-ins 
transformed the streets into a powerful visual image where books had an elevated status of 
respect and importance.  Participants in this event discussed the need to bring back the value of 
books, given the rise of technology, books had receded to secondary status.  These activities 
further legitimized the movement by directly addressing the national crisis of illiteracy and by 
also appearing to care for its subaltern publics.   
Protests and Rallies  
The senior strategies of the February 20th movement saw the protests as important for 
building collectivities and mobilizing the people to join the movement (see figure 6.4).   As such, 
the activists spent ample amounts of time and energy organizing successful protests that would 
motivate people to come to the streets.  Staying true to the local grievances and sensitivities of 
the people, the protests differed in format from city to city.  Accounts by the interviewed activists 
and photographic documentation on the February 20th movement’s online platform, mamfakinch, 
support the conclusion that Rabat and Casablanca deployed the most artful practices for their 
rallies.  
The activists across the different cities and small towns emphasized their loyalty to the 
nation.  The streets were filled with the colors of the Moroccan flag.  Activists wrapped their 
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bodies in the Moroccan flag or dressed in the flag’s red and green palate.  The Amazigh flag, 
rather than project an alternative to national emblem, frequently flew side-by-side with the 
Moroccan flag.  In one of the photos an activist supplied, for example, two small boys held a 
sign that stated, “the People want a new Morocco.”  Visually representing the new generation 
and hope for the future, these little boys were demanding change while still showing loyalty to 
the monarchy by standing behind the monarchical crown emblem (see figure 6.5).  The use of the 
national symbols and colors branded the movement’s identity.  The members of the February 20th 
movement were loyal and patriotic.    
The movement also had to minimize protest fatigue. To sustain the mobilization of active, 
young people, the protests included free festivals.  The breadth of creative expressions displayed 
in the streets during the protests was an identifying characteristic of the February 20th movement.  
The activists transformed the streets into performing stage that invited public participation.  
During the protest rallies, the movement incorporated combinations of music, the spoken word, 
paintings, body performances, and recitation of poetry to attract public attention and 
participation.  In one of the protests held in March 2011, the activists joined together, using their 
bodies to spell the word “freedom” in Arabic (see figure 6.3).  Through this collective effort, the 
movement created a visual moment that provided a simplified, resonant reminder of who had the 
power to contest hegemonic practices of the state.  The movement also revived old Moroccan 
traditions, such as story telling and poetry.  These oral traditions were part of Morocco’s rich 
heritage but, given colonialism and globalization, had lost their popularity.  All political in 
nature, these activities functioned to intertwine the public and the February 20th movement’s 
goals for political progress.  By participating in the various forms of aesthetic practices, the 
public enacted, and therefore had a participatory stake in, the goals of the movement.  
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To generate newness and identify with the youth, the February 20th movement in Rabat 
organized a performative act in front of the Rabat parliament entitled, “Freeze for Democracy” 
(“Contester Differemment: flashmob & Freeze ce Dimanche,” 2011).  The young female and 
male activists used their bodies to “perform” their message of absolute silence, a strategy never 
seen before in the Maghreb region.  The movement’s members called the approach “Freeze for 
Democracy” because their bodies were frozen in time and space.  As they occupied public space, 
pedestrians and bystanders walking by had to walk through or consciously avoid the protestors as 
they walked or crossed the streets.  In this way movement strategists made even the skeptical or 
curious participate in the demonstration.  
 The activists used creative uniqueness to sustain the public’s involvement with the 
movement.  As one activist opined, “If we continue to do the same type of protests, it loses its 
impact” (as qtd. in “Morocco: The Youth Rise Up,” 2011).  The activists concluded after a long 
debate they needed to reenergize the sit-ins and rallies after their initial public gatherings 
(“FEB20 Infos manifs dimanche,” 2011).  They called for artistic and cultural contestation.  A 
revealing illustration involved how the originators of the freeze strategy posted two online videos 
of global protests, both where movement’s deployed the approach. One was in New York’s 
Grand Central train station and the other was in Europe.  The activists asked the public to 
examine what successful protest freeze performances looked like and how the movement could 
localize the freeze strategy within the Moroccan context. The February 20th movement activists 
appropriated global aesthetic practices to local contexts to generate newness and creativity. The 
activists stated: “ We are young, and we are capable of innovation. The activists in Rabat decided 
to diversify their forms of contestations…. We will do a freeze and followed by poetry and 
music” (“Contester Differemment: flashmob & Freeze ce Dimanche,” 2011).   
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Taken together, such performative forms of resistance functioned not only to raise 
political and social consciousness, but also to reclaim the Moroccan public space.  These simple, 
but meaningful acts diminished the state’s govermentality and become a steppingstone for further 
claims for legitimacy, socio-economic justice, and human rights.  One of the activists shared a 
story of how difficult the performative approach was when they first started Felsafa fe Zanka 
(Philosophy in the Streets). When the activists first met in a public space to discuss controversial 
topics deemed important, the police used to stop them by insisting they had to get a permit.  One 
activist who organized this event stated,  
You have a public place and when police comes, the people no longer care. We cannot 
understand human rights without understanding the abuse. Now we have a special place 
in the street and no one [the police] comes to us. We freed it.  No rules apply to us during 
those two hours.  It’s an exercise of democracy we do every Saturday everywhere in 
Morocco. 
One activist present at the same discussion reminded the others that some activists were 
previously jailed and risked their lives for enabling this change.  Another activist from Rabat 
shared the same sentiment stating, “If we speak about Morocco, public spaces are the 
government’s property and we have to get a permit to do something. The February 20th broke 
this….” The activists considered the ability to assemble without fear of retribution one of the 
movement’s key successes.  
Alternative to State-Driven Cultural Productions 
As an alternative to the state sponsored festivals, the February 20th movement launched 
Festival de Resistance et d’Alternatives (Festival of Resistance and Alternatives).  Composed 
mainly of a young group of activists ranging in age from 22 to 32, the Festival of Resistance and 
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Alternatives included art workshops, independent film screenings, music, poetry, public debate, 
conferences, spoken word, photo exhibitions, and dance performances  (see figure 6.1).  These 
events did and currently take place in different locations, such as the headquarters of the 
Moroccan Labor Union, the Association of Human Rights’ building, high schools, universities 
and public spaces (Festival de Resistance et d’Alternatives, 2014).  According to the official 
online website of Festival of Resistance and Alternatives, 
The Festival of Resistance and Alternatives (FRA) offers a place dedicated to innovation, 
exchange and participation, where every individual can express themselves freely. The 
festival is an independent Moroccan initiative to create a space where people share their 
ideas, their principles, their talents and their artistic creations about sociocultural subjects 
such as economy, politics, art, education and others. (Festival de Resistance et 
d’Alternatives, 2014). 
During the interview with one of the main organizers and founder of the Festival of 
Resistance and Alternatives, the young artist/activist focused on the third edition of the yearly 
festival (2014) as a way to understand the goals and strategies of the festival aesthetic practices.  
The third edition of the festival created an alternative city, with a parliament, police station, 
market, hospital, and other places essential to public life.  The Festival of Resistance and 
Alternatives’ website (2014) explained the purpose of the approach:    
In these different locations, workshop, discussions, and artistic happenings will be 
 held with the aim to look critically and creatively at the current social and  institutional 
practices.  The participants are invited to debate and explore alternatives to the current practices 
in these locations. The website provided a map of the Alternative city that listed all the locations 
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along with their different functions.  The ultimate goal was to “stimulate creative and critical 
thinking” (“Festival de Resistance et d’Alternatives Maroc”, 2014).   
In a similar way, Guerilla Cinema offers an alternative to the state controlled 
Cinematographic Center.  The mission of Guerilla Cinema (2012) is: 
We are an artistic resistance for freedom of expression in Morocco. We don't believe in 
censorship & Moroccan filmmaking laws. We believe that the Centre Cinematographique 
Marocain is a corporatist institution designed, under tyranny, to control Moroccan films 
and contain or censor any critique against the makhzen. In the spirit of peaceful 
disobedience, we shoot films and encourage others to shoot films without authorization 
as a form of protest. Cameras are our weapons. Guerrilla Cinema is an @artivistes' 
campaign.  
Through this statement the Guerilla Cinema clearly articulated its objectives and stance in 
opposition to the hegemonic, state-funded, cultural organizations.  
The Guerilla Cinema offered a vehicle of self-expression for artists throughout Morocco.  
In an interview with a February 20th male activist and filmmaker, he described how an 
independent film he created on the February 20th movement enabled him to archive history and 
give a voice to the voiceless.  The independent film, My Makhzen and Me, documented the 
protests and movement’s activities through the first year its life.  According to the filmmaker, the 
film attempted to break the state’s sole monopoly to write history and gave a voice to the 
protestors and activists of the movement to archive their own history.  He stated: 
What I really hoped to do was to not allow the regime 10 to 20 years from now to hide 
the facts like it did in the 1982 uprisings in Morocco . . . .You wouldn’t be able to tell the 
people this did not happen or tell them a different story of what has happened . . . In the 
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long run, the regime will write the story in textbooks and basically in our history.  Our 
film is way to document and stop that. It shows people what really happened from the 
perspective of the protestors.  
For the activists, film was not only a mode of self-expression and critique but also a creative 
strategy to archive and break the state’s monopoly of historization.  
Both the Festival of Resistance and Guerilla Cinema have a similar fundraising approach.  
Refusing to take funding from the state to lower their risk of co-optation, the activists relied on 
social sites to fundraise for their cultural events and products.   In an effort to have credibility 
with online funders, they use full transparency when outlining their budget.  Further, they both 
work to keep the budgets for the production of these festivals and films relatively low.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has examined how the February 20th movement used cultural production to 
creatively deconstruct Morocco’s hegemonic narrative.  It also demonstrated how the movement 
constructed the same practices to empower the Moroccan people as a collective to promote 
participatory politics, as well as civic and social engagement.  The February 20th movement 
deployed various artistic strategies to critically address the regime’s mechanisms for quelling 
citizen participation in the political process.  The activists’ engagement with culture in their 
political struggle showcased a new era of performed dissent on the public stage.  According to a 
female activist from Tangier, “the new forms of art redefined activism in in Morocco.”  Pop 
culture catalyzed a style of politics marked by cultural codes and enabled by creativity.  In other 
words, it contested regime narratives to reclaim political and social agency by engaging directly 
with the ideologies of society.   
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The February 20th aesthetic practices critiqued both the corrupt state apparatus and the 
state-censored media, while generally refraining from directly critiquing the King.  The primary 
focus of the movement’s use of cultural production was to bring attention to actions of the 
corrupt makhzen system.  A male activist from the Rabat Committee of Communication and 
Media of the February 20th movement stated, “We focused on educating the people not 
politically but through culture and art.”   
Through its visual artistic presence, the February 20th movement claimed its existence 
and identity within the Moroccan political and cultural scene.  Aesthetic practices were important 
not only in the form they took, but also in the process of simply undertaking the freedom to do 
art.  This communal function of bringing people together to produce cultural practices functioned 
to build collective trust between members of the people and the movement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Street art 
Figure 6.2 Al Haked Slogan 
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Figure 6. 3 Music and Protests 
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Figure 6.6 The New Generation 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 While scholars and pundits have often dubbed Morocco the exception to the Arab Spring, 
the February 20th movement serves as a reminder that Morocco has not been immune to the 
revolutionary waves of protests shaking the Arab political regimes.  Although the Moroccan 
monarchy has historically enjoyed legitimacy, the country currently shares similar sociopolitical 
and economic problems with its neighboring countries.  Such ongoing frustrations with 
conditions on the ground, coupled with the public’s rising expectations of political reform 
accompanying King Mohammed VI’s assumption of the throne and the inspiration derived from 
upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, gave rise to the February 20th movement.   
 The activists of the February 20th movement called for nationwide protests on February 20, 
2011 to speed political change.  They called for a new constitution that would restrict the 
monarchy’s executive powers, the removal of corrupt practices in the Kingdom, and an improved 
infrastructure that would improve the citizenry’s quality of life.  Facing the King’s historic public 
acquiescence of the nation’s citizenry, activists in the movement urged Moroccans to boycott the 
referendum on the new constitution that the King supported.  The February 20th movement 
mobilized members across fifty towns and cities, demonstrating the dispersed nature of public’s 
discontent in the Moroccan Kingdom. 
 Core February 20th activists consider their movement highly successful in instilling the 
spirit of fearlessness and political activism.  One activist referred to the effort as the “mother of 
all movements,” while another equated the February 20th movement with the Egyptian April 6 
protest movement.  The movement created the biggest grass-root mobilization in the history of 
Morocco.  It resulted in the King’s acceptance of a constitutional referendum that led to the 
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official recognition of the Amazigh as one of Morocco’s official languages.  It succeeded in 
uniting people across the religious and political spectrums through its demands for more 
democracy and meaningful citizenship.   
 All of the activists interviewed for this study agreed that the biggest success of the 
February 20th movement was the elevated spirit the movement instilled in the Moroccan public.  
An activist from Casablanca summed up the sentiment of his fellow activists by stating, “By 
classical definition of what a social movement is, it’s dead - but the spirit of the movement is 
strong and alive.”  When asked to explain further, activists described how the February 20th 
movement inspired young people to become politically active, broke down the wall of the 
public’s fear, and built a strong national network of Moroccan activists that remain ready to 
mobilize.  From the activists’ perspective, the February 20th movement set the stage for future 
political activism.  Young organizers had learned the important lessons of organizing, mobilizing 
and, navigating the politics of protests which they could again rely upon in the future.  
 Nonetheless, the February 20th movement failed to realize its main political goals.  
Corruption, repression of political activists, and lack of real political and social reforms still 
continue to plague the country.  The Moroccan economy is still afflicted with high 
unemployment and the gap between rich and poor has not decreased.  The constitutional changes 
in 2011 did not lead to a parliamentary monarchy.  Further, the constitution lacks a coherent plan 
for linguistic integration of Tamazight.  Despite the new constitutional linguistic rights, however, 
questions of integration and implementation continue to undermine the efficacy of the new law.  
The degree to which this change will actually fulfill the demand of the Amazigh activists 
depends largely on implementation of these new reforms.  Internally, the withdrawal of the 
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Islamist party of Al Adl wa Ihsan from the February 20th movement weakened the movement’s 
strength and capacity to mobilize within the streets.  
 Whether the February 20th movement has had or will have any real long-term impact on the 
Moroccan political scene remains unknown.   One thing, however, is for certain:  the King and 
the makhzen now have to answer to an active, energized public sphere which has created a new 
political culture of accountability which has destabilized longstanding balance of power 
relationships in Morocco.  For instance, in August 2013, when Spanish pedophile Daniel Galvan 
was freed in Morocco through a royal pardon, hundreds of outraged activists mobilized quickly 
across different cities pressuring the King to revoke his royal pardon.  In another historic move, 
the King responded to the national outcry and rescinded the royal pardon.  The February 20th 
movement’s capacity to build a network that can be mobilized to the streets in a click of a button 
cannot be underestimated.  The February 20th movement future strength will lay in its ability to 
retain its online and offline members that are readily available to mobilize.  
Insights into the Communication Strategies of the February 20th Movement  
 This study contributes to ongoing debates about the role of social media and the Arab 
Spring by analyzing Morocco’s February 20th movement’s online and offline communication 
strategies.  It examines the historical, sociopolitical, and cultural factors that situated the rise of 
the February 20th movement, the online and offline mediums that activists deployed to reach 
different segments of the Moroccan population, the online and offline communication strategies 
deployed to mobilize the subaltern, and how interactions between the online and offline 
approaches functioned within local contexts.   
 While the overwhelming majority of studies on the Arab Spring and social media have 
focused on particular practices of online or offline media, this study examines the February 20th 
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movement’s broad-based use of media practices.  This study uses a qualitative, multi-method 
approach that includes interviews with senior strategists of the February 20th movement, onsite 
observations of movement events, a rhetorical and cultural analysis of the movement’s use of 
online and offline communications, and a critical analysis of the political, historical, and cultural 
context that spawned the movement.  The study’s examination of the February 20th movement’s 
full media ecology highlights the complex interrelationships, negotiations, and convergences 
among online and offline media.  It looks at the aggregated media environment that activists 
used, and the ways the movement capitalized on various mediums in relation to local contexts.  
Further, the study examines cultural symbols, identity appeals, and ideological frameworks to 
understand the discursive and non-discursive fields of the February 20th movement.  Such an 
approach moves beyond the singular medium bias that characterizes most of social movement 
literature on the Arab Spring and social media.    
 Operating within a context of high illiteracy rates, a highly divided public on national 
reforms, and a diverse conglomerate of linguistic and ideologically based Moroccan subgroups, 
the February 20th movement had to use creative strategies to build a broad-based collective 
inspired by the movement’s goals.  In response, the February 20th movement embraced the 
diversity of its membership, including the most disenfranchised groups in the status quo.  The 
February 20th movement emphasized the agency of those most affected by injustice and 
positioned participants to enact engaged citizenship.  To encourage mobilization and collective 
action, the February 20th movement developed a repertoire of communicative strategies, which 
spoke directly to their varied political, economic, and social target audiences.  The movement’s 
strategies included language choices, reappropriation of national symbols, culturally coded 
slogans, and symbolic rituals.  This intersectional approach enabled the February 20th movement 
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to avoid fragmentation, allowed strong alliances and affinities to build across political and 
religious divides, and championed a discourse of democratization, unity, and social change.  
Further, through the implementation of various cultural and linguistic practices, the movement 
worked to reformulate traditional concepts of nation and state, create a shared history of 
oppression and resistance, empower voices previously unheard in the public sphere, and envision 
a new era of participatory politics.  
 The February 20th movement’s use of Internet platforms was very much connected to the 
everyday realities of Morocco.  The sentiments expressed online were often an extension of the 
offline in an effort to extend the Moroccan public space to broader communities.  The online 
environment created a semi-safe space for dissent, organizing, negotiating, gathering, and 
recruiting.  However, the online platforms alone were insufficient to build a national collective 
representative of the Moroccan public in its entirety.  Marginalized publics in Morocco were 
often unable to participate online because of their high rates of illiteracy and their limited access 
to Internet.  Given local contexts filled with both political apathy and fear of state authorities, the 
activists had to develop communication approaches that utilized various combinations of offline 
and online platforms to reach targeted Moroccan subgroups.   
 To constitute an active public, the February 20th movement used cultural production to 
creatively deconstruct Morocco’s hegemonic practices and empower the people towards 
participatory politics.  The activists’ engagement with culture in their political struggle 
showcased a new era of performative dissent on the public stage in Morocco. Through both 
image and sound-based artistic activities, the February 20th movement functioned within the 
Moroccan political and cultural scene. 
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Towards a Holistic Study of Social Movements and Social Media 
This February 20th movement study adds rich and new findings to the debate of the Arab 
Spring and social media.  It shifts the focus of the Arab Spring communication studies to a 
movement that did not call for regime change to demonstrate how a combination of direct and 
indirect communication strategies become necessary to dislodge authoritarian powers in 
monarchical public spheres.  It demonstrates how and why the online and offline media strategies 
had to converge, interact, and prevail in a variety of ways to reach specific groups of citizens 
from various socioeconomic and political backgrounds.  It documents how the movement 
strategically targeted the subaltern populations by emphasizing offline activities and aesthetic 
practices to frame participatory politics from below.  Lastly, it expands on previous studies of the 
February 20th movement by examining how the social activists’ use of multimodal 
communication approaches helped challenge the hegemonic system without dissolving the 
society into sectarianism and social anarchy.   
The study stresses the need for theories of social movements and social media to take into 
account two key factors:  the localized sociopolitical, cultural, and historical contexts of the 
movement, and an expanded definition of social media that includes both online and offline 
media platforms.  Situating social movements within their social, cultural, and historical contexts 
fosters needed understandings about how social movements are implicated in broader social 
networks and webs of power.  Such a process enables an awareness of how those contexts 
influence both the inner dynamics of a social movement that, in turn, helps explain the 
messaging strategies the activists deem appropriate for use.  Understanding the historical, 
political, and cultural environment is also crucial to any evaluation of how and why the 
movement is responding.  Social movement theorists should not discuss media ecology without 
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reference to the various contexts that either enabled or limited it use.  
 Expanding the definition of social media to include traditional and nontraditional forms 
of offline communication strategies is also a critical step for scholars interested in studying social 
movements and social media.  The approach used here highlights the interrelations between old 
and new technologies.  It enables an examination of how and why the online and offline media 
strategies converged, interacted, or prevailed within various socioeconomic and political 
contexts.  Finally, by not privileging the online platform, the more expansive method helps avoid 
drawing too narrow, or even mistaken, conclusions about the full terrain of communication 
strategies that activists employed. 
Including aesthetic forms of media practices used to encourage participation and 
inclusion of various targeted audiences is also an important element in more holistic 
understanding of the social movement’s ecology.  Here, nontraditional forms of communication, 
such as music, storytelling, slogans, street theater, and film were prevalent.  By not reducing 
aesthetic forms of media practices to only alternative media or radical media, a more holistic 
approach examines how the movement produces, actualizes, performs and transforms social 
practices and geographical places through aesthetic forms of media practice.  By discussing a 
fuller range of media channels that a movement utilizes, the broader approach allows for a 
greater understanding of the dialectical relationship between online and offline media, and how 
those interactions function and compete within the local contexts. 
Taken together, a broader focus on context and various forms of social media reveals that 
social movement scholars who fail to adopt the more holistic approach will risk misleading or 
overgeneralizing their conclusion about how communication operates within the national social 
movements.  As discussed below, this study of the February 20th movement demonstrates that the 
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geographical, demographical, ideological, and cultural contexts of targeted subpopulations 
influenced how the social movement’s senior strategists targeted their use of social media.  
Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of Government Structures  
 As new social movement theory has recognized, theoretical understandings of social 
movements should carefully take into account cultural, political, and historical contexts.  Such 
approaches privilege local knowledge and equip scholars to look at the varied modalities of 
resistance that provide an alternative to the hegemonic political nature of knowledge formation 
and production.  This study adds to those earlier perspectives by indicating that social movement 
theorists of the Arab Spring should also utilize culturally specific understandings of 
governmental structures that operate in response to the movements.  Social movements located 
within monarchical governing structures, for example, are dissimilar to their Arab Spring non-
monarchical counterparts in many ways.  Because of the ritualized and, at times, sacred 
monarchical public sphere, engrained norms function as a unique rhetorical exigency.  In such 
circumstances movements face public backlash against their causes if they fail to display a 
cultural recognition of and sensitivity to the sacred traditions.  Disaggregation of state actors thus 
becomes a key factor that social movement analysts should recognize as a necessary lens for 
examining the message strategies in such monarchical contexts.  
 The sociopolitical challenges facing the February 20th movement’s mobilization efforts, for 
example, were complex.  The movement operated within a highly ritualized public sphere where 
the monarchy had historical and religious legitimacy among the people.  As such, the February 
20th movement had to develop appropriate response strategies to the King who held sacred status, 
the makhzan who was corrupt and used fear tactics to disperse the movement’s followers, and the 
unresponsive, state-censored media.  In an attempt to distinguish amongst the different political 
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actors, the February 20th movement deployed a combination of direct and indirect 
communication strategies to dislodge authoritarian constrains while still acknowledging 
monarchical authority.  Moroccan activists generally avoided the use of direct criticisms of the 
King, choosing  instead to emphasize the needs of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation.’  More subtle, 
indirect attacks on the King, however, did occur, including the use of cultural codes, 
reappropriated national symbols, and the use of particular languages important to repressed 
groups.  By sharp contrast to the movement’s approach to the King, the movement directly 
attacked the makhzen and the state media.  The movement’s website and slogans explicitly 
named these two groups and highlighted the damage they caused the Moroccan citizenry, as 
perhaps most evident in the movement’s highly circulated slogan “down with the makhzen.” 
 Recognizing the complexity of this context, the February 20th movement grounded its 
appeals for a new collective identity in national appeals.  Such an approach gave the February 
20th movement more flexibility to maneuver within a political landscape filled with great risks.  
The February 20th movement’s approach raised the collective consciousness by highlighting 
shared grievances of the Moroccan citizenry, without explicit public challenges to the King.  
Furthermore, the movement’s focus on one national collective insulated the activists from state 
allegations that they were traitors or that they were working for the Polisario. Within such a 
framing, the Moroccan security system faced greater difficulty in efforts to accuse the movement 
of being anti-Moroccan.  
From a practical perspective, particular attention to the creation and continuation of 
national identify frames become an imperative, especially in the context of post Arab Spring.  
With the threat of sectarianism sweeping the larger MENA region, national identity and 
citizenship frames can strengthen social cohesion and prevent state collapse. The February 20th 
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movement serves as a model of how movements can develop a nuanced set of strategies 
designed to avoid inciting division and violence within its own competing target audiences.  
Such approaches mark a positive move towards a political model in which there is a space for the 
existence of multiple political discourses and coexistence of different social groups. 
Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of Online and Offline 
 This study of the February 20th movement in Morocco reveals that studies of social 
movements need to simultaneously explore virtual, electronic, and physical spaces to more fully 
understand the communicative context of mobilization.  Moving beyond the insights available 
from examinations of ICTs and traditional media, analysis of a social movement’s use of 
aesthetic practices (e.g., staged action in public spaces, film, music, clothing, rallies, and 
alternative media forums) contributes to the unmasking of how culture, politics, and media 
intertwine and function.  Such an expanded model moves away from technological determinism 
and places emphasis on individual agency, as participants choose not only if they will attend to 
or believe a particular message, but how they will (en)act those messages now and into the 
future.  Further, it avoids overlooking key insights available from both embodied performances 
in physical space and disembodied involvement behind computer and phone screens.  Attention 
to a social movement’s full range of media practices better equips scholars to analyze each 
medium’s opportunities and constraints for building collective identity. 
 Further, a model that expands social media to online and offline practices provides 
opportunities for examining the complementary relationships of the varied media practices and 
how different media function, negotiate, and circulate.  Social movements do not rely on a single, 
homogenous online and offline approach to reach their multiple target audiences.  The 
complementary functions of online and offline media practices are heavily dependent on the 
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local contexts, and, in turn, those same regional and cultural contexts influence the types of 
communication strategies activists will deploy.  Demographic breakdowns, ideological makeups, 
audience access, resource availability, and security levels all contribute to the movement’s choice 
of medium and messaging strategy.  Accordingly, a movement’s media practices may differ 
substantially from one area to the next within the same political borders.  
 For example, the study found that in Morocco the online social platforms alone were 
insufficient to build a national collective representative of the Moroccan public in its entirety.  
The online marginalized subaltern publics were often unable to participate because of high rates 
of illiteracy and limited access to organized movement activities.  Additionally, while the online 
environment helped set the agenda for political discussion, it was also unable, on its own, to 
mobilize the Moroccan people to come to the streets.  Operating within a local context steeped in 
political apathy and fear, the online simply could not substitute for traditional offline 
communication.   
 Further, the study found that the northern and southern cities were different in their usage 
of Internet technologies and offline communication strategies.  For instance, the northern city of 
Rabat substantially relied on Internet technologies, as activists there were mainly youth.  Video 
technology was particularly a focus for activists in Rabat.  On the other hand, the southern cities 
of Casablanca and Tangier relied more on a combination of offline and online platforms.  As both 
of these cities contain large shantytowns on their outskirts where poverty is most visible, the 
movement had to incorporate more offline activities.  The heavier reliance on the offline also 
emerged in these southern cities because a large segment of activists from Casablanca and 
Tangier came from marginal neighborhoods and identified with the subaltern. 
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 The February 20th movement communication strategies clearly demonstrate that the 
movement did not rely on a single, homogenous online and offline approach to reach the 
Moroccan people.  Regional differences and cultural contexts influenced the types of 
communication strategies the activists deployed.  Viewed from a holistic perspective, however, 
the movement used the online environment for communication between core activists and to 
strengthen those networks throughout the country, while the offline communication strategies 
were key to building trust and collective identification with various segments of the population, 
such as the subaltern. 
Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of Target Audiences 
 This study of the February 20th movement also reveals that studies of the Arab Spring 
should not presuppose a homogenous populace as the target population for the movements.  
Cultures are polyvocal, multilayered, fractured, and decentered.  In particular, studies of social 
media and the Arab Spring should not ignore the political reality of poor urban and rural 
populations, as democracy frequently cannot take root without the participation of these groups.  
By focusing on dominant audiences in high profile national and transnational events, scholars 
can misrepresent or ignore non-dominant public(s) or the subaltern class altogether.  By taking a 
broader look at how communication strategies target particular audiences, communication 
scholars can more adequately address the cultural impact of changing media environment on the 
different, and often disparate, publics.  
 This study demonstrates the need for more attention to how activists use different forms of 
media to mobilize and empower the subaltern publics.  While certain communication approaches 
seem more beneficial for reaching such groups as opposed to their young, wired, urban 
counterparts, subaltern publics are not homogenous.   At times, the distinction between activists 
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and the subaltern publics become blurred.  Further, different sets of subaltern publics have 
different set of challenges and media preferences.  Activists, therefore, have to both understand 
the nature of the subaltern population they are targeting and modify their communication 
strategies to reach the particular audience.  To better understand the various communicative 
strategies social movements deploy to mobilize subaltern publics, the study of social movements 
should move beyond medium-centered approaches to more context-centered approaches.   
 For instance, the unique political contexts of the various cities in Morocco played a major 
role in the movement’s targeted choices of communication platforms.  The biggest difference 
between the three cities was the ratio of Islamists to leftist activists.  In Casablanca, Islamists and 
leftists were almost divided equally.  In Rabat, the percentage of Islamist participants was 
minimal, while in Tangier, the Adl wa Ihsan outnumbered the leftists to a large degree.  Many of 
the Adl wa Ihsan members from Tangier and Casablanca came from poor neighborhoods.  As 
such, activists in those cities were able to mobilize a large segment of the subaltern publics and 
had greater success with their message.  In Casablanca, hip-hop artist and activist Al Haqed, in 
particular, played a key role in mobilizing the people from marginal neighborhoods. Seen as one 
of them, the hip-hop artists spoke in the vernacular language and discussed issues that were 
pertinent to the marginalized publics.   
 Not surprisingly, Casablanca and Tangier differed from Rabat in their approach to 
mobilizing the subaltern neighborhoods. The movement’s decision to relocate the protest rallies 
from downtown to marginalized neighborhoods was problematic in Rabat, as the activists were 
not as well connected to the subaltern publics as the activists from Casablanca and Tangier.  In 
Casablanca and Tangier, the subaltern publics played major roles in the protests and mobilization 
of the movement. The national media’s lack of attention to the subaltern made them less visible 
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to the public.  As a result, the makhzen tactics differed substantially when the protests occurred 
in these neighborhoods rather than at downtown locales.   
 Due to the demographic and cultural contexts of the cities, the February 20th movement 
used aesthetic practices, such as body performances and street theater, more frequently in Rabat 
and Casablanca then in Tangier.  On the whole, northern Morocco is much more conservative 
than the southern portions of the country.  As such, nontraditional forms of art, such as 
performances emphasizing the body and western appropriated art, were less likely to prompt 
identification with the movement.  Even within the offline platforms, cultural considerations 
influenced the movement’s selections of how to deliver its messages to target audiences.  
 As illustrated, this study establishes that activists in social movements use localized tactical 
strategies to mobilize the subaltern publics.  Activists privilege offline media communication 
practices to encourage participatory politics and build trust between the social movement and the 
subaltern publics.  Their specific strategies include face-to face communications, multilingual 
messaging, cultural codes and vernaculars, simplified language, embodied performativity, 
neighborhood gatherings, onsite protest rallies, and visual and sound-based communication.  In 
addition, activists rely on charismatic artists from the subaltern neighborhoods to deliver 
trustworthy messages while simultaneously building identification with the movement.  They 
also establish subaltern neighborhood committees and utilize family and friend networks to 
widen the base of subaltern supporters.  Using a language of inclusivity, these complementary 
strategies help build trust and identification with the movement.  However, the types of offline 
social media practices can from one geographical area to the next.  A systematic tracking of all a 
social movement’s offline social media practices would equip scholars to better comprehend the 
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social movement’s approach and the reasons behind the activists’ selection of particular offline 
communication practices. 
Limitations and Areas for Future Study 
 One fruitful area of needed future study would be an examination of the specific 
mobilization strategies of the February 20th movement in small towns and rural areas.  This study 
limited its focus to activists located in three cities: Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca.  While these 
cities represented the largest number of people that mobilized and went to the streets, a 
comparative analysis of the mobilization strategies presented here with those deployed in 
Morocco’s small towns and rural areas could yield further insights into how the socio-political 
context influenced the movement’s communication approaches.  This study, for example, found 
that cities with large concentrations of youth and limited conservative populations relied more 
heavily on aesthetic practices to mobilize their publics.  Did the movement utilize a similar 
approach in small towns and rural areas, especially in the regions that had more turbulent past 
interactions with the state?  
 A second avenue for future research would be to focus on female activists in the February 
20th movement.  This study limited its interviews to those who responded to calls from a 
Moroccan journalism who offered activists the opportunity to participate.  Perhaps as a result, 
only 6 of the 24 interviewees were female.  Gender issues emerged as a common subject in both 
the movement’s national and local meetings.  They also served as a point of contention between 
the Islamists and the leftist members of the February 20th movement.  As the perspective of 
female activists could differ substantially from that of their male counterparts in the movement, 
more focus on female senior strategists appears warranted.    
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 A third avenue for productive future research would be a comparative study of the 
February 20th movement with other movements in the MENA region that called for reform 
within the existing political institutions.  Did the activists employ similar reformist strategies?  
Are monarchies that operate within a tribal culture different from non-tribal monarchies?  For 
instance, did the social movements calling for political reform in the Gulf region have a different 
set of challenges influencing their activists’ choice of communications strategies?  Did the 
activists differentiate between the political system and the King or did other nuanced cultural 
understandings guide the movement’s strategic thinking?  Such a focus will allow examination of 
the various forms of communication available for enabling progressive change.  
 Lastly, an audience study of the February 20th movement would illuminate whether the 
strategic communication approach of the activists impacted the various subgroups in the ways 
the activists intended.  Particularly useful would be an audience study in the subaltern 
neighborhoods of Casablanca and Tangier.  These subaltern neighborhoods were the most active 
in the February 20th movement, despite the fact that the people faced the most risk. What made 
the subaltern public neighborhood join the movement?  How and why did these communities 
identify with the movement’s cause?  What changes did these populations hope to achieve?  
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APPENDIX A 
Interviewee Description  
Interview Number 
City 
(indicate if they participate in other 
cities) 
Gender 
1 Casablanca (participated in Tangier, 
Rabat, and Casablanca protests) 
Female 
2 Tangier Female 
3 Rabat Male 
4 Rabat Male 
5 Rabat Male 
6 Rabat Male 
7 Casablanca Male 
8 Casablanca Male 
9 Casablanca Male 
10 Rabat and US Male 
11 Rabat Male 
12 Rabat 
(Participated in Casablanca protests as 
well) 
Male 
13 Casablanca 
(Participated in Rabat protests as well) 
Male  
14 Casablanca Male 
15 Casablanca Male 
16 Casablanca Female 
17 Casablanca Male 
18 Casablanca Female 
19 Tangier Female 
20 Tangier Female 
21 Tangier Male 
22 Casablanca Male 
23 Casablanca Male 
24 Casablanca 
(participated in Rabat) 
Male 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Questions and IRB Protocol 
1. What is your profession?  How old are you? What was your last grade in school? 
2. What changes does the movement want to see in Morocco?  
3. Do you consider the February 20th movement a success? Why or why not? 
4. Do you think there were any key figures or leaders of the movement? If so, who? 
5. What were the biggest challenges the movement faced? 
6. What channels did the movement use to get its message out to the poor and marginalized 
citizens? Rank order the following: February 20th website: mamfakinch.com, other online 
platforms (please specify which ones), satellite television, national television, newspapers 
(please specify which ones), music tapes/cds (please specify which ones), 
brochures/pamphlets, graffiti art (please specify which ones), face to face communication. 
7. What channels did the movement use to get its message out to the rural citizens? Rank order 
the following: February 20th website: mamfakinch.com, other online platforms (please 
specify which ones), satellite television, national television, newspapers (please specify 
which ones), music tapes/cds (please specify which ones), brochures/pamphlets, graffiti art 
(please specify which ones), face to face communication. 
8. What online communication strategies did the movement use to reach marginal and poor 
areas? Can you provide examples? 
9. What offline communication strategies did the movement use to reach marginal and poor 
areas? Can you provide examples? 
10.  What online communication strategies did the movement use to reach rural areas? Can you 
provide examples? 
  
208
11. What offline communication strategies did the movement use to reach rural areas? Can you 
provide examples? 
12. How did the movement choose the actors for the videos?  How did it determine what 
languages to use to convey the video messages?  What factors went into the movement’s 
decision to use certain images in its videos?  
13. How did the movement attempt to identify with the diverse segments of the Moroccan 
population?  
14. How did the movement elicit public sympathy for its cause? 
 
15. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
 
IRB Protocol and Safety of Participants 
During this entire project, the safety of participants was of utmost importance, given the 
security situation on the ground in Morocco. This study took many steps to assure the safety of 
the participants, including, but not limited to, providing each interviewee a consent form, 
encryption of the interview responses, removal of identifying information on all participants, and 
only allowed individuals to participate after they made first contact with the interviewer. 
Upon further reflection, however, more protection of human subjects was needed. By 
using the certified translation with the interviewees prior to the approval of the IRB board the 
researcher did not fall within the parameters of her approved protocol. Further, during the 
fieldwork component of the study the research carried a higher risk to those involved than 
reported to the IRB. Finally, the researcher did not upload the certified translation consent form 
in French and Arabic for more than a year. 
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By delaying the upload of the certified translated copies of the approved English consent 
forms for the IRB approval according to the timeline of this study’s protocol, Arabic or French 
interviewees could have potentially given their informed consent based on mistranslated 
information. Fortunately, after the delayed submission of the translations to the IRB, reviewers 
found: “the two translated consent forms appear to match the approved English consent forms.” 
Had the translations not been as carefully constructed, the interviewees would have experienced 
increased risk.  By failing to communicate all of the risks on the ground in a timely manner to the 
IRB, potential additional needed precautions were not taken.   
To avoid such risks in the future, the researcher will upload all necessary and agreed upon 
amendments before any research or new procedures take place, so that appropriate review can 
occur.  Further, the researcher will not conduct any research or use any documents that have not 
been approved (in advance) by the IRB. In addition, if conditions on the ground in the fieldwork 
change, the researcher will notify the IRB in a timely fashion so that any needed protocol 
adjustments can occur.  
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APPENDIX C 
Informed Consent 
Georgia State University 
Department of Communication Studies 
Informed Consent 
  
Project Title:  Media Usage and the Arab Spring: Activists and the Subaltern Publics 
Researcher:  Houda Abadi  
Principle Investigator: Dr. Carol Winkler 
Student Investigator: Houda Abadi  
 
         
Purpose: 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to examine 
the communication strategies used in the February 20th movement. First, it will examine the 
movement’s communication strategies. Second, it will examine how the Moroccan public 
responded. You are invited to participate because you currently identify yourself as a Moroccan 
or because you are a current or former in the movement. Participation will require 2-3 hours of 
your time in one day. The approximate number of Moroccans to be enrolled in the study is 
twenty-five. 
Procedures: 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to answer some questions.  The interview will take 
between two and three hours in one session. You will be audiotaped. The interview will take 
place in a public coffee place. You are encouraged to add any additional information.  It will be a 
one on one interview. It will take place only once. 
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Risks: 
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.  It is 
unlikely that the interview will cause you any discomfort. However, you may leave the interview 
at any time. You do not need to explain. 
Benefits: 
Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. You will have the opportunity to 
archive your experiences with the movement as part of this study of Moroccan history. We hope 
to gain a better understanding of new media’s role within a North African and Middle Eastern 
social movement. 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: 
Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. Being in the study is 
your choice. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop at 
any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. You may ask me to rewind 
the tape and record over any information you would like.  
Confidentiality: 
We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Houda Abadi and Carol Winkler 
will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who 
make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human 
Research Protection). We will assign your tape a study number and the role you played in the 
February movement.  Your name will not appear on any of the study's records.  The information 
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you provide will be digitally copied. It will be stored in a firewall password protected laptop in 
Morocco. It will be deleted from the digital audio-recorder after it has been uploaded. We will 
transfer all data to a USB for transcription in a locked office in Atlanta, Georgia 
Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or 
publish its results.  The findings will be summarized and reported in a group form.  You will not 
be identified personally unless you request your identity to be public in the interview. 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this study, you may contact the student 
investigator Houda Abadi at 908-420-3077 / houda.abadi@gmail.com or the principle 
investigator Carol Winkler at 404-413-5105/cwinkler@gsu.edu.  If you have questions or 
concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan Vogtner 
in Georgia States’ Office of Research Integrity.  Her number is 404- 413-3513 or 
svogtner1@gsu.edu . 
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep. 
Please indicate if you consent to participate in today's interview and be audio recorded. 
Thank you.  
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APPENDIX D 
Glossary of Arabic Terms 
Adala wa Tanmiya:  A Moroccan Islamist organization that has parliamentary representation and 
works within the existing political institutions, also known as “Justice and Development Party” 
(PJD).  The organization is led by Abelilah Benkiran.  In 2011, Benkiran became the new Prime 
Minister of Morocco, marking the first led Islamist government elected to parliament.  Benkiran 
is outspoken that Islam must be the source of law and inspiration in Morocco.    
Adl wa Ihsan:  A Moroccan Islamist organization that was founded by Shiekh Abdsalem Yassine.  
It is a banned but popular Islamist movement, also referred to in English as “Justice and 
Spirituality”. Unlike Adala wa Tanmiya, Adl wa Ihsan refuses to participate in the political 
system. 
Amazigh:  The indigenous population of Morocco (also known as Berbers).  Given that the term 
“Berber” is derived from the Spanish word “barbaric” and has a negative connotation, this study 
will use Amazigh to refer to Morocco’s indigenous population.  
Amir Mu’minin:  Commander of the faithful. A title that the King of Morocco holds to mark his 
role as spiritual leader of the Moroccan people. 
Baltagiya:  Slang term used for thugs or outlaws. Also known as Chmakriya. 
Baraka:  An Arabic word that means blessing. 
Bay’aa:  Annual rite where members of the royal family, Islamic scholars, and high-level 
officials from around the country claim respect and allegiance to the King.  
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Darijaa:  The local dialect of Morocco that is derived of Arabic, some “arabatized” French and 
Spanish words. The majority of Moroccans speak Darijaa.  It is the colloquial language of 
Morocco.  
Makhzen: The Moroccan political state apparatus and ruling elite with close ties to the 
monarchy.  The makhzen is made up of a patchwork of clientelist networks, which although 
historically centered on and supportive of the person of the monarch, have their own interests 
(Willis, 1999).  
Moudawana:  Moroccan family law code. It compromises laws that govern women’s 
relationships within the families, children, and husbands. Some of the 2004 Moudawana reforms 
include raising the marriage age from 15 to 18; giving spouses equal rights and responsibilities in 
the family, divorce based on mutual consent, and rescinding the wife’s duty of obedience to her 
husband.  
Rif:  Northern region of Morocco. According to the activists, this region faced the most police 
brutality and state repression.  
Tamazight:  Language spoken by Amazigh. The 2011 constitution recognized Tamazight as an 
official language of Morocco, alongside Arabic.  Despite problems with implementation, a 
majority of activists see this development as a step forward.  
 
